The Echo Foundation

presents

Ideology, Conflict & Hope: The Bosnia Project

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Introduction

With a mission to promote justice and inspire hope through education, service and the development of leadership for a more humane world, The Echo Foundation creates cutting-edge educational programs that develop in young people the moral and intellectual tools necessary to effect positive change in their local and global communities.

Today, as we consider the 20th Anniversary of the Genocide at Srebrenica, and the subsequent Dayton Peace Accords, we focus our 2016-2017 academic programs on Bosnia and Herzegovina. The juxtaposition of the rich culture, beautiful landscape, and welcoming people, to strong nationalism and the needless loss of thousands of lives, adds urgency to the study of this historic land and its challenges and possibilities today.

We offer the enclosed articles, maps, interviews and more as learning materials about the region, the former Yugoslavia and its break-up, the Bosnian War and Genocide at Srebrenica, international intervention, etc. Perhaps if we understand the forces that converged to bring about violence in Bosnia, we may discover universal truths that can be implemented to bring about peace in other conflict regions and topics in the world.

When we consider the Holocaust, Rwanda, and Bosnia, we ask ourselves: What is it about 'The Other' that instills fear and even hatred in us? Why do we knowingly perpetuate intolerance; and what is the price of doing so? Do faith, memory, and experience cultivate in us understanding or hatred, commitment or indifference, or perhaps even, compassion and hope? How do we shape attitudes that lead to a civil society, where the sanctity of every individual is a given?

With the dedicated leadership of Echo Student Interns, the engagement of many additional students, the sage input by academic advisors, and the vital administrative expertise by many devoted professionals, The Echo Foundation is pleased to offer its 2016-17 curriculum, ***Ideology, Conflict & Hope: The Bosnia Project.*** This collective effort does not presume to be the definitive word on Bosnia, not at all; but rather it is a gesture of friendship, a seeking to understand, a recognition of the enormous complexity of the region, and an effort to honor those who lost their lives there.

We share this curriculum with educators and students everywhere in the hope that you will find excitement and fulfillment in the exploration of history, new concepts, remarkable culture and beautiful landscapes. We appreciate you who wish to learn, to infuse teaching with compassion, and strive to cultivate understanding. We thank all teachers for your unwavering devotion to the next generation. To the students: We love you; we believe in you – soon the future will be yours!

Stephanie G. Ansaldo, President
The Echo Foundation

Ideology, Conflict & Hope: The Bosnia Project

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Foreword

With guidance from our academic advisors, we have helped to compile the 2016 Echo curriculum, ***Ideology, Conflict & Hope: The Bosnia Project***, which explores the events and culture that surrounded the breakup of the former Yugoslavia and the Bosnian conflict. By studying the articles and stories of those who lived the conflict itself, we have done our best to understand the hardships they were forced to deal with as well as the ethnic beliefs and traditions that helped define them. With this curriculum, we challenge you to take a step back from the politics of today and to discover what happened through the many different viewpoints.

The six chapters introduce the Bosnian conflict as well as the culture and history of the region. The first chapter provides an overview of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The second chapter is devoted to the history of the region – the foundation of modern Bosnia-Herzegovina. The third chapter is about the three main ethnic groups involved in the conflict and how their differences shaped the tragedy that followed. The fourth chapter explains the events of the Bosnian conflict and how the international community reacted. The fifth chapter describes Bosnian culture – its people, traditions, art, architecture and education. And finally chapter six focuses on the aftermath of the Bosnian War and what lessons we can take away from it. At the end of each of the first six chapters there are study questions to reinforce the themes covered throughout the chapter.

We encourage you to check out the online materials in the Appendix located in Chapter 7 (videos, photo slideshows, interactive maps, etc.), which bring to life the curriculum.

Sincerely,

The Echo Foundation Student Interns,

Drew Weinstock
Rohan Ramani
Priyanka Tejwani

Special Thanks

It is with gratitude that The Echo Foundation acknowledges the steadfast commitment and support by the following professionals for their invaluable contributions to

Ideology, Conflict & Hope: The Bosnia Project.

Dr. John Cox, Assc. Professor, Dept. of Global, International & Area Studies, UNC Charlotte
Heather Fried, Non-profit Management Consultant
Dr. Mirsad Hadzikadic, Executive Director of Data Science Initiative, Director of Complex Systems Institute, UNC Charlotte

Chapter I:
Bosnia and Herzegovina: An Overview

"I don't think Bosnia is ready for reconciliation, but I do think it is ready for truth."

Paddy Ashdown, Former U.N. High Representative, Bosnia-Herzegovina
November 1, 2005

Bosnia and Herzegovina

Country in the Balkans

Bosnia and Herzegovina, a country on the Balkan Peninsula in southeastern Europe, encompasses mountainous terrain, medieval villages and Muslim and Christian landmarks. Its countryside is marked by deep gorges, turquoise rivers and lakes, and the Dinaric Alps' forests and crags. It's a popular destination for outdoor sports such as hiking, mountain biking, white-water rafting and skiing.

[Capital](): [Sarajevo]()
[Dialing code](): +387
[Currency](): Bosnia and Herzegovina convertible mark
[Continent](): [Europe]()
[Population](): 3.829 million (2013) [World Bank]()

Bosnia and Herzegovina Statistics

Compiled by Echo Student Interns using CIA Factbook

Location	Southeastern Europe, bordering the Adriatic Sea and Croatia
Climate	Hot summers and cold winters; areas of high elevation have short, cool summers and long, severe winters; mild, rainy winters along coast
Ethnicities	Bosniak 48.4%, Serb 32.7%, Croat 14.6%, other 4.3%
Languages	Bosnian, Serbian, Croatian
Religions	Muslim 40%, Orthodox 31%, Roman Catholic 15%, other 14%
Life expectancy	76.55 years
National Holiday	National Day (Statehood Day), 25 November (1943)
Constitution	14 December 1995 (constitution included as part of the Dayton Peace Accords); amended several times, last in 2009

Natural Resources	Coal, iron ore, bauxite, copper, lead, zinc, chromite, cobalt, manganese, nickel, clay, gypsum, salt, sand, timber, hydropower
Population	3,867,055 (July 2015 est.)
Independence	1 March 1992 (from Yugoslavia)
National symbols	Golden lily; national colors: blue, yellow, white
Economy	Bosnia has a transitional economy with limited market reforms. The economy relies heavily on the export of metals, energy, textiles and furniture as well as on remittances and foreign aid.
Labor force - by occupation:	Agriculture: 19% Industry: 30% Services: 51% (2013)
Internet Users	Total: 2.6 million Percent of population: 67.5% (2014 est.)
Urbanization	Urban population: 39.8% of total population (2015)

Bosnia-Herzegovina– Timeline

BBC News
March 18, 2015

A CHRONOLOGY OF KEY EVENTS

1908 - Bosnia-Herzegovina annexed to Austria-Hungary.

1914 - A Bosnian Serb student, Gavrilo Princip, assassinates the Austrian Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo. This precipitates World War I.

1918 - Austria-Hungary collapses at the end of the war. Bosnia-Herzegovina becomes part of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes.

1941 - Bosnia-Herzegovina annexed by pro-Hitler Croatian puppet state. Thousands of Serbs, Jews and Gypsies are sent to the death camps.

Bosnia was part of Yugoslavia, which was headed by Marshal Tito (*Source: Getty Images)*.

1945 - Bosnia-Herzegovina liberated following campaign by partisans under Tito.
1945-1991- Bosnia is part of Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

Sarajevo hosted the 1984 Winter Olympics.

1991 - Following collapse of communism, nationalists win first multi-party elections and form coalition government despite having conflicting goals: Muslim nationalists want centralised independent Bosnia, Serb nationalists want to stay in Belgrade-dominated rump Yugoslavia, Croats want to join independent Croatian state.

WAR ON MANY FRONTS

1992 - Croat and Muslim nationalists form tactical alliance and outvote Serbs at independence referendum. Serb nationalists are incensed as constitution stipulates that all major decisions must be reached through consensus.

War breaks out and Serbs quickly assume control of over half the republic. Ethnic cleansing is rampant in the newly proclaimed Serb Republic but also widespread in Muslim and Croat-controlled areas.

The Bosnian Serbs, under Radovan Karadzic, lay siege to Sarajevo. The city is controlled by Muslims but they are unable to break out through lines set up to defend surrounding Serb villages. There is bitter fighting as well as many atrocities.

1993 - As tensions rise, conflict breaks out between Muslims and Croats, culminating in the destruction of much of Mostar [by Croatian forces], including its Old Bridge. The bridge had graced the city since it was built by the Ottomans in the 16th century and was a symbol of Bosnia's cultural diversity.

Sarajevo under siege in 1992 (*Source: The Atlantic)*.

The conflict is extremely complex. Muslims and Serbs form an alliance against Croats in Herzegovina, rival Muslim forces fight each other in north-west Bosnia, Croats and Serbs fight against Muslims in central Bosnia.

UN safe havens for Bosnian Muslim civilians are created, to include Sarajevo, Gorazde and Srebrenica.

1995 - Safe haven of Srebrenica is overrun by Bosnian Serb forces under General Ratko Mladic. Thousands of Bosnian Muslim men and boys are separated from their families and massacred, despite the presence of Dutch UN troops. Nato air strikes against Serb positions help Muslim and Croat forces make big territorial gains, expelling thousands of Serb civilians on the way.

Dayton peace accord signed in Paris. It creates two entities of roughly equal size, one for Bosnian Muslims and Croats, the other for Serbs. An international peacekeeping force is deployed.

AFTER DAYTON

1996 - The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia begins work in the Hague. Drazen Erdemovic, a Croat who fought for the Serbs and took part in the Srebrenica massacres, is the first person to be convicted. He is sentenced to five years in prison.

1997 - International conference in Bonn extends powers of High Representative.

BRIDGE OF HOPE

Mostar's 16th century bridge was damaged in the 1990's war but reopened in 2004.

1998 - Elections see nationalist politicians do well. The first Bosnian Muslims and Croats are convicted of war crimes in the Hague.

2000 - Moderate parties do well in elections in the Muslim-Croat entity but nationalists gain the upper hand in the Serb entity. Results force main Serb nationalist party to form a coalition headed by moderate Prime Minister Mladen Ivanic.

2001 March - The Croat representative in the collective presidency, Ante Jelavic, is dismissed as his party threatens to declare independent Croat republic.

2001 May - Bosnian Serbs in Banja Luka and Trebinje use force to break up ceremonies marking the reconstruction of mosques destroyed during the Bosnian war. Several Muslim refugees are injured, cars are set on fire and international delegates are forced to shelter in local buildings.

KRSTIC SENTENCED

2001 August - Hague war crimes tribunal finds Bosnian Serb Gen Radislav Krstic guilty of genocide for his role in the massacre of thousands of men and boys in Srebrenica. Krstic sentenced to 46 years.

Three senior [Bosniak] generals indicted to face war crimes charges.

2001 December - Amid growing international pressure, the main Bosnian Serb nationalist party, the SDS, votes to expel all war crimes suspects, including wartime leader Radovan Karadzic.

2002 May - UK politician Paddy Ashdown becomes UN High Representative.

2002 October - Nationalists win back power in federation presidential, parliamentary and local elections.

Former Bosnian Serb President Biljana Plavsic changes her plea at the UN tribunal in The Hague to one of guilty of crimes against humanity. The remaining seven charges are dropped. She is subsequently sentenced to 11 years in prison.

2003 January - Three months after elections, parliament approves new government led by Adnan Terzic.

EU officially embarks on its first foreign security operation by taking over policing duties from UN.

2003 March - A mass grave is discovered near Zvornik in eastern Bosnia, close to the Serbian border. More than 600 bodies thought to be those of victims of the 1995 Srebrenica massacre are eventually excavated from the grave.

2003 April - Mirko Sarovic, Serb member of presidency, resigns following report by Western intelligence services on affair involving illegal military exports to Iraq and allegations of spying on international officials.

Paddy Ashdown with Radovan Karadzic in 1992 (*Source: BBC UK).*

High Representative Paddy Ashdown abolishes Supreme Defence Council of Bosnian Serb republic. He also alters constitutions of Bosnian Muslim/Croat federation and Bosnian Serb republic removing all reference to statehood from both.

Borislav Paravac of Serb Democratic Party replaces Sarovic as Serb member of presidency.

2004 July - Celebrations mark the reopening of the rebuilt 16th century bridge at Mostar.

EU PEACEKEEPERS TAKE OVER

2004 December - Nato hands over peacekeeping duties to a European Union-led force, Eufor.

2005 March - High Representative Paddy Ashdown sacks Croat member of presidency Dragan Covic, who faces corruption charges.

2005 May - Ivo Miro Jovic appointed Croat member of presidency.

2005 June - Bosnian unit with members from all three main ethnic groups heads for Iraq to support forces of US-led coalition.

2005 October - Entity and central parliaments back establishment of unified police force.

2005 November - EU foreign ministers give go-ahead for Stabilisation and Association Agreement talks.

2006 January - Christian Schwarz-Schilling takes over from Paddy Ashdown as UN High Representative.

2006 February - International Court of Justice in The Hague begins hearings in genocide case brought by Bosnia-Herzegovina against Serbia and Montenegro.

SREBRENICA TRIAL

Former Bosnian-Serb army general Zdravko Tolimir at International Criminal Tribunal in The Hague (*Source: The Wall Street Journal).*

2006 July - Largest war crimes trial to date over the 1995 Srebrenica massacre opens at the UN tribunal in The Hague.

2006 October - General elections reflect ethnic divisions, with Serb entity voting to maintain split from Muslim-Croat entity. In run-up to vote, Bosnian Serb leadership threatens to seek complete secession in event of moves to end autonomy of Serb entity.

2006 December - Bosnia joins Nato's Partnership for Peace pre-membership programme after the organisation overturns a decision to exclude it because of its failure to catch Radovan Karadzic.

2007 January - Nikola Spiric, a Bosnian Serb, is asked to form a government after party leaders agree on a coalition.

2007 February - The International Court of Justice rules that the 1995 Srebrenica massacre constituted genocide, but clears Serbia of direct responsibility.

2007 May - Zdravko Tolimir, one of the top fugitives sought by the UN war crimes tribunal in The Hague for his alleged role in the Srebrenica massacre, is arrested.

2007 July - Miroslav Lajcak, a Slovak diplomat, takes over as High Representative.

2007 November - Nikola Spiric resigns as prime minister in protest at EU-backed reforms the High Representative wanted to introduce.

2008 June - Former Bosnian Serb police chief Stojan Zupljanin is arrested near Belgrade and transferred to The Hague to stand trial for war crimes.

Bosnia signs Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) with EU.

KARADZIC CAPTURED

2008 July - Celebrations on the streets of Sarajevo at news that former Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic, wanted on war crimes charges, has been arrested in Belgrade after nearly 13 years on the run.

2008 October - Nationalist parties do well among all three ethnic groups in local elections, leaving Bosnian politics divided firmly along ethnic lines.

2009 March - Austrian diplomat Valentin Inzko takes over as High Representative.

2009 May - US Vice-President Joe Biden visits Bosnia and tells local leaders to work together ahead of the expected closure of the Office of the High Representative.

2009 July - Report by High Representative Inzko on progress towards full sovereignty says Bosnian leaders are undermining state institutions despite international condemnation.

CONSTITUTIONAL STALEMATE

2009 October - EU- and US-brokered talks aimed at breaking deadlock on constitutional reform end in failure.

Trial of former Bosnia Serb leader Radovan Karadzic begins at UN tribunal in The Hague. He faces 11 counts of genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and other atrocities.

2010 February - Bosnian Serb Republic passes law making it easier to hold referendums on national issues, in a move seen as a challenge to the international High Representative's authority and potentially paving the way for a referendum on independence.

2010 March - Bosnian wartime leader Ejup Ganic is arrested in London at the request of Serbia, which accuses him of war crimes. A court later blocks a bid to extradite him.

2010 October - Serb nationalist party led by Bosnian Serb Republic premier Milorad Dodik and multi-ethnic party led by Zlatko Lagumdzija emerge as main winners in general election.

RATKO MLADIC ARREST

2011 May - Serbian authorities arrest former Bosnian Serb military chief Ratko Mladic, one of the world's most wanted war crimes suspects.

2011 December - Bosnia's Muslim, Croat and Serb political leaders reach agreement on formation of new central government, bringing to an end 14 months of deadlock since 2010 general election.

2012 January - Parliament elects Croat Vjekoslav Bevanda as prime minister under the December agreement.

2012 May - War crimes trial of Ratko Mladic opens at The Hague. He faces charges including genocide and the massacre of more than 8,000 Muslim men and boys at Srebrenica in 1995.

2012 July - Large crowds attend the mass funeral of some 500 newly-identified victims of the Srebrenica massacre.

Ratko Mladic was on the run for 16 years before his arrest in 2011 (*Source: BBC UK).*

2012 December - Bosnian Serb ex-general Zdravko Tolimir is sentenced to life in prison by Hague UN war crimes tribunal for genocide over the Srebrenica massacre. A close aide to then Bosnian Serb military chief Ratko Mladic, he was arrested in Serbia in 2007 after two years on the run.

OFFICIAL CORRUPTION

2013 April - The president of the Muslim-Croat entity, Zivko Budimir, is arrested on corruption charges. Mr Budimir and four other officials are accused of taking bribes to arrange pardons for convicts. Mr Budimir had refused to step down from office in the wake of a political crisis that blew up in 2012, splitting the ruling coalition.

2013 May - A UN tribunal finds six former Bosnian Croat leaders guilty of war crimes and crimes against humanity during the 1990s Balkan wars. The men are convicted of persecuting and murdering Bosnian Muslims and other non-Croats as part of a plan to create an ethnic Croat state in Bosnia.

2013 September - About 140 miners barricade themselves inside a pit near the northern town of Tuzla for two days in a dispute over pay.

2013 October - A huge mass grave - thought to be even larger than the one discovered near Zvornik in eastern Bosnia in 2003 - is located in the village of Tomasica in north-western Bosnia.

2014 January - Ratko Mladic refuses to testify at the war crimes trial of Radovan Karadzic at The Hague, denouncing the UN tribunal as a "satanic court" and saying that testifying could prejudice his own case.

2014 February - Hundreds of people are injured in protests in Sarajevo and Tuzla over high unemployment, which is perceived as a symptom of official corruption and inertia.

2014 May - The worst flooding in modern times leaves quarter of the population without clean drinking water as half-a-million people are evacuated from their homes.

Defence in trial of former Bosnian Serb army chief Ratko Mladic on genocide and crimes against humanity charges opens in The Hague. He denies the charges.

Denis Zvizdic is the current Prime Minister of Bonsia and Herzegovina (*Source: Sarajevo Times).*

2014 October - Party of Democratic Action emerges as largest party in general election. Proposes Denis Zvizdic as prime minister. He takes office in February.

2015 March - European Union foreign ministers and Bosnia sign Stabilisation and Association Agreement that has been on hold since 2008, raising possibility of Bosnia's joining Union if it carries out key political and economic reforms.

Chapter I: Bosnia and Herzegovina: An Overview Study Questions

Created by Student Interns, The Echo Foundation

1. Describe the terrain of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

2. What countries and body of water border Bosnia and Herzegovina?

3. How do you think Bosnia's geography might have influenced its politics and war?

3. What are the three main ethnic and religious groups? Which group is largest in numbers?

4. How did Bosnia and Herzegovina participate in World War II?

5. What ethnic group gained power in 1992? What did they do with their power?

6. Who is Paddy Ashdown? What did he do in 2003 for ethnic relations in Bosnia and Herzegovina?

7. Why did NATO initially exclude Bosnia and Herzegovina from the Partnership for Peace pre-membership programme?

8. Name some of the individuals involved in the Bosnian war who were later arrested and brought to trial.

9. Who is Denis Zvizdic? When did he become relevant?

Chapter II: History



I never wanted an independent Bosnia. I wanted Yugoslavia. That is my country.

Emir Kusturica, Serbian Filmmaker
October 25, 1992

Byzantine Empire

From The History Channel
2010

INTRODUCTION

The origins of the great civilization known as the Byzantine Empire can be traced to 330 A.D., when the Roman emperor Constantine I dedicated a "new Rome" on the site of the ancient Greek colony of Byzantium. Though the western half of the Roman Empire crumbled and fell in 476, the eastern half survived for 1,000 more years, spawning a rich tradition of art, literature and learning and serving as a military buffer between the states of Europe and the threat of invasion from Asia. The Byzantine Empire finally fell in 1453, after an Ottoman army stormed Constantinople during the reign of Constantine XI.

A NEW ROME

The term "Byzantine" derives from Byzantium, an ancient Greek colony founded by a man named Byzas. Located on the European side of the Bosporus (the strait linking the Black Sea to the Mediterranean), the site of Byzantium was ideally located to serve as a transit and trade point between Europe and Asia Minor. In 330 A.D., Roman Emperor Constantine I chose Byzantium as the site of a new Roman capital, Constantinople. Five years earlier, at the Council of Nicaea, Constantine had established Christianity (once an obscure Jewish sect) as Rome's official religion. The citizens of Constantinople and the rest of the Eastern Roman Empire identified strongly as Romans and Christians, though many of them spoke Greek and not Latin.

DID YOU KNOW?

One of the most extraordinary aspects of the Byzantine Empire was its longevity: It was the only organized state west of China to survive without interruption from ancient times until the beginning of the modern age.

Though Constantine ruled over a unified Roman Empire, this unity proved illusory after his death in 337. In 364, Emperor Valentinian I again divided the empire into western and eastern sections, putting himself in power in the west and his brother Valens in the east. The fate of the two regions diverged greatly over the next several centuries. In the west, constant attacks from German invaders such as the Visigoths broke the struggling empire down piece by piece until Italy was the only territory left under Roman control. In 476, the barbarian Odoacer overthrew the last Roman emperor, Romulus Augustus, and Rome had fallen.

SURVIVAL OF THE BYZANTINE EMPIRE

The eastern half of the Roman Empire proved less vulnerable to external attack, thanks in part to its geographic location. With Constantinople located on a strait, it was extremely difficult to breach the capital's defenses; in addition, the eastern empire had a much shorter common frontier with Europe. It also benefited greatly from a stronger administrative center and internal political stability, as well as great wealth compared with other states of the early medieval period. The eastern emperors were able to exert more control over the empire's economic resources and more effectively muster sufficient manpower to combat invasion. As a result of these advantages, the Eastern Roman Empire–variously known as the Byzantine Empire or Byzantium–was able to survive for centuries after the fall of Rome.

Though Byzantium was ruled by Roman law and Roman political institutions, and its official language was Latin, Greek was also widely spoken, and students received education in Greek history, literature and culture. In terms of religion, the Council of Chalcedon in 451 officially established the division of the Christian world into five patriarchates, each ruled by a patriarch: Rome (where the patriarch would later call himself pope), Constantinople, Alexandria, Antioch and Jerusalem. The Byzantine emperor was the patriarch of Constantinople, and the head of both church and state. (After the Islamic empire absorbed Alexandria, Antioch and Jerusalem in the seventh century, the Byzantine emperor would become the spiritual leader of most eastern Christians.)

THE BYZANTINE EMPIRE UNDER JUSTINIAN



Justinian I, 6th century A.D. *(Source: Wikipedia).*

Justinian I, who took power in 527 and would rule until his death in 565, was the first great ruler of the Byzantine Empire. During the years of his reign, the empire included most of the land surrounding the Mediterranean Sea, as Justinian's armies conquered part of the former Western Roman Empire, including North Africa. Many great monuments of the empire would be built under Justinian, including the domed Church of Holy Wisdom, or Hagia Sophia (532-37 A.D.). Justinian also reformed and codified Roman law, establishing a Byzantine legal code that would endure for centuries and help shape the modern concept of the state.

At the time of Justinian's death, the Byzantine Empire reigned supreme as the largest and most powerful state in Europe. Debts incurred through

war had left the empire in dire financial straits, however, and his successors were forced to heavily tax Byzantine citizens in order to keep the empire afloat. In addition, the imperial army was stretched too thin, and would struggle in vain to maintain the territory conquered during Justinian's rule. During the seventh and eighth centuries, attacks by Persians and Slavs, combined with internal political instability and economic regression, threatened the empire. A new, even more serious threat arose in the form of Islam, founded by the prophet Muhammad, [whose flight from] Mecca [to Medina] in 622 [is considered the beginning of organized Islam]. In 634, Muslim armies began their assault on the Byzantine Empire by storming into Syria. By the end of the century, Byzantium would lose Syria, the Holy Land, Egypt and North Africa (among other territories) to Islamic forces.

FROM ICONOCLASM TO MONASTICISM

During the eighth and early ninth centuries, Byzantine emperors (beginning with Leo III in 730) spearheaded a movement that denied the holiness of icons, or religious images, and prohibited their worship or veneration. Known as Iconoclasm–literally "the smashing of images"–the movement waxed and waned under various rulers, but did not end definitively until 843, when a Church council under Emperor Michael III ruled in favor of the display of religious images.

During the late 10th and early 11th centuries, under the rule of the Macedonian dynasty founded by Michael III's successor, Basil, the Byzantine Empire enjoyed a golden age. Though it stretched over less territory, Byzantium had more control over trade, more wealth and more international prestige than under Justinian. The strong imperial government patronized the arts, restored churches, palaces and other cultural institutions and promoted the study of ancient Greek history and literature. Greek became the official language of the state, and a flourishing culture of monasticism centered on Mount Athos in northeastern Greece. Monks administered many institutions (orphanages, schools, hospitals) in everyday life, and Byzantine missionaries won many converts to Christianity among the Slavic peoples of the central and eastern Balkans (including Bulgaria and Serbia) and Russia.

BYZANTIUM AND THE CRUSADES

The end of the 11th century saw the beginning of the Crusades, the series of holy wars waged by Western Christians against Muslims in the Near East from 1095 to 1291. With the Seijuk Turks of central Asia bearing down on Constantinople,

Painting of the Crusades *(Source: Crisis Magazine)*

Emperor Alexius I turned to the West for help, resulting in the declaration of "holy war" by Pope Urban II at Clermont (France) that began the First Crusade. As armies from France, Germany and Italy poured into Byzantium, Alexius tried to force their leaders to swear an oath of loyalty to him in order to guarantee that land regained from the Turks would be restored to his empire. After Western and Byzantine forces recaptured Nicaea in Asia Minor from the Turks, Alexius and his army retreated, drawing accusations of betrayal from the Crusaders.

During the subsequent Crusades, animosity continued to build between Byzantium and the West, culminating in the conquest and looting of Constantinople during the Fourth Crusade in 1204. The Latin regime established in Constantinople existed on shaky ground due to the open hostility of the city's population and its lack of money. Many refugees from Constantinople fled to Nicaea, site of a Byzantine government-in-exile that would retake the capital and overthrow Latin rule in 1261.

THE FALL OF THE BYZANTINE EMPIRE & ITS LEGACY

During the rule of the Palaiologan emperors, beginning with Michael VIII in 1261, the economy of the once-mighty Byzantine state was crippled, and never regained its former stature. In 1369, Emperor John V unsuccessfully sought financial help from the West to confront the growing Turkish threat, but was arrested as an insolvent debtor in Venice. Four years later, he was forced–like the Serbian princes and the ruler of Bulgaria–to become a vassal of the mighty Turks. As a vassal state, Byzantium paid tribute to the sultan and provided him with military support. Under John's successors, the empire gained sporadic relief from Ottoman oppression, but the rise of Murad II as sultan in 1421 marked the end of the final respite. Murad revoked all privileges given to the Byzantines and laid siege to Constantinople; his successor, Mehmed II, completed this process when he launched the final attack on the city. On May 29, 1453, after an Ottoman army stormed Constantinople, Mehmed triumphantly entered the Hagia Sophia, which would become the city's leading mosque. Emperor Constantine XI died in battle that day, and the decline and fall of the Byzantine Empire was complete.

In the centuries leading up to the final Ottoman conquest in 1453, the culture of the Byzantine Empire–including literature, art and theology–flourished once again, even as the empire itself faltered. Byzantine culture would exert a great influence on the Western intellectual tradition, as scholars of the Italian Renaissance sought help from Byzantine scholars in translating Greek pagan and Christian writings. (This process would continue after 1453, when many of these scholars fled to Italy from Constantinople.) Long after its "end," Byzantine culture and civilization continued to exercise an influence on countries that practiced its Orthodox religion, including Russia, Romania, Bulgaria, Serbia and Greece, among others.

Islam and the Ottoman Empire

By Firas, Lost Islamic History
November 20, 2012

If you read many Western histories of the Ottoman Empire, you may not even learn that the Ottomans were a Muslim empire. They are often seen as a typical European multi-cultural empire whose only purpose in existence was to promote its own interests. The truth is far from this, however. Throughout its history from the 1300s to the early 1900s, the Ottoman Empire was a strongly Muslim state at its core. Islamic law and ideas formed the basis of society, law, and government. Ottoman sultans saw themselves as the protectors of the Muslim world. With this emphasis on Islam, however, protection for other religions in the empire was ensured in ways that would take Christian Europe centuries to match.

THE GHAZIS

At the very beginning, the Ottoman state was nothing more than a small tribal alliance led by a Turkish bey, by the name of Osman. His beylik (small state) in western Anatolia bordered the hostile Byzantine Empire. Osman was known as a *ghazi,* or a soldier of the faith. In the Turkish culture of the time, huge emphasis was placed on being a Muslim soldier defending Muslim lands against Byzantine attacks. The Byzantines had been in a state of war with Muslim empires on and off since the Righteous Caliphate of Abu Bakr, Umar, Uthman, and Ali.

The first Ottoman sultan, Osman, set a precedent of Islam being an integral part of the Ottoman state (*Source: Arcade World History*).

Under Osman, the Turks of Anatolia found a common identity in sticking to Islam in all walks of life, and using their expertise as soldiers in defense of Muslim lands. This emphasis on Muslim identity is seen in Osman's advice to his son:

Son! Be careful about the religious issues before all other duties. The religious precepts build a strong state. Do not give religious duties to careless, faithless and sinful men or to dissipated, indifferent or inexperienced people. And also do not leave the state administrations to such people. Because the one without fear of God the Creator, has no fear of the created…Depend on God's help in the esteem of justice and fairness, to remove the cruelty, attempts in every duty. Protect your public from enemy's invasion and from cruelty.

Clearly, the patron of the Ottoman Empire (Ottoman is a Latin corruption of Osmanli, the Turkish name for their empire) placed great emphasis on Islam as a pillar of his state. All subsequent sultans of the Ottoman Empire were coronated with Osman's sword by a religious scholar. This symbolized the status of the sultans as the defenders of Islam.

LEADERS OF THE MUSLIM WORLD

From their humble beginnings as a small Turkish state in the 1300s, the Ottomans would grow to become the premier Muslim empire throughout the 15th to 19th centuries. In 1517, the Ottoman Empire extended its domain to include the Arabic-speaking regions of North Africa, Egypt, Syria, Iraq, and the Arabian Peninsula. With this, they now controlled the 3 holy sites – Makkah, Madinah, and Jerusalem – and thus bore the responsibility of the protectors of the holy cities.

Makkah in 1910, during the Ottoman reign in the city. The square arcade around the Ka'bah still stands today as the inner-most part of the mosque.

In the holy cities, the Ottomans placed much emphasis on the protection and preservation of Islam's most important places. The oldest parts of the current Masjid al-Haraam in Makkah, the inner arcade of pillars, was built by the Ottomans in the 1500s. In Madinah, the Ottoman Sultan Suleyman greatly decorated the grave of Prophet Muhammad (Peace Be Upon Him), while also protecting the grave from damage with a brass and gold covering that still stands today. In Jerusalem, Sultan Suleyman ordered the rebuilding of the city's walls, which also still stand.

Much of the older part of Masjid al-Nabawi in Madinah, including the house of Muhammad (PBUH) was built or renovated by the Ottomans.

Besides just architectural achievements, the Ottomans were the ensurers of the yearly pilgrimage to Makkah. They organized official processions of pilgrims from Yemen, Central Africa, and Iraq. The main pilgrimage routes however were through Damascus and Cairo. Every year the sultan would appoint a special delegate who would lead the pilgrimage from Damascus. He would take with him vast amounts of gold and silver as a gift to the people of Makkah and Madinah to help support them economically. During the reign of Sultan Abdulhamid II in the late 1800s, a

railway was built from Istanbul to Madinah, to help transport the hundreds of thousands of pilgrims going to the holy cities.

In addition to protecting the holy sites, the Ottomans saw it as their duty to protect Muslims worldwide, whether or not they lived within the borders of the Ottoman Empire. Ottoman naval fleets intermittently aided Muslim rebels fighting persecution in newly Catholic Spain in the 1500s. Also, in 1565, the Ottomans sent their fleet to distant Sumatra (present-day Indonesia) to protect the Sultanate of Aceh from Portuguese attacks. From these examples and others, it is clear the Ottomans were very willing to use their military power to protect Muslims everywhere, regardless of whether they were a prt of the Ottoman Empire or not.

ISLAM AND GOVERNMENT

Unlike the modern secular ideas regarding government separation from religion, the Ottomans felt that Islam should play a vital role in the government. After 1517, the Ottoman sultan was also the caliph or *khalifah* of the Muslim world. The caliph ideally plays a role as a spiritual and political leader of all Muslims worldwide. With the sultan-caliph at the top of the government, a complex religious bureaucracy developed that ran the religious affairs of the empire.

Sultan Suleyman Kanuni personally sorted through the Ottoman Empire's laws with the mufti of Istanbul to make sure they all abided by Islamic guidelines. (*Source: Lost Islamic History)*

According to Islamic law, the most important and basic duty of a Muslim ruler, particularly a caliph, was to maintain Islamic law throughout the empire – the *shari'ah*. Scholars of Islamic law, the '*ulema*, were organized in a heirarchical fashion. At the top were two top Islamic judges that were permanent members of the sultan's group of advisors. Under them were the *qadis*, or judges, of the major cities of the empire, such as Damascus, Cairo and Baghdad. They oversaw all the laws of the Ottoman Empire, and presided over civil and criminal cases in their cities. For example, a *qadi's* job included diving up inheritance after someone's death, finding solutions between two feuding parties, and prosecuting criminals. These *qadis* also oversaw lesser *qadis* that presided in smaller towns throughout the empire.

Before laws could be sent down to individual *qadis* throughout the empire, they had to pass through another Islamic branch of the government. Separate and independent from the sultan was the *mufti* of Istanbul – also known as the *shaykh al-Islam*. *Mufti* is an Arabic word meaning a scholar qualified to interpret religious laws, and *shaykh al-Islam* means "the scholar of Islam". The *shaykh al-Islam* had the right to review any laws the

sultan wanted to implement, and reject the ones that went against the *shari'ah.* In many cases, the sultans would work closely with him to ensure all of the empire's laws conformed with Islam. For example, Sultan Suleyman was nicknamed *Kanuni*, meaning "the law giver" because he personally went through all the empire's laws in the mid-1500s with the *shaykh al-Islam* to ensure none contradicted Islamic laws.

THE MILLET SYSTEM

While analyzing the Ottoman Empire's Islamic character, one must keep in mind that much of the empire's population was not Muslim. Large communities of Orthodox Christians, Jews, and Catholics all lived in the empire. At some times, Muslims even formed a minority of the empire's population. At no time in the empire's history were non-Muslims forced to abide by any Muslim laws. Instead, a system of religious pluralism, known as the millet system, was implemented. In the millet system, each religious group was organized into a millet, or nation.

Each millet was allowed to run by its own rules, elect its own leaders, and enforce their own laws on their people. For example, after the conquest of Constantinople in 1453, Sultan Mehmed II had the Orthodox Christian community of the city elect a new patriarch, who served as their leader. By not enforcing Islamic laws on non-Muslims, the Ottoman Empire ensured social and religious stability and harmony within its borders for much of its history. Contrary to this, throughout the rest of Christian Europe, religious freedom only began to take root in the 1700s and 1800s. Denial of rights and persecution of non-Christians continued, however, as is seen in the Holocaust of the 1940s and the ethnic cleansing of Muslim Bosnians in the 1990s.

CONCLUSIONS

While the successor state of the Ottoman Empire, Turkey, officially employs a policy of state secularism, the history of the Ottoman Empire is intertwined with Islamic history. For centuries, the Ottomans were the protectors of the Islamic faith. They presided over the holy sites of Islam, and made it their mission to protect Muslims from outsiders. Islamic law was the fundamental basis of the empire's law system itself. Along with this emphasis on Islam, non-Muslims never had their rights violated, and in fact found stability and protection in the Ottoman Empire.

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History of the Austrian Empire

By Bamber Gascoigne
From History World

BOSNIA, HERCEGOVINA AND SERBIA: 1875-1878

An insurrection against Turkish rule begins in Hercegovina in 1875, spreads rapidly to neighbouring Bosnia and by the summer of 1876 becomes part of a wider Serbian war against Turkey. The European powers, alarmed as ever by unrest in the Balkans, attempt to mediate but without success. In July 1876 the emperors of the two powers most closely involved in the region, Austria-Hungary and Russia, meet in Reichstadt and come to a secret agreement for a mutual settlement after the war.

Austria is to take control in Bosnia-Hercegovina, while Russia will gain Turkish territory in Bessarabia and Georgia.

The situation subsequently escalates to the point where Russia herself joins in Serbia's war against Turkey from April 1877. The terms of the eventual peace settlement, agreed at an international congress in Berlin in July 1878, include the occupation and administration of Bosnia-Hercegovina by Austria-Hungary.

The region is to remain nominally part of the Ottoman empire. This has advantages from the Austrian point of view. The unruly Slavs of Bosnia-Hercegovina can be kept under control by Austrian troops, but their number will not be added to the Slav population of Austria-Hungary - avoiding any change in an already uneasy pattern of ethnic rivalries.

BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA: 1908-1914

Map of Austrian Empire, 1914 *(Source: Wikipedia).*

The anomalous position of Bosnia-Hercegovina, administered since 1878 by Austria-Hungary but part of the Ottoman empire, is dramatically emphasized after Turkey's revolution of 1908. The Young Turks insist that the region must be represented in the new parliament in Istanbul. Nationalists in Bosnia welcome this demand, seeing the chance of an international forum in which to air their grievances and undermine the grip of Austria-Hungary.

The Austrian response is brisk. Bosnia-Hercegovina is annexed before the end of the year. A separate constitution is provided for the provinces so that they need not be incorporated in either of the two monarchies, Austria or Hungary. This development, intensely unpopular in Bosnia and among Slavs in all parts of Austria-Hungary, turns out to have repercussions very much wider than the local issue.

There is a strong indication of danger when the emperor Francis Joseph makes a state visit to Bosnia in 1910. During it, at the formal opening of the diet, a student makes an assassination attempt on the governor of the province. In spite of this another royal event is planned for 1914. The archduke Francis Ferdinand, heir to the throne of Austria-Hungary, takes part in military manoeuvres in Bosnia in June. Towards the end of the month he visits Sarajevo with his wife.

ASSASSINATION IN SARAJEVO: 1914

Hearing that the Austrian archduke Francis Ferdinand is to visit the Bosnian capital, Sarajevo, some young Serb nationalists lay plans to assassinate him. They have the support of the head of Serbia's military intelligence, who is also the leader of a secret terrorist group known as the Black Hand. He provides them with weapons and spirits them across the border from Serbia into Bosnia.

The day of the archduke's visit, June 28, demonstrates two things - the incompetence of the six conspirators, and the extraordinary incaution of the Austrian authorities. The visit is taking place against the advice of the Serbian foreign ministry, which has urged that Serb nationalism makes Sarajevo too dangerous.

Archduke Ferdinand and his wife in Sarajevo moments before they were assassinated *(Source: The Economist)*.

On the day itself the Austrians prove positively foolhardy. The archduke and his wife are on their way to the town hall when a bomb is thrown at their car. They are unhurt but an officer, wounded by the blast, is taken to the local hospital. After the official visit, the archduke decides to visit the injured man in hospital. As he leaves the town hall, another bomb is thrown at him but fails to explode. In spite of this he and his wife continue through the streets in their car.

The chauffeur, uncertain where the hospital is, takes a wrong turning and reverses. By

sheer chance the car stops beside one of the conspirators, a 19-year old Bosnian Serb student, Gavrilo Princip.

Princip draws a pistol and fires twice at the car. The two shots mortally wound the archduke and his wife. This disaster, depriving the aged Austrian emperor of his heir, is interpreted in Vienna as a conspiracy by the Serbian government. In fact Serbia's rulers are bitterly opposed to the activities of the Black Hand. And the Serbian prime minister, hearing of a possible plot at Sarajevo, has even sent a veiled warning to the Austrian authorities - too veiled and of no avail, as it turns out.

Over the next five weeks this bungled and accidental sequence of events becomes the flashpoint for Europe's most destructive war.

WAR IN THE EAST: 1914

Russia mobilizes rapidly in August 1914, in an attempt to relieve the German pressure on France. As a result early gains are made, with Russian armies advancing into east Prussia and into Galicia (the northeast corner of Austria-Hungary). This move has the desired short-term effect, causing the Germans to withdraw four divisions from Belgium for the eastern front. But events soon suggest that Russia has entered the field unprepared. Disaster strikes before the end of the month.

Several factors contribute. The large Russian army in east Prussia is ill-fed and exhausted. And Russian commanders incautiously send each other uncoded radio messages which are intercepted by the Germans.

The result is that a much smaller German force is able to effect a devastating pincer movement during August 26-28 to encircle the Russians at Tannenberg (the site also of a famous medieval battle). About half the Russian army is destroyed, including the capture of 92,000 men. The Russian general, Aleksandr Vasiliyevich Samsonov, shoots himself.

Russian POW after their defeat at Tanneberg
(Source: General-History.com).

Further south the Russians have slightly more lasting success in their invasion of Austria-Hungary. By the end of 1914 much of Galicia is still in their hands. Further south again,

the Austrians prove ineffective in their attempts to crush their tiny neighbour Serbia (in the regional dispute which sparked the wider conflict).

The local campaign begins in mid-August when an Austrian army invades Serbia, but within a fortnight - and with a loss of some 50,000 men - they are driven back by the Serbs. Another invasion is more successful, three months later, when the Austrians succeed in occupying Belgrade for two weeks (from Nov. 30). But by the end of the year the Serbs have again recovered all their territory.

Although there is more movement on the eastern front, particularly on the open plains between Germany and Russia, the outcome at the end of the first calendar year of the war suggests that here too there will be no easy or quick victory. Both sides begin to look for new allies.

Partisans: War in the Balkans 1941-1945

By Dr. Stephen A. Hart
From BBC
Last updated February 17, 2011

Murder, rape and mass executions were all too common in Yugoslavia during World War Two - carried out by Partisan fighters as well as by Chetnik rebels and German troops. Stephen Hart examines how resistance to Hitler led to terrifying brutality in war-time Yugoslavia.

INVASION

On 6 April 1941 Adolf Hitler gave the order for German forces - backed by Italian, Romanian, Hungarian and Bulgarian Axis allies - to invade Yugoslavia and Greece. He launched the assault in order to secure Germany's Balkan flank for Operation Barbarossa, his planned spring 1941 invasion of the Soviet Union.

The make up of the population of Yugoslavia at the time of World War Two was extremely complex. Broadly speaking, there were two main ethnic groups - the Serbs and the Croats - plus three other smaller ethnic groupings - Albanians, Macedonians, Slovenes. The Serbs predominantly followed the Orthodox Church, although many Bosnians were Muslims ('Bosnians' are the descendants of Serbs who converted to Islam many centuries ago, and lived in Bosnia-Hercegovina). Greater Croatia, in addition to its Christian Croat population, also contained significant Islamic populations, either in parts of Bosnia or Croatia proper. Hitler was able to profit from the tension between these ethnic groups, particularly that between the Serbs and Croats.

Facing attack from three sides, the ethnically-divided Yugoslav Army soon succumbed to the onslaught - indeed, many ethnically Croatian units surrendered immediately to the invading Germans. By 17 April Yugoslavia had capitulated, and in the aftermath of the conflict the Axis victors claimed the spoils of conquest and dismembered the country. Greater Croatia, which included Bosnia-Hercegovina, became an independent pro-Axis state ruled by the anti-Semitic Fascist-nationalist Ustase. Germany also annexed northern Slovenia, occupied Serbia, and left its allies to annex or occupy the remaining parts of Yugoslavia. Axis occupation brought with it real hardship for the inhabitants of these territories, as these areas were ruthlessly exploited for the German war effort.

CHETNIKS



Chetniks: Serb Yugoslav troops who had evaded Axis capture.

In some ways, however, the Axis victory remained a hollow one. For the writ of the Axis powers ran little beyond the towns and main roads. In the remote mountain regions, embryonic resistance forces soon emerged. But before the Germans could crush these nascent movements, their forces were redeployed from Yugoslavia to the east, in preparation for the now-imminent Operation Barbarossa.

Subsequently, those substantial Axis forces that did remain in the conquered Yugoslavia became locked in a protracted and appallingly brutal anti-partisan war, which raged across much of the territory. The resistance groups divided into two main movements - the Chetniks and the Partisans.

The first resistance group to emerge were the Chetniks - in Serbian the word means a detachment of men. These bands were nominally led by a former Yugoslav Army Colonel, named Dragoljub ('Draza') Mihailovic, who served the Yugoslav Royalist government in exile.

The original nucleus of these guerrilla bands were the ethnic Serb Yugoslav troops who had evaded Axis capture during the invasion, and then fled to the hills of Bosnia, Montenegro, and Serbia. Mihailovic established his first stronghold in the mountainous Ravna Gora area of western Serbia.

Soon Chetnik numbers were swelled by Serb peasants who had fled from Greater Croatia - non-Serbs were not allowed to join Chetnik bands. Many of these participants sought simply to defend their local village from the terrible brutalities of the Ustase. The latter were so brutal that they even drew protests from the Germans - not on humanitarian grounds, but because Ustase ethnic cleansing was fuelling the resistance movements.

The Chetniks were never a homogenous ideological movement, and many sub-groups paid no more than lip-service to Mihailovic's leadership. Some groups were implacably anti-German, whereas others saw the emerging rival resistance movement, that of the Partisans, as the greater threat. The elements that did unite the Chetniks, however, were their loyalty to the old Royalist regime, and their desire to ensure the survival of the Serbian population.

These disparate groups strove to protect the Serbs from what seemed to be the genocidal intent of the Croats and Germans, plus the hostility of Muslims (both Croatian and

Serbian) and Communists. To achieve this goal, Chetniks strove to forge an ethnically-pure Greater Serbia by violently 'cleansing' these areas of Croats and Muslims.

On the other hand, Chetniks were often reluctant to attack Axis targets, in case this provoked brutal Axis retaliation against the local Serb population. In addition, Mihailovic wished to conserve his forces for the general uprising that would coincide with the envisaged Allied invasion of Axis-occupied Yugoslavia.

PARTISANS

The Partisans were committed to social revolution.

The rival resistance movement, the Partisans, were led by 'Tito' - real name Josip Broz - who was head of the underground Yugoslav Communist party (KPJ), and received support from Stalin's Soviet Union. Broz was a Croatian-Slovene peasant, who after capture as an Austro-Hungarian soldier by the Russians during the Great War, had become a fanatical Communist.

The Partisans' goal was to create an independent Socialist Yugoslav state by freeing the country from Axis occupation. For Tito, therefore, resistance to the Axis always went hand-in-hand with the fostering of Socialist revolution. To this latter end, the KPJ attempted to appeal to all the various ethnic groups within Yugoslavia, by preserving the rights of each group - including those of both Serb and Croat Muslims. While the ethnic composition of partisan units varied widely over time and between regions, Tito's followers on the whole were Serbs.

Whenever the Partisans established control of an area within occupied Yugoslavia, they forged a disciplined Communist mini-state. Tito's first 'liberated base area', termed the Uzice Republic, was located in western Serbia, just 40km south of the Chetnik stronghold of Ravna Gora.

In these liberated areas the Partisans disseminated propaganda, and established schools, cinemas, newspapers, weapons workshops, and railways. However, as the Partisans were subject to strict Party discipline and did not generally fight to protect a particular village, they had the freedom to abandon a stronghold when faced by overwhelming Axis military operations - a flexibility the Chetniks often did not have.

Partisan strategy often sought to deliberately attack the Axis, so as to provoke appalling reprisals - the Germans usually worked on the basis of 100 executions for every German

soldier killed by the resistance. Tito's coldly-calculated rationale was that the greater the cruelty the Axis inflicted on ordinary Yugoslavs, the greater the numbers that would join the Partisans' crusade to liberate Yugoslavia.

TWO MOVEMENTS IN CONFLICT

Women played a key role in the Partisans' People's Liberation Committees.

Relations between the two movements were uneasy from the start, but from October 1941 they degenerated into full-scale conflict. To the Chetniks, Tito's pan-ethnic policies seemed anti-Serbian, whereas the Chetniks' Royalism was anathema to the Communists. German intelligence, however, failed to identify this rift, and their misperception of deepening Chetnik-Partisan cooperation led to the first significant anti-partisan sweeps. The death of ten German soldiers in the guerrilla attack on Gornij Milanovas led to an orgy of retaliation, during which the Germans executed 2,324 men in the nearby town of Kragujevac. The dead included 144 schoolboys - a tragedy subsequently immortalised in an often quoted poem by Desanka Maksimovic. The atrocity set the tenor for the barbarity that was to follow.

From autumn 1941, after recognising Mihailovic as the official head of the resistance in Yugoslavia, Britain regularly sent Special Operations Executive (SOE) agents to the Chetniks to assist them in their efforts. This move further strained Chetnik-Partisan relations. Then in late 1941, the Germans assaulted both Ravna Gora and Uzice. To avoid the continuance of this onslaught, Mihailovic suggested a truce with the Germans, and offered to fight against the Partisans - his first step on the rocky road to collaboration. This time, the Germans declined.

In the face of the German attacks, Mihailovic's Chetniks either melted away back to their villages or fled with their leader to eastern Bosnia. Here, they became locked in a vicious struggle with Croat Ustase and Bosnian Muslim forces that were wreaking genocidal atrocities against local Serbs.

Chetnik Serb vengeance, in return, was equally brutal. At Foca (also in eastern Bosnia) they systematically raped Muslim women and slit the throats of over 2,000 men. When Tito's Partisans then arrived in Foca, after retreating from Uzice in the face of German attacks, they became locked into what was now a three-sided war.

The fighting between Partisans and Chetniks continued to escalate, and as it developed so did the collaboration of the latter with the Axis forces. Having expanded into Montenegro (located in west-central Yugoslavia, along the northern border of the Italian colony of Albania) during 1942, the Chetniks increasingly cooperated with the occupying Italian forces while attempting to annihilate the Partisans. Consequently, British support for Mihailovic waned.

GAINING GROUND

During 1943, the Partisans gained significant ground by spearheading the fight against Axis occupation, while simultaneously paving the way for Socialist Revolution by crushing the Chetniks. In May, the Partisans evaded a large-scale Axis offensive against them.

Next, in September, Italy surrendered to the western Allies, and while Axis forces immediately occupied the Italian-controlled areas of Yugoslavia, the Partisans captured large amounts of Italian equipment. Even more importantly for Tito, increasing Chetnik collaboration with the Axis powers finally led the British in December to switch their support to the Partisans.

Then, in May 1944, German airborne forces mounted a daring raid that came close to capturing Tito. The leader, however, escaped and subsequently established his headquarters on the Adriatic island of Vis. While he was there the Allies continued to support him militarily, and also worked to reconcile the Communists with the exiled Yugoslav King.

AFTERMATH

The Partisans liberated Belgrade before the Red Army arrived.

Finally, in early October 1944, the Soviet advance against German occupation forces reached the eastern regions of Yugoslavia. This compelled those Germans deployed in the southern Balkans to withdraw north into Serbia and Croatia - to link up with the units defending the Eastern Front. As a result, on the 20th, Partisan forces liberated Belgrade, capital of Yugoslavia, just a few hours before the Red Army arrived.

In the aftermath of the German withdrawal from the southern Balkans, sizable Partisan forces now controlled whole swathes of Yugoslav territory. During the remaining weeks of the war, the Red Army and the Partisans gradually drove the Axis forces north-westwards through Serbia and Croatia until the German surrender of 8 May.

The days that followed the end of the war led to one last round of vengeful blood-letting. Tito's Partisans executed at least 30,000 Croat Ustase troops, plus many civilian refugees. In addition, Tito's secret police - the OZNa - hunted down the Chetnik bands in Serbia, and in 1946 executed Mihailovic as a war criminal. Many Chetniks went into hiding, living a shadow existence constantly on the move between safe houses to avoid arrest.

One Chetnik who survived a Nazi concentration camp only to fall into the hands of the OZNa recalled, 'the Gestapo destroyed the body; OZNa raped the soul.' The violent struggles that occurred in Yugoslavia between 1941 and 1945 resulted in over 1.7 million dead.

Of these, one million were caused by Yugoslav killing Yugoslav, whether it was Croat Ustase against Jews, Muslims, Serbs, Chetniks and Partisans; or Partisans against Chetniks and Ustase; or Chetniks against Ustase, Muslims, and Partisans.

Sadly, too many of the dead met a gruesome end, like the 250 Serbs of the Glina district who, after being locked in a church, were beaten to death by Ustase wielding spiked clubs. Such was the reality of life - and death - in war-torn war-time Yugoslavia.

Axis Invasion of Yugoslavia

By U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum
From Holocaust Encyclopedia
Last updated January 29, 2016

A flag bearing a swastika is raised over the city hall in Sarajevo after German forces captured the city. Sarajevo, Yugoslavia, April 16, 1941.

The Axis powers invaded Yugoslavia on April 6, 1941. The immediate reason for the Axis invasion of Yugoslavia was the Yugoslav government announcement that it would not honor its obligations under an agreement announced on March 25, 1941, by which Yugoslavia joined the Axis and would permit transit through its territory to German troops headed for Greece.

The debate over signing the Tripartite Pact that bound the Axis partners had bitterly divided the Yugoslav federal government; Prince Paul had pushed hard for it and had prevailed. The announcement of the agreement on March 25 was extremely unpopular in many parts of the country, particularly in Serbia and Montenegro. On March 27, Serb military officers overthrew the regency, placed the 17-year-old King Peter on the throne and denounced the previous government's decision to join the Axis. Although the new Prime Minister, Colonel Dusan Simovic, sought within days to retract this statement, Hitler was furious and ordered the invasion of Yugoslavia on the evening of March 27. The Axis invasion, involving German, Italian, Hungarian, and Bulgarian military units, commenced on April 6, 1941. Eleven days later, after the Simovic government and King Peter fled to London via Alexandria, Egypt, Yugoslavia surrendered to the Axis powers.

The Axis powers dismembered Yugoslavia, exploiting ethnic tension to reinforce new territorial boundaries. Germany annexed northern and eastern Slovenia, occupied the Serb Banat, which had a significant ethnic German minority, and established a military occupation administration in Serbia proper, based in Belgrade. Italy annexed southern and eastern Slovenia, occupied the Yugoslav coastline along the Adriatic Sea (including Montenegro) and attached Kosovo-Metohija to Albania, which Italy had annexed in April 1939. Under Pavelic as *Poglavnik* (Leader), the Ustasa proclaimed an “Independent State of Croatia,” sponsored by Germany and Italy, which annexed Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Hungary annexed the Backa and Baranja regions in northeastern Yugoslavia; while Bulgaria occupied Macedonia and the tiny Serb province of Pirot.

Despite the country's claim to be independent, Germany and Italy divided Croatia into zones of influence, in which each stationed troops. Conflicts in the policy and tactics of Germany and its Axis partners impacted directly upon the fate of the Jews living in Yugoslavia.

SERBIA

In April 1941, Germany established a military occupation administration in Serbia, and an indigenous administration and police force nominally supervised by a puppet Serb government under former Yugoslav general Milan Nedic. German military and police authorities interned most Jews and Roma (Gypsies) in detention camps during the summer of 1941—Topovske Supe, Dedinje, Sabac, Nis, and, later, Semlin (Sajmiste), across the border in Croatia. By the end of summer an uprising, based in Serbia and Bosnia and initiated by the Communist-led Partisan Movement and by the Serb nationalist *Cetnik* Movement of Draza Mihailovic, had inflicted serious casualties upon German military and police personnel. Hitler ordered that, for every German death (including those of ethnic Germans in Serbia and the Banat), German authorities were to shoot 100 hostages.

During the late summer and autumn of 1941, German military and police units used this order as a pretext to shoot virtually all male Serb Jews (approximately 8,000 persons), approximately 2,000 actual and perceived communists, Serb nationalists and democratic politicians of the interwar era, and approximately 1,000 male Roma. The German Security Police rounded up Jewish women and children and incarcerated them in the Semlin detention camp in the autumn of 1941. In the winter of 1942, the Reich Central Office for Security sent a gas van—a truck with a hermetically sealed compartment that served as a gas chamber—to Belgrade. Between March and May 1942, German Security Police personnel killed around 6,280 persons, virtually all Jews and mostly women and children from Semlin camp. By the summer of 1942, virtually no Jews remained alive in Serbia, unless they had joined the Partisans or were in hiding.

CROATIA

In the so-called Independent State of Croatia, the Ustasa leadership instituted a reign of chaotic terror so extensive that the policy lost them control of the Croat and Bosnia countryside. As a result, outside the large cities, German or Italian troops essentially administered the “Independent State.” The Ustasa regime murdered or expelled hundreds of thousands of Serbs residing on its territory. In the countryside, Croatian military units and Ustasa militia burned down entire Serbian villages and killed the inhabitants, frequently torturing men and raping women. In all, Croat authorities killed between

320,000 and 340,000 ethnic Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina between 1941 and 1942.

By the end of 1941, Croat authorities had incarcerated about two-thirds of the approximately 32,000 Jews of Croatia in camps throughout the country (Jadovno, Kruscica, Loborgrad, Djakovo, Tenje, Osijek, and Jasenovac. The Ustasa murdered between 12,000 and 20,000 Jews in the Jasenovac system of camps, located roughly 60 miles from the Croat capital, Zagreb. In two operations—August 1942 and May 1943—Croatian authorities transferred about 7,000 Jews into German custody. The Germans deported these Jews to Auschwitz-Birkenau. Approximately 3,000 Croat Jews evaded these deportations, largely because they were exempted from the deportations due to intermarriage or other reasons, or because they managed to flee to the Italian-occupied zone of Yugoslavia.

Generally rejecting or evading German demands to transfer Jews from these areas, Italian authorities instead assembled some of the Jewish refugees in a camp on the island of Rab off the Adriatic coast. Italian authorities removed a few hundred Jewish refugees in the Italian zone to refugee camps in southern Italy. After the Italian government surrendered to the Allies in September 1943, the rapid Allied occupation of southern Italy liberated these Jews. After the Italian surrender, the Germans occupied the Italian zone of Yugoslavia. Yugoslav Partisans liberated some 3,000 Jews from Rab before the Germans could occupy the island, and assisted them in avoiding capture.

Croat authorities also murdered virtually the entire Roma (Gypsy) population of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, at least 25,000 men, women and children, between 15,000 and 20,000 of them in the Jasenovac camp system.

A Sephardic Jewish couple in Sarajevo circa 1900. *(Source: Wikipedia).*

HUNGARIAN-ANNEXED, BULGARIAN-OCCUPIED YUGOSLAVIA, AND KOSOVO-METOHIJA

In January 1942, Hungarian military units shot around 3,000 people (2,500 Serbs and 600 Jews) in northeastern city of Novi Sad, ostensibly in retaliation for an act of sabotage. Hungary, however, otherwise refused to deport Jews from the Backa and Baranja. After the Germans occupied Hungary in March 1944 and negotiated with the Hungarian authorities to remove the Hungarian Jews, Hungarian

gendarmerie units concentrated the approximately 16,000 Jews of the Backa and Baranja in May 1944 in transit facilities—Backa-Topolya, Baja, and Bacsalmas. In early June, Hungarian gendarmerie units deported the Jews to the border of the Generalgouvernement and released them into the custody of German police, who transported them to Auschwitz-Birkenau, where the majority died in the gas chambers.

In Macedonia and the Serb province of Pirot, Bulgarian military and police officials concentrated virtually the entire Jewish population, more than 7,700 people, in a transit camp in Skopje in March 1943. Bulgarian authorities transported the Jews to the Serb border, where the Germans took custody of the transport and directed the train to the Treblinka killing center in German-occupied Poland. Virtually none of the Macedonian and Pirot Jews whom the Bulgarian authorities deported survived.

In Albanian-annexed Kosovo, which was under Italian rule, around 400 Jews, most of them native to the area but including refugees from Serbia, were incarcerated in Pristina. In the spring of 1944, the Germans deported between 300 and 400 to Bergen-Belsen, where between 200 and 300 died.

COLLABORATION IN YUGOSLAVIA

In addition to the puppet Nedic government in Serbia, which had both a gendarmerie and a political police department, the Germans relied on Albanian bureaucrats, Bulgarian military and police officials, Hungarian gendarmes, and the Croat government establishment along with the Ustasa militia to implement German policy in occupied and dismembered Yugoslavia. All were involved in the deportation and/or murder of Jews, Roma, Communists, and other political opponents in Yugoslavia. In combating the Communist-led partisans, the Germans and especially the Italians were able to count on some collaboration from Mihailovic's *Cetniks*, whose leaders, as it became clear that Germany would lose the war, sought to inflict damage on the Communists rather than the Axis.

German authorities recruited extensively for the Waffen SS among ethnic Germans in the Banat, the Backa, Baranja, and Croatia. In the Banat and Slovenia, ethnic Germans were subject to the German draft, though many volunteered for service in the Waffen SS or in the German SS and police forces in the Banat and

Reichsfuehrer-SS Heinrich Himmler reviewing the Handzar Division in 1943 *(Source: Remarkable Travels).*

Serbia. Some ethnic Germans were conscripted—in some cases involving the use of force. In the spring of 1943, the SS recruited among Bosnian Moslems for the proposed 13th Waffen SS Mountain Division Handžar, though the 13th Division could only be deployed in Bosnia between February and October 1944 due to the unreliability of the Muslim recruits operating outside their home base.

When German troops occupied Italy in September 1943, the SS and Police apparatus in Trieste had the task of rounding up and transporting Jews from northeastern Italy and Italian-annexed Slovenia to Auschwitz. To implement this operation, to which nearly 5,000 Jews fell victim, German SS and police authorities recruited and deploy police authorities, including some Slovenes recruited from Italian-occupied Slovenia.

GERMAN WITHDRAWAL FROM YUGOSLAVIA

When Romania withdrew from the Axis and joined the Allies on August 23, 1944, the German position in the Balkans became untenable. German troops evacuated Greece, Serbia, Albania, and Bosnia-Herzegovina in the autumn of 1944. German and Croat troops continued to fight in northwestern Yugoslavia until the end of April 1945 when they retreated to Austria along with the surviving leadership of the Ustasa regime.

The Germans and their Axis partners murdered more than 67,000 Jews on Yugoslav soil (including more than 3,500 Jews from other countries who had found refuge in Yugoslavia before the Axis invasion) between 1941 and 1945. Around 14,000 Jews survived, many by hiding with friends or neighbors or by joining the Partisans. More than 4,500 Jews served in the Partisan resistance movement; around 1,300 died in combat. Of the 14,000 survivors, more than half emigrated to Palestine (after 1948: Israel) after the war, leaving a Jewish population of around 6,500 in Yugoslavia by 1950.

The Germans and their Axis partners, especially the Croats, killed approximately 27,000 Roma in Yugoslavia. The Ustasa killed about 20,000 at the Jasenovac camp system and perhaps as many as 6,000 more on the Croatian and Bosnian countryside. German military and police authorities shot most of the remainder, between 1,000 and 2,000, in Serbia.

After the war, many of the leaders of the German occupation authorities in Serbia were extradited to Communist-led Yugoslavia to stand trial, including the Higher SS and Police Leader in Belgrade, August Meyszner. Nedic either committed suicide or was killed by Yugoslav authorities on February 4, 1946, after US authorities sent him back to Yugoslavia to testify as a witness against Nazi offenders.

Ante Pavelic.

Several of the Ustasa leaders, including Ante Pavelic and Andrija Artukovic, escaped via Austria and Italy to the New World. Pavelic lived in Argentina until an attempt on his life in 1957 induced him to relocate to the Spain of dictator Francisco Franco. Pavelic died in Spain in 1959. Artukovic entered the United States in 1946 under a false identity and was ordered deported in 1953. A US immigration court in Los Angeles, however, stayed the order of deportation on the grounds that Artukovic would face political discrimination as a Croat in Communist Yugoslavia. After changes in the US immigration law in 1978 eliminated Artukovic's eligibility for relief from deportation, the US Justice Department's Office of Special Investigations initiated new deportation proceedings in 1979. These proceedings were ongoing when Artukovic was extradited to Yugoslavia in 1986. Yugoslav authorities prosecuted and convicted him, sentencing him to death. Execution of the sentence was delayed, however, possibly with intent. Artukovic died in prison shortly thereafter of natural causes.

After World War II, the Yugoslav Union was reestablished under Communist rule, though the country's leaders broke with the Soviet bloc in 1948. In 1991-1992, it dissolved again, this time as the result of an impending civil war that induced Slovenia and Croatia to declare their independence. In the vicious propaganda supporting the violence in Yugoslavia in the 1990s were numerous references to events in the former Yugoslavia during the Holocaust era.

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World War II

By Marko Attila Hoare
Excerpt from Genocide in the former Yugoslavia from the 1940s to the 1990s
May 2007

The genocide in former Yugoslavia during World War II was not the pre-ordained result of the prior two decades of political conflict, nor was it the accidental result of Axis occupation. Rather, the invasion and occupation of Yugoslavia by the Axis powers, which took place in April 1941, created the conditions in which the most extreme elements among the Yugoslav nationalities could attempt to resolve their power struggle through collaboration with the occupier. At the same time, the occupiers' genocidal policies provided a catalyst for the genocidal policies of the local actors.

Part of the reason for the high level of genocidal violence in World War II Yugoslavia was, ironically, that German control there was relatively loose - in comparison to places like Poland or the Ukraine. Yugoslavia was not a region of prime strategic importance for Germany. The Germans were most interested in Serbia, where they established a relatively tight, exclusive control. Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina, however, were a strategic backwater for Germany, so German control there was looser. The best part of these territories were established as the so-called 'Independent State of Croatia' under the Ustashas, as an Italo-German condominium or buffer state. And it was precisely here that the worst violence took place.

Hitler and Pavelic shake hands at a meeting in Berghof, Germany.

The Ustashas, as a fringe group of extremists installed in power by the Germans and Italians, inherited a country gripped by the long-standing power-struggle between Croats, Serbs and Muslims. Their genocidal policy was not in any way 'provoked' by Serb resistance, as Ustasha apologists sometimes claimed. Yet the Ustashas took power in the face of opposition from remnants of the Yugoslav Army and local Serbs, and their genocide was catalysed by this continuing power struggle. The Ustashas were hoping to take advantage of the Axis occupation to resolve the power struggle in Croatia's favour. Eugen Dido Kvaternik, the Croatian Himmler, privately admitted during the war that he thought Britain would win in

the end, but said that by that time there would be no Serbs left in Croatia, and the victors would have to accept the result.[6]

What makes the Ustasha and Chetnik genocides in World War II, and the Serb genocide of the 1990s, more similar to the Rwandan and Armenian genocides, and less similar to the Holocaust, is that they arose in the context of genuine power struggles between nationalities. Except for the Jews and Gypsies themselves, none of the victim groups targeted in the Yugoslav genocides were members of essentially passive, unresisting nationalities, as were the Jews in the Holocaust. Nor did the Ustashas and Chetniks define their victims in a racial manner. Nor did either the Ustashas or the Chetniks aim at the total extermination of their victim groups (except for the Jews and Gypsies, in the case of the Ustashas). Nevertheless, the Nazi Holocaust was structurally linked to these genocides. Hitler encouraged the Ustasha leader Ante Pavelic to adopt a hard-line policy toward the Serbs. The Ustashas issued various orders to deport Jews and Serbs to concentration camps, treating the two groups as a single category for the purposes of administering genocide.[7] The Ustasha death camp of Jasenovac was a killing centre for both Serbs and Jews, as well as anti-fascist Croats and others. Furthermore, Ustasha attempts to deport part of their Serb population to Serbia were coordinated with, and prompted by, Nazi efforts to deport ethnic Slovenes to Croatia.[8]

So far as the Chetniks are concerned, Chetnik propaganda targeted Jews as the supposed carriers of Communism. Chetnik leaders in Bosnia and Croatia were often closely allied with the Nazi-puppet regime in Serbia, which was itself directly involved in the destruction of the Serbian Jewish population. Chetniks frequently killed Jews or handed them over to the Nazis. During roughly the first two years of the war, the Chetniks in Croatia and Bosnia acted as auxiliaries to the Italians, who played a game of divide-and-rule, encouraging the Chetniks against Croats and Muslims. Chetnik massacres of Croat and Muslim civilians occurred under the Italian military umbrella. The Chetniks also acted as auxiliaries of the Serbian Nazi-quisling regime of Milan Nedic, who hoped to use them to extend his power into Bosnia, with the aim of eventually establishing a Great Serbian state under the Nazi umbrella.[9]

The Ustasha and Chetnik genocides were structurally linked to one another. Ustasha extermination of Serbs provided a catalyst for Chetnik massacres of Croat and Muslim civilians; indeed, local Serb rebel bands carried out such massacres even before they gelled into the actual Chetnik movement. Yet it is untrue, as apologists for the Chetniks claim, that Chetnik massacres were simply retaliation for prior Ustasha massacres. For one thing, the weight of Ustasha genocide occurred in Croatia proper and in West Bosnia,

whereas the largest Chetnik massacres occurred in East Bosnia and the Sanjak region - the latter was not even under Ustasha rule or touched by the Ustasha genocide. The Chetnik officer Pavle Burisic reported to Chetnik leader Draza Mihailovic in 1943 the results of his actions in East Bosnia and the Sanjak: 'All Muslim villages in the three mentioned districts were totally burned so that not a single home remained in one piece. All property was destroyed except cattle, corn and senna'. He continued: 'During the operation the total destruction of the Muslim inhabitants was carried out regardless of sex and age'. In this operation 'our total losses were 22 dead, of which 2 through accidents, and 32 wounded. Among the Muslims, around 1,200 fighters and up to 8,000 other victims: women, old people and children'.[10]

The Ustasha and Chetnik genocides were not equivalent to the Nazi Holocaust of the Jews and Gypsies. World War II claimed the lives of nearly 17% of Bosnian Serbs, 13% of Bosnian Croats and 9% of Bosnian Muslims. This includes military losses, as well as civilians killed outside of the genocide. This can be compared to the loss of approximately 80% of Yugoslav Jews and over 30% of Yugoslav Gypsies.[11] In terms of relative death tolls, the Ustasha and Chetnik genocides were similar in scale to the Nazi genocide of the Polish Christians. Both the Ustasha persecution of the Serbs and Chetnik persecution of the Muslims and Croats, in the opinion of the present author, amounted to genocide, as they each involved an attempt to destroy a nationality, or nationalities, in whole or in part. There is, however, some controversy over the matter, to which we shall return following an examination of Serb and Croat perceptions of genocide after World War II.

The orthodox line in Titoist Yugoslavia portrayed the Ustashas and Chetniks essentially as genocidal movements. That the Ustashas carried out genocide against the Serbs was not controversial under Titoism; when Mihailovic was tried under Titoist Yugoslavia as a war-criminal in 1946, the indictment claimed he 'undertook the extermination of Croats and Muslims' and 'issued orders to his commanders to annihilate the Moslems (whom he called Turks) and the Croats (whom he identified with the Ustashas)', and this charge was upheld by the court.[12]

Two leading Titoist historians of World War II genocide, the Serb Dedijer and the Croat Antun Miletic, were typical in their equation of the Ustasha and Chetnik genocides. Dedijer compiled a book about the Vatican and the Ustasha genocide called the The Yugoslav Auschwitz and the Vatican.[13] Miletic edited a three-volume collection of documents about the Ustasha death-camp of Jasenovac, in which he argued: 'Hitler gave Pavelic a green light also for his Serbophobia. He deemed that genocide - expulsions,

killings, imprisonment in camps and forced baptisms of Serbs - was the condition for the survival of the NDH'.[14] The two then produced a jointly edited volume entitled Genocide of the Muslims, which assembled documents detailing Chetnik persecution of the Muslims. In the introduction, Dedijer claims that the Chetniks' genocidal policies were inspired by Hitler: 'Hitler accelerated this process of destroying the Slavic people. His methods, proclaimed publicly in Mein Kampf, undoubtedly influenced also the concept of genocide in the movement of Draza Mihailovic'.[15]

Ramiro Marcone (right), Vatican legate, visiting the NDH with Ante Pavelic (center).

Historians' understanding of these crimes is nevertheless blurred by the almost complete absence of any genuine historical analyses of either genocide. Titoist historians were content basically to catalogue and describe crimes, rather than to interpret them. Historians in the West largely ignored the Ustashas, and while some excellent monographs were written about the Chetniks, these focussed almost exclusively on Chetnik relations with the Axis and Allies, rather than on atrocities. This has only begun to change in the last couple of years. This failure to interpret the genocides led directly to Serb and Croat nationalist revisionism and genocide denial. This was made worse by the fact that not all aspects of the Titoist line were given equal emphasis in Communist education and propaganda, so not all aspects equally entered popular awareness.

In 2006, the Serbian historian Olivera Milosavljevic brought out a study of collaboration with the Nazis in Serbia, which emphasised the fact that the Serbian Nazi quisling regime under Milan Nedic had not been merely collaborationist, but was a fully fledge fascist regime, with a Nazi-style ideology that claimed that Serbs were members of the Aryan race, and that was fanatically anti- Semitic.[16] Milosavljevic confirms what the present author's own research has suggested to him: that official Titoist statements about World War II emphasised the Nazi-collaborationist character of the Chetniks and the Nedic regime, but not their genocidal or fascist character. This made it easier for the Serb-nationalist propaganda in the 1980s and 90s to claim that it had only been Croats, Muslims and Albanians, but not Serbs, who had been genocidal or pro-fascist in World War II, and to deny Serb collaborationist killings of Jews, Muslims and Croats. Titoist

propaganda had instead emphasised the Serbs' domination of the interwar Yugoslav kingdom and their oppression of other nationalities, and many Serb intellectuals felt they were continually being made to feel guilty about this.

Conversely, Titoist propaganda strongly emphasised the Ustasha genocide. Just as many Serbs felt they were being made to feel guilty about the interwar Kingdom, so many Croat intellectuals felt Croats were continuously made to feel guilty about the Ustashas. Croat nationalist revisionism therefore did not focus on denial, as was the case with the Serbs, so much as on minimisation and relativisation. The best known Croat revisionist historian is, of course, the late Franjo Tudman, who subsequently became Croatian President. Tudman's revisionism largely focussed on the Serb death-toll in the Ustasha genocide and particularly at the Jasenovac death-camp, which he rightly claimed had been exaggerated by Titoist historians - and this conclusion of Tudman's is supported by the Holocaust Memorial Museum in Washington and by the most authoritative demographic studies. However, Tudman went to the other extreme, and minimised the death-toll at Jasenovac.[17] He also went on to suggest that the figure of six million Jewish dead in the Holocaust was unreliable. And he relativised Jewish suffering, comparing Israel's treatment of the Palestinians with the Holocaust, and claiming that Jewish inmates had held a privileged position at the Jasenovac camp.[18] In essence, Tudman claimed that what the Ustashas had done was no different from innumerable other acts of mass violence since biblical times, therefore not a big deal.

By the late 1980s and early 1990s, there was an almost complete unawareness among Serbs of any Serb genocide or fascism during World War II, while mainstream Croat-nationalist opinion no longer cared about the Ustashas; and some were ready to embrace a more positive reinterpretation of them, including genocide denial. This all contributed to an atmosphere that made new atrocities possible.

Yugoslavia: 1918-2003

By Tim Judah
From BBC
February 17, 2011

THE SOUTH SLAVS

Out of the wreckage of the old Yugoslavia a new union is currently being formed between Serbia and Montenegro. This act of creation is a sign that a great experiment in the 'land of the south Slavs' (which is what Yugoslavia means) is finally over.

This decision in Belgrade's federal parliament to create a new loose union between the two republics, called simply Serbia and Montenegro, and to finally consign the name of Yugoslavia to history, shows how the legislators have bowed to reality. The real Yugoslavia perished in the 1990s, during the wars that consumed it.

The great experiment in this Slavic nation was based on a noble idea. Its proponents thought that south Slavs, that is to say people with much in common, especially their languages, who lived in a great arc of territory from the borders of Austria almost to the gates of Constantinople (now Istanbul), should unite and form one great strong south Slav state.

Ideas for a union of the southern Slavs had begun circulating at least as early as the 1840s. In the regions that were to become part of modern Croatia, thinkers dreamed of a new Illyria - a name harking back to the days of the Roman Empire. Amongst Serbs, however, such notions were less prevalent. Serbian nationalist thinkers dreamed of recreating, first a Serbian state and then perhaps a Serbian empire.

Dreams of a union, state or empire came easily to the lands of the south Slavs because all of the people who lived in what was to become Yugoslavia were then the subjects of others. And the fault-lines of empire divided the south Slavs from one another.

Montenegrins, Serbs, Greeks and Bulgarians united against the Turks during the Balkan War of 1912 *(Source: The Economist).*

By 1912, however, the first of the wars that were to convulse this region periodically throughout the 20th century was about to begin. Two small

Serbian and Montenegrin states had already emerged and become independent - having shaken off the Ottoman Turkish yoke - but the rest of what was to become Yugoslavia was still part of either the Ottoman or the Austro-Hungarian Empire.

With the first Balkan war of 1912 all that began to change. The new small states of Serbia and Montenegro, fighting alongside Greece and Bulgaria, managed to push the Turks back to Constantinople. Serbia and Montenegro conquered Kosovo, and Serbia took a large share of Macedonia. For many Serbs and other Slavs living within the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Serbia was their champion. Inspired, and also helped, by Serbia's secret services, one of these young radicals took a pot-shot at the heir to throne of Austro-Hungary, Franz Ferdinand, who was visiting Bosnia on 28 June 1914.

A young Josip Broz who went on to lead Yugoslavia as Marshal Tito.

AN UNHAPPY KINGDOM

Within months the old order was gone. The assassination in Sarajevo sparked off World War One, which in its wake destroyed the Austro-Hungarian Empire. What was to replace it? Many Croat, Serb and other south Slav soldiers remained loyal to Austria-Hungary during the war, but there were also some who did not.

Indeed, some of its politicians feared that as Austria-Hungary crumbled Italy would seize as much of the coast of Dalmatia as it could, while Serbia would create a new greatly enlarged Serbian state, including Bosnia and parts of what are now Croatia - especially those areas that were then heavily inhabited by Serbs. The politicians felt that a deal must be reached with Serbia. A new union was to be proclaimed. The Serbian Army would save Croatia and Slovenia from the territorial ambitions of the Italians, and union would also save Croatia from Serbia itself. The kingdom was formed on 1 December 1918. Serbia's royal family, the Karadjordjevics, became that of the new country, which was officially called the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes until 1929 - when it became Yugoslavia.

Immediately it became clear that the union was not a happy one. Many Croats especially resented it, because they felt they had exchanged the domination of Vienna for that of Serbian Belgrade. Kosovo's Albanian population was restive too. Albanians were not Slavs and were bitter that Kosovo had not been able to join the newly independent

Albania (which proclaimed its independence in 1912). Macedonian nationalists also resented the new state.

So Yugoslavia lurched from crisis to crisis until finally it collapsed, with barely a fight, in 1941 - when attacked by Nazi Germany and Mussolini's fascist Italy. The country was carved up. A tiny extreme fascist quisling clique, known as the Ustashas, was installed in power in the Croatian capital Zagreb. They began a campaign of terror and genocide directed especially at the Serbs of Croatia and Bosnia.

Resistance soon began to emerge. In Serbia so-called Chetnik forces loyal to the old Serbian-dominated Yugoslav order began to fight, and so did a communist dominated resistance under the half-Slovene half-Croat Josip Broz - also known as Tito.

TITO'S YUGOSLAVIA

The war years were a nightmare of inter-ethnic bloodletting, fighting and wars within wars. While Yugoslavia was occupied and resistance was directed against the occupiers, in fact the majority of those who died, did so in fighting between nationalists of various stripes - royalists, communists, quislings and so on.

Marshal Tito in 1975 *(Source: BBC UK).*

Tito's forces, however, soon gained the recognition and help of the Allies. They also offered an ideal - a dream of 'brotherhood and unity' - that would link the nations or peoples of Yugoslavia. By 1945 Tito's forces were victorious, and crucially, although the Soviet Red Army had helped in the struggle, it had now moved on to central Europe. So Tito, not Moscow, would shape the new state.

But Tito was a communist, loyal to Stalin. He wanted to model his country on the Soviet Union, so a federal state of six republics was proclaimed (Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, Slovenia). Stalin was wary of Tito, however, and in 1948 the two fell out. Yugoslavia was expelled from the communist bloc but Tito did not fall from power, as many had expected. He survived, and began to chart an independent course for the nation he ruled.

Over the next 40 years Yugoslavia changed beyond recognition. It developed its own brand of socialism, and a society far more open than that of its communist neighbours. For them, and for many communists around the world, Yugoslavia seemed to be a

paradise on earth. At home the federation appeared to have solved the bitter national questions of the past, living standards were high and, unlike in other communist countries, citizens were free to travel to the west, either to work or to take holidays.

Tito's Yugoslavia also gained enormous prestige as a founder of the non-aligned movement, which aimed to find a place in world politics for countries that did not want to stand foursquare behind either of the two superpowers.

Despite all this, and although there was much substance to Tito's Yugoslavia, much was illusion too. The economy was built on the shaky foundations of massive western loans. Even liberal communism had its limits, as did the very nature of the federation. Stirrings of nationalist dissent in Croatia and Kosovo were crushed. The federation worked because in reality the voice of only one man counted - that of Tito himself.

DESCENT INTO CHAOS

When Tito died in 1980, Yugoslavs were shocked and apprehensive. They had been prepared for his demise with the slogan 'After Tito - Tito'. But there was no new Tito. Without him the state began to unravel, as the governments of the republics began to exercise the powers that were due to them under the constitution. Dissent began to grow. Serbs complained of persecution at the hands of ethnic Albanians in Kosovo. Croats and Slovenes resented the fact that money earned from tourists in their republics went to subsidise poorer parts of Yugoslavia, such as Kosovo. Albanians there demonstrated for their own republic, and even for secession and union with Albania.

Managing these strains and crises was hard enough, but by the late 1980s some people began to sense that communism itself was in question. And if it was, what was to replace it? For Slobodan Milosevic, an up-and-coming politician in Serbia, the answer was nationalism. Seizing on the delicate issue of Kosovo, Milosevic came to supreme power. And so, Yugoslavia began to crumble. In 1989 Milosevic abolished Kosovo's autonomy. Croats and Slovenes feared that they were next in line.

Slobodan Milosevic is led into the UN War Crimes Tribunal *(Source: Telegraph UK).*

In this way a spiral of competitive and mutually fearful nationalisms began to destroy the country. Politicians fanned the embers of all the old divisions - Serbs versus Croats, Orthodox Christians versus Catholics versus Muslims, and so on.

Milosevic clearly wanted to dominate all of the old Yugoslavia, but when he realised that he could not, he switched to another option, that of a Greater Serbia. History had scattered the Serbs especially, well outside the borders of Serbia. Milosevic argued that the federation meant that nations could secede from it, but not republics. So, he said, Slovenia - with no indigenous minorities - and Croatia could leave Yugoslavia if they wished - but then Croatia could not take its Serb areas with it. The stage was set for war.

The story of those conflicts in Slovenia, in Croatia, in Bosnia, in Kosovo, and finally NATO's war in Yugoslavia, has been told many times.

NEW IDENTITIES

Now, prosperous Slovenia is looking forward to EU and NATO membership. Croatia is recovering from war, and its territory is intact, although most of its Serbs have fled or been driven out. Bosnia is divided into two, a shattered land still struggling to overcome the legacy of the war. Macedonia has been riven by ethnic conflict - but spared all-out war - between ethnic Macedonians and ethnic Albanians. Hundreds of thousands of ethnic Albanians returned to Kosovo after the war there, but then 230,000 Serbs and other non-Albanians were forced to flee.

Serbia and Montenegro have been impoverished by the wars and even today - as their new union is being formed - their future state is far from assured. Serbs and Montenegrins have much in common, especially their common Orthodox heritage, but Serbia is a land of some eight million people, and Montenegro has only 650,000 citizens. Whether two republics of such unequal size can work together in one federation remains to be seen. The new deal is for a loose union for three years, after which either republic can opt for independence. On paper it is a sensible compromise. In reality it will be hard, but not impossible, to make it work - if there is enough goodwill.

The new deal, however, makes no provision for Kosovo, a UN protectorate since 1999, but still nominally part of Yugoslavia - or now its successor state. Its majority Albanian population has no intention of ever entering any new union with Belgrade, while its Serbs have no intention of permitting it to take the path of independence. If they can't prevent independence they (and the policymakers in Belgrade), would probably like to partition it, with the northern Serbian inhabited areas staying within Serbia. So, the final disintegration of the old Yugoslav state is not yet complete.

Having taken their different paths, the people of the former Yugoslavia will look back on the past with different and mixed emotions. The final end of Yugoslavia will barely be noticed in much of the old country, and in Serbia and Montenegro most people are simply too exhausted by the conflicts of the past and the difficulties of life to really care.

But throughout the old Yugoslavia, and especially amongst those who grew up under Tito (except perhaps the Kosovo Albanians), the passing of its name will leave many with a wistful feeling - a feeling for which, indeed, they already have a name: Yugonostalgia.

Chapter II: History
Study Questions

Created by Student Interns, The Echo Foundation

1. Where and why did the Byzantine Empire begin?
2. The Byzantine Empire was the continuation of what past empire?
3. What was the political structure of the Byzantine Empire?
4. Why did the influence of the Byzantine Empire recede after the rule of Justinian in the 6th century?
5. What was the result of the Crusades on the Byzantine Empire?
6. Which other empire caused the end of the Byzantine Empire and how did they do it?
7. How did the end of the Byzantine Empire affect current day Bosnia?
8. The Ottoman Empire replaced what past empire as the major power in the Eastern Mediterranean?
9. At its peak, the Ottoman Empire included which modern day countries?
10. What was the religion of the Ottoman Empire?
11. Why was the Ottoman Empire as successful as it was?
12. How was the government formatted in the Ottoman Empire? Did it benefit the citizens?
13. What major events happened during the rule of Mehemet (Mehmed)?
14. What led to the decline of the Ottoman Empire?
15. When was the Austro-Hungarian Empire formed?
16. What role did the Austro-Hungarian Empire play in WWI?
17. What conflicts existed in the Balkan region during the time of the Austro-Hungarian Empire?

18. What influence did the Austro-Hungarian Empire have on the formation of Yugoslavia?

19. Who was Franz Ferdinand? What role did he play in the conflicts during the time of the Austro-Hungarian Empire?

20. Who was the leader of Bosnia until 1980? What was his role in the government at that time?

21. When was communist Yugoslavia formed?

22. Describe the reactions and events that occurred as a result of the death of Tito.

23. What happened during the 1980's? How was Yugoslavia ruled?

24. What was the role of religion in establishing identity in the Byzantine, Ottoman, and Austro-Hungarian Empires?

25. How has identity evolved in Europe from the Byzantine Empire to today? How do people identify now?

Chapter III:
Three Ethnic Groups



Bosnia is a complicated country: three religions, three nations and those 'others'. Nationalism is strong in all three nations; in two of them there are a lot of racism, chauvinism, separatism; and now we are supposed to make a state out of that.

Alija Izetbegovic, 1st Chairman of the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina

Bosnian Muslims, Bosniaks

From Encyclopedia of World Cultures Supplement
2002

ORIENTATION



Bosniak religious flag.

Identification and Location. The Bosnian Muslim homeland is Bosnia and Herzegovina in the western Balkans. One of six republics in the former Yugoslavia, it was internationally recognized as an independent state in 1992. Bosnian Muslims share the country with the Bosnian Serbs and Croats, whose identification and political orientation are largely synonymous with those of the neighboring countries of Serbia and Croatia. Bosnia and Herzegovina has been claimed by both these neighboring peoples, but the Muslims have contested their claims. The Bosnian Muslims identify themselves as belonging to a distinct ethnic group or nation and, contrary to the Bosnian Serbs and Croats, consider Bosnia and Herzegovina their only homeland. In the constitution for Bosnia and Herzegovina outlined by the Dayton Accord (21 November 1995) the official name for Bosnian Muslim is Bosniak (or Bosniac—both spellings are used in English), an English translation of the ethnonym Bošnjak that is preferred by the Bosnian Muslim political leadership to avoid confusion with the religious term "Muslim." All natives of Bosnia and Herzegovina may also be referred to by the term Bosanac; Bosanka (fern.), Bosanci (pl. of Bosnian).

The Bosnian Muslims were the largest ethnic group in Bosnia and Herzegovina before the 1992-1995 war. They lived among Orthodox Serbs, Catholic Croats, and other Bosnians in cities, towns, and villages throughout the country. The largest concentrations of Muslims were in the central and eastern parts and in the northwestern area of the country. During the war Muslims were expelled from or killed in the territories controlled by the Croat or the Serb armies. Others fled from cities under siege and bombardment. The Muslims have traditionally dominated the cities as evident in the cultural expression of the capital city of Sarajevo. Since 1995 the Bosniak population has been concentrated in the major cities that were under Bosnian Muslim control during the war: Sarajevo, Zenica, and Tuzla, along with other municipalities within the Bosniak-Croat Federation.

The federation with the Bosnian Serb-controlled "Republika Srpska" forms the two state entities of Bosnia and Herzegovina established by the 1995 Dayton Accord.

As a consequence of the past war (1992-1995), communities of Bosniaks can be found throughout Europe, with the largest number in Germany. Outside of Europe groups of refugees from Bosnia, with the assistance of the United Nations, have been sent to the United States, Canada, Australia, Turkey, Indonesia, and Pakistan.

Demography. According to the 1991 national census for Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Muslims accounted for 43.5 percent, or almost two million (1,902,956) people, of a total population of 4,337,033. However, as a consequence of the 1992-1995 war this number has been reduced and it is difficult to ascertain the exact post-war population because of the dislocation caused by military action, forced expulsions and massacres (ethnic cleansing), and political manipulation. (In July 2000, the population of Bosnia and Herzegovina was estimated at 3,835,777.) During the war hundreds of thousands of Muslims either fled or were systematically expelled from their homes. In addition, thousands were killed in massacres. For instance, when the city of Srebrenica in eastern Bosnia was taken by Serb forces in July 1995, it is believed that more than seven thousand Muslim men were massacred (7,141 were missing, and approximately four thousand bodies were found in mass graves). The war, and particularly the strategy of so-called ethnic cleansing, had left over two million Bosnians (Bosniaks, Croats, Serbs and others) displaced within the country or living as refugees abroad. An estimated 250,000 people were killed during the war.

One of the provisions of the Dayton Accord was the right of all refugees and displaced persons to return to their prewar homes. Six years after the accord was signed an estimated 700,000 people have returned to the municipalities they lived in before the war (almost 600,000 of these people returned to the Federation entity), but a majority were not able to go back to their prewar homes.

Linguistic Affiliation. Bosniaks share a language with their Serb and Croat neighbors within Bosnia and Herzegovina and in the neighboring states of Serbia and Croatia. It is a Slavonic language whose official name before the disintegration of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was Serbo-Croat. Since the dissolution of this state and its division into ethnically based nation-states this common language has taken on three different designations: Serbian (the eastern *Ekavski* variant using the Cyrillic alphabet), the official language of the Serbian population; Croatian (the western *Ijekavaski* variant using the Latin alphabet), the official language of the Croatian population; and Bosnian (which is of the Ijekavaski variant and uses the Latin alphabet), the official language of the Bosniak population. The last variant is distinguished from the Croatian mainly by a variation in vocabulary.

HISTORY AND CULTURAL RELATIONS

Bosniak women in traditional dress *(Source: The Washington Post).*

The independent kingdom of Bosnia arose in the Middle Ages. In 1463 Bosnia was conquered by the Ottoman Empire after a century and a half of fighting. In the following centuries a large number of the local people (Christians belonging to the Roman Catholic or Eastern Orthodox churches and, some scholars argue, the Bosnian Church—the "heretical" church of the Bosnian king whose members were persecuted by Rome and Catholic Hungary) converted to Islam, the religion of the conquering state. Those who converted came from a broad cross section of society. The Bosnian gentry were probably among the first to embrace Islam—and the securing of property and privileges may have been a motivating factor—but peasants and members of other socioeconomic categories followed suit.

The Ottoman administration favored those who shared their faith. They had access to education and could hold office in the administration. A Bosnian Muslim elite grew up that obtained the right to own land. The peasants who worked on their land were usually Christians. Although a majority of Muslims were peasants, significant socioeconomic differences developed between Bosnia's different religious communities. In the Ottoman Empire various groups had been identified and administered on the basis of religion. During Ottoman rule Bosnia was multireligious and the three major faiths were Islamic, Serbian Orthodox, and Roman Catholic. The Christian churches were a significant force in the national movements in Croatia and Serbia in the nineteenth century. Gradually, these movements expanded into neighboring Bosnia and Herzegovina and over time Catholic and Orthodox Bosnians came to see themselves as Croats and Serbs with an allegiance to the "national centers" of Zagreb and Belgrade, respectively. A Bosnian Muslim national movement developed much later, and had a smaller popular base. It was mainly a response to a Serb and Croat nationalist denial of the existence of a separate Bosnian Muslim identity and claims that Bosnian Muslims were ethnically Serbs or Croats. Along with these claims went Serbia's and Croatia's nationalist aspirations to

incorporate Bosnia and Herzegovina, or those territories with a substantial ethnic Serbian or Croatian population, into their respective nation-states. However, the Bosnian Muslims refused to become either Serbianized or Croatianized.

Since its independent status in the Middle Ages, Bosnia and Herzegovina has been under the political control of different state powers. The Ottoman empire, the Habsburg empire, and the Yugoslav kingdom all discriminated against one community or segment of the population while favoring another. In postwar Yugoslavia, the communist partisans led by Marshal Tito developed a complex system for the balance of power between the largest ethnic groups to make sure that no ethnic group or nation within the multinational Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was favored or became dominant. The main competition for power had historically been between Serbia and Croatia. In Bosnia and Herzegovina the two met in their hegemonic aspirations for territory expressed through their coreligionists and ethnic brethren. Bosnia and Herzegovina was thus a potential source of instability in the new socialist Yugoslavia. Tito may have calculated that the Muslims could be used as a stabilizing factor. Under Tito's rule the Muslims obtained the constitutional nationality status of *narod* (people or nation). This gave them the equal status with Serbs and Croats that Muslim activists had long demanded. None of the three constituent nations of Bosnia and Herzegovina had carried an ethnonym that directly identified it with the country. In the case of the Muslims their religious rather than ethnic affiliation and territorial identity was stressed, while for the Bosnian Catholics and Orthodox Christians it was their affiliation with a political and territorial entity outside of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

With the rise of separatist nationalism and the dissolution of Tito's Yugoslavia at the end of the 1980s the Serb and Croat populations in Bosnia and Herzegovina were mobilized for Serbia's and Croatia's state-building projects. Explicitly or implicitly they sought a division of Bosnia and Herzegovina along ethnic lines. The Muslims were caught in between (together with Bosnians of ethnically mixed parentage), as they neither identified with a political unit outside of Bosnia or had military or political support from a neighboring patron state. The Muslim political leadership and population favored a united multiethnic Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Muslims became the victims of genocide perpetrated by the Serbian side and were the hardest hit by "ethnic cleansing." Before war broke out in 1992 people of different ethno-religious backgrounds coexisted as neighbors, friends, and colleagues throughout the country. The degree to which people coexisted and interacted varied locally. Some traditions, customs, and rituals were regionally based and shared by people of all three backgrounds. However, during World War II Bosnia and Herzegovina had been the scene of a ferocious civil war and a war against the German and Italian occupying forces. Issues and historical memories from that war inspired nationalist rhetoric and became a motivating force for the 1992-1995 war.

SETTLEMENTS

Before 1992 Muslims lived throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina but there were sharp regional variations in ethnic composition. For instance, in Cazin in the northwest and Janja in the northeast, Muslims made up 95 percent of the population. In some areas, such as that surrounding Banja Luka, Muslims lived among a Serb majority, while in western Herzegovina Muslims lived among a Croat majority. In other regions Muslims and Croats or Muslims and Serbs were found in almost equal numbers.

Remnants of a *mahala* in Bosnia.

The major cities are often divided into an old city center and a new part characterized by high rise tower blocks. The city centers were divided into *mahalas* or neighborhoods that traditionally had been inhabited by one ethnic group. In Sarajevo certain mahalas in the old city had been inhabited by urban Muslim families for generations. In rural areas Muslims lived in separate villages or hamlets or in ethnically mixed ones. In ethnically mixed villages the different groups lived in separate or clearly defined areas or families with different ethno-religious backgrounds lived as next door neighbors. Settlements typically consisted of brothers with their families. The ideal for a young married man was to set up his own household in a new house. However, it was not uncommon for a young family to share a household with the husband's parents until it could establish its own house. This house was often built on the man's father's land nearby. As a result of industrial development in Yugoslavia after World War II wage labor became widely available, and in the 1960s migrant labor opportunities abroad made sons independent of their fathers. The traditional communal patrigroup household called *zajednica* ("community") became less common as brothers left the household at a much earlier age and established their own households. During the past war most ethnically mixed villages were socially and physically destroyed. After 1998, in Federation territory of central Bosnia, Bosniacs and Croats began to return to life in mixed villages.

ECONOMY

Subsistence. The 1992-1995 war destroyed most prewar economic activities. During the war people lived off small plots of land, by receiving food aid and remittances from abroad, and by engaging in black market activities. The unemployment rate was an estimated 80 percent and remains at 40 percent. There are no distinct subsistence or

economic activities in which Bosniaks engage. Although there are full-time farmers, agriculture is typically of the subsistence variety: Rural households derive income mainly from industry and labor migration and supply the household economy from small agricultural holdings. Agricultural products such as milk, butter, and eggs are sold at the local market mainly by women.

Commercial Activities. From the 1960s until the dissolution of Yugoslavia many Bosnians engaged in labor migration, primarily to Germany and Austria. When the labor market in Europe became more restricted in the 1980s, men left for Canada and Australia. Yugoslav companies were involved in construction work in the Middle East, and Bosnian men worked in that region. The money they earned often was invested in projects in their home country such as the building of a new house or invested in a private business.

Industrial Arts. In larger cities and market towns Bosniaks engage in traditional handicrafts: Coppersmiths make traditional plates, coffee grinders, coffee sets, and tables. Silversmiths and goldsmiths make traditional filigree jewelry. Shoemakers make traditional slippers and leather shoes. Bosnian Muslim artisans also make traditional pottery, and some women weave traditional kilims or knit colorful and richly patterned woolen socks that they sell in the marketplace.

Division of Labor. Both men and women are involved in wage labor in industry, education, the health services, and public administration. Household work is primarily the domain of women, and particularly in rural areas there is a clear distinction between women's and men's work. During the second half of the twentieth century when men left rural areas to work in industry in nearby cities and abroad, agriculture and sheep herding became female centered. This trend is changing as there are few opportunities for wage labor in postwar Bosnia.

Land Tenure. During Ottoman rule (1463-1878), Bosnia had a feudal system with Muslim *begs,* or landlords, at the top. The Muslim landlords made up 2 percent of the Muslim population, but most of the sharecroppers *(kmets)* who worked on their land were Christians. There were some Muslim kmets, but most Muslim peasants were freeholders and did not have to make obligatory payments to a landlord. The kmets had to give over a third of the annual crop to a Muslim landlord and another tenth in levies to the state. Throughout the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries there was a series of peasant revolts that were directed against the feudal system with its Muslim landlords. The Austro-Hungarian dual kingdom that governed Bosnia and Herzegovina from 1878 to 1918 made only a few cosmetic changes. During royal Yugoslavia, 1918-1941, radical agrarian reforms were introduced and 150,000 peasant families received over one million hectares of land. The previous, mostly Muslim, owners of the land received some cash compensation from the Yugoslav government. During the socialist period another set of agrarian reforms was introduced. Over one and a half million hectares were confiscated

and allotted to partisans and landless peasants; Muslim landlord privilege was totally eradicated. The peasant working collectives introduced in 1945 proved to be an economic disaster and by 1965 had ceased to exist. The 1945 agrarian reform had allowed a maximum of twenty five to thirty five hectares for private ownership. In 1953 the maximum was decreased to ten hectares; it was again increased slightly for mountainous regions in the 1980s.

KINSHIP

Kin Groups and Descent. The basic social and political units in rural communities are agnatically-based kin groups. This is reflected in the settlement pattern in which brothers with their wives and children live next door to each other on land inherited from the father. This agnatic structure is modified by the important role of maternal kin and affines in a person's kinship network. The relationship between inlaws called *prijatelji,* or "friends,"is characterized by ritual gift exchanges in connection with marriage. Affines may be called on in times of crisis for economic and other forms of assistance. Affines and kin constitute a kinship network with a political and economic mobilizing potential. Descent is reckoned patrilineally, but in practice kinship networks are bilateral. In rural areas Bosniaks are usually endogamous within the ethnic group. Kinship is thus the main organizational principle for the ethnic community and ethnic loyalties are primarily kinship loyalties.

Kinship Terminology. The Bosnian Muslim terminology system is parallel to that of the Bosnian Serbs and Croats, but the words used to denote certain relatives often differ. All three groups distinguish between uncles and cousins on the father's and the mother's sides. The terms used by men and women for their respective parents-in-law also differ. The same term is used for a brother's wife, a son's wife, and a man's brother's son's wife. This lumping together of close male relatives' wives reflects the old patrilocal and patrigroup-based household organization.

MARRIAGE AND FAMILY

Marriage. Bosniaks are exogamous and disapprove of marriage between relatives reckoned collaterally up to "the ninth generation." "Generations" are counted from ego or alter up to an apical ancestor. Since genealogies are rarely known farther back than the third or fourth generation, the prohibition usually is applied to known cousins or traceable genealogicalties. In rural

A Bosniak bride on her wedding day.

areas and among urban religiously oriented families marriage with non-Muslim Bosnians is disapproved of. Bosniaks are thus exogamous within the kin group and endogamous within the ethno-religious group, although there are numerous exceptions. During the socialist era any marriage had to be registered by the secular authorities before a religious ceremony could be conducted. Only a few religiously devout Muslims married according to Shari'a or Islamic law. Such a wedding had a symbolic value but could not supersede secular laws on marriage. Polygyny is not permitted and was rare even until 1945 when Islamic family law was accepted by the authorities. Divorce is socially acceptable, religiously permissible, and not uncommon. Children may remain with either parent. The legal age for marriage is eighteen but may take place at an earlier age in the form of an elopement. Socially a couple is married if the woman is brought to the man's parent's home as a bride and spends the night there. This is followed by a series of visits and gift-exchanges between the groom's and the bride's parents and close relatives. Marriage is essential to obtain the status of a fully adult and responsible individual.

Domestic Unit. The basic socioeconomic unit is the household based on the core family, which is generally virilocal [definition: living with or located near the husband's father's group] in rural areas and neolocal in urban areas. In some rural areas the traditional viri-patrilocal extended family unit is found. In both rural and urban regions a young couple often shared a house with the man's parents, as a separate house was not always practical or economically possible. The war radically altered domestic arrangements. Houses and apartments are in short supply, and many people have been displaced from their homes; a large number of families have been forced from rural areas into the large cities; families and households have been split up; and households have become large extended family units. The domestic unit, however, is still the primary socializing unit. A household gains considerable social worth and status by offering hospitality to guests. A guest should be treated to the best a household can offer in the way of food and comfort.

Inheritance. Secular inheritance laws are followed and inheritance is equal for male and female heirs. Farm property is divided equally among all the heirs, but inheriting daughters often relinquish their share to a brother since they usually marry out of the village.

Socialization. The kind of socialization a child receives is often dependent on the socioeconomic status of its family. Generally, socialization is more gender-specific than is the case in northern Europe. Boys are brought up to be the center of attention and take precedence over their female siblings. Certain tasks and skills are gender-specific. Parental use of corporal punishment (such as caning) is not uncommon. Education is seen as important and is encouraged. In rural areas, sons are encouraged to receive an education, while girls frequently leave school earlier and marry earlier than boys. Children grow up with many adults around and are rarely excluded from adult social

gatherings. Depending on the religious attitude of the parents, both boys and girls may be sent to Quranic schools *(Mekteb)* at the age of six or seven.

SOCIOPOLITICAL ORGANIZATION

Political Organization. After the 1992-1995 war the country was divided into a Serb entity (Republika Srpska) that more or less covers the territory that the Bosnian Serb nationalist forces took control of and "ethnically cleansed" during the war and the Bosniak-Croat Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Federacija Bosna i Hercegovina) that covers territory that the Bosnian Army or the Croatian Defense Forces controlled during the war. Under the terms of the Dayton Peace Accord the "Srpska" entity has 49 percent of the territory and the "Federation" has 51 percent. The Bosniaks are the most numerous group in the Federation. As of the 1996 elections the Bosniak nationalist party (the SDA) had an absolute majority in the Federation parliament and was in a position to elect the prime minister and most of the other ministers. In the general election in November 2000, the Bosniak (SDA), Croat (HDZ), and Serb (SDS) nationalist parties that politically and militarily controlled Bosnia and Herzegovina since 1992 lost their absolute majority in the State (central) and Federation parliaments to nonnationalist parties. In the Republika Srpska the Serb nationalist party still has a solid majority. There is considerable power sharing between Bosniaks and Croats within the Federation. Substantial powers have devolved to cantons and municipalities. Certain cantons are predominantly Bosniak, some are predominantly Croat, and two are mixed. Within the mixed cantons there are elaborate procedures for power sharing. A substantial part of the Bosniak population has legal and voting rights in the Republika Srpska. However, with few exceptions they do not live in the Republika Srpska and have not been able to return. Bosnia and Herzegovina has a very weak central government that controls a limited number of functions, such as foreign relations, foreign trade, and fiscal policy. The national government is based on a principle of ethnically based proportional representation There is a national parliament with two-thirds of the representatives from the Federation and one-third from the Republika Srpska. The head of state is the chairman (president) of the three-member presidency, which consists of one Bosniak, one Croat, and one Serb. The joint presidency is elected by popular vote for a four-year term. The office of chairman rotates among the three members every eight months.

Social Control. In the secularized society of the Bosnian Muslims, Islamic law has not functioned as the social control mechanism. Instead, shared values such as egalitarianism accompanied by the controlling mechanism of jealousy, hospitality, and loyalty to the household as a unit and to kin have been important. In modern times Muslims have experienced discrimination from the Christian sections of the population. The long experience of authoritarian governments combined with experiences of harassment and violence have imbued Bosnians with a weariness and distrust of government, and in some

cases of strangers, that is expressed through guardedness in speech. Friendship toward loyal friends and allies is correspondingly strong.

Conflict. In 1995 the Bosnian Muslims emerged from the civil war as the victims of genocide and "ethnic cleansing." The primary source of conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina is politicized ethnicity and the extreme brand of Serbian and Croatian nationalist ideologies. Not only did tens of thousands of Bosnian Muslims perish in the 1992-1995 period, they were completely driven out of eastern and northern Bosnia. More than half the Muslim population was displaced or became refugees, and mosques and other Muslim cultural monuments were deliberately destroyed. This experience has led to a deeply held sense of injustice and anger. The Dayton agreement remains fragile, and only the presence of a large international peace-keeping force prevents large-scale fighting. The situation is particularly fragile in areas where nationalist separatists are still in power and people who were expelled are attempting to return to their homes. The war left many Bosnians destitute and homeless and without opportunities for employment. This has created tension within families and among Bosnians as they compete for employment and housing. The brutality of the war traumatized many people, particularly young soldiers, women subjected to systematic rape, and children who witnessed the loss of their homes and families. Posttraumatic stress is likely to strain families and be a source of long term tension, health problems, and domestic conflict.

RELIGION AND EXPRESSIVE CULTURE

Bosniak Muslim performing the call to prayer.

Religious Beliefs. Bosniaks are Sunni Muslims of the Hanafi school of law. Religion is the main distinguishing factor between Serbs, Croats, and Bosniaks in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Islam thus defines and sets apart Bosniaks from Serbs and Croats. Since religion and ethnic identity are intimately interconnected, public displays of religious beliefs were discouraged in socialist Yugoslavia (1945-1990). Membership in the Communist Party, which was a prerequisite for a successful career or for being hired as a state employee, excluded the possibility of practicing one's religion openly. The limitations put on the expression of Muslim religious beliefs was at times particularly vigorous. During this period only a small number of Muslims followed the five pillars of Islam. Toward the end of the 1980s the regime relaxed its attitude

towards religion, and many new mosques were built, often with economic sponsorship from Islamic countries in the Middle East. With the disintegration of Yugoslavia in the late 1980s and early 1990s there developed increased popular interest in religion and Islamic practices. The war and the losses inflicted on Muslims have increased awareness of Islamic religious practices. In the nationalist climate of the 1990s Islamic rituals became central to the expression of a Bosniak national identity. Islamic symbols are core elements in the emblems and political rhetoric of the main Muslim party, the SDA, which was elected to power in 1990. In rural areas the Islamic religion was always practiced as part of a body of traditions. This rural form of Islam was less scriptural than that practiced by the devout elite in the cities. Rural religious practices are a blend of orthodox Islam, popular Islam (such as the visiting of saints' graves for good health and fortune), and non-Islamic customs, some of which Bosniaks share with their Christian neighbors. In some regions the influence of rituals and customs characteristic of the Naqshibandi sufi order and religious customs is reflected in local religious practices.

Religious Practitioners. There are both male and female religious instructors. The male instructor is called a *hodza* and the female instructor is called a *bula.* Both are educated at the *Medressa* (a Quaranic school) in Sarajevo. The men and women receive the same education but have different duties once employed by a mosque council. Women cannot lead prayers in the mosque or perform the ritual washing of a male corpse. Bulas engage in leading *tevhids* (social gatherings with collective prayers for the souls of the dead) ; preparing a female corpse for burial; reciting and reading at *mevluds* (a festive gathering where Islamic recitations, songs and poems are performed to honor the birth of the Prophet Mohammad) ; and in some cases they are instructors at children's Quranic schools. On ritual occasions other devout Muslims who are known as good reciters may give a recital. Islamic scholars who know the Quran by heart *(hafiz)*, demand particular respect. Hodžas who are members of a sufí order, are sought by people in times *of* personal crisis.

Bosniak Muslims during prayer *(Source: World Bulletin).*

Ceremonies. In Islam, religious ceremonies accompany life-cycle rituals such as male circumcision, marriage, and death. Among Bosnian Muslims circumcision is rarely an elaborate ritual, although some devout families may organize a mevlud in connection with a son's circumcision. A religious wedding ceremony was rare before 1990 but may be on the increase. Death is the life crisis that receives the most ritual elaboration through

various forms of congregational prayers. Here the tevhid and particularly the women's tevhid occupy a central place. Ceremonial holidays follow the Islamic calendar, but some are observed only by the devout, while others have a more popular appeal. Bajram is a three day feast that marks the end of Ramadan, the month of fasting. Only a small number of devout Muslims (primarily women) fasted during the socialist period, but since 1990 the numbers have been increasing. Bosnian Muslims also observe Kurban Bajram, the sacrifice of the ram. In addition, throughout the calendar year, individual Muslim households may host a mevlud, often in connection with happy events such as the birth of a child. Tevhid, or prayers for the dead, is the most popularly held noncalendric ceremony. Muslims are required to pray five times a day and (for men) attend the mosque on Fridays. Devout Muslims do this, but most Bosniaks do not.

Arts. Bosniak architecture is reflected in the style of mosques and houses in the old neighborhoods in cities such as Sarajevo, Travnik, and Mostar. During the 1992-1995 war more than a thousand Muslim religious sites were destroyed, including some of the oldest and finest examples of Bosnian Muslim architecture: The Ferhad Pasha mosque in Banja Luka and the Alada mosque in Foća were among those razed by Serbian nationalist forces. The old Ottoman bridge in Mostar was blown up by Croatian nationalist forces.

In folk music Bosnian Muslims are associated with a particular kind of melancholic love song called *sevdalinka* and a traditional string instrument called *saz.* Islamic calligraphy has been produced by Bosniak artists.

Bosnia and Herzegovina has a rich literary tradition. Internationally acclaimed writers who draw on motives from their Bosniak cultural background include Meša Selimović (1910-1982) and the poet Mak Dizdar (1917-1971). The work of the painter Mersad Berber (b. 1940) is inspired by Bosnian scenery, history and folklore.

Medicine. Before the war Bosnia and Herzegovina had an extensive public medical and health care system with highly educated medical practitioners. Some members of this profession remain, but the public health care system is in disarray and treatment is very costly to the individual patient. During the war, medical personnel left the country or were killed, and those who were educated during the war received incomplete training. A statewide health insurance system was not in place at the beginning of the twenty-first century, and some health personnel expect bribes to treat patients. Bosnians of all three ethno-religious backgrounds seek the assistance of alternative healers as a supplement to conventional medicine. Some Muslims visit hodžas known to posses extraordinary powers that enable them to divine and cure physical and mental afflictions. Certain hodžas write small charms with a Quranic verse that a person carries for healing or protection. The holy text is believed to have healing powers, and the recital of specific

verses from the Quran may be used for healing. Many Bosnians have knowledge of the use of herbs and herbal teas and other natural remedies.

Death and Afterlife. At death certain obligatory rituals prescribed by Islamic law are performed by men, such as the ritual washing of a male corpse and the *Dženaza* prayers and burial. Women are not allowed to attend the burial ceremony and instead participate in tevhid, collective prayers that help the deceased secure a good afterlife. This ritual is not prescribed by Islam and is therefore considered voluntary. The tevhid used to be performed mainly by women, usually in the house of the deceased, but now is increasingly performed by men in the mosque. It is held five times at determined intervals during the first year after a person's death. The prayers are said on behalf of the deceased and are believed to assist him or her by earning him or her religious merit. Those who say the prayers increase their chances of well-being in after-life. It is also an occasion for remembering and honoring other dead relatives and neighbors. In times of special need people may pray at the shrines of a Muslim martyr *(šehit)* or saint *(evlija)*. Because of their piety during their lifetime and/or their heroic deaths and martyrdom these pious dead are believed to be closer to God and in a position to mediate on behalf of the living.

For the original article on Bosnian Muslims, *see* Volume 4, Europe.

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Serbs in Bosnia

By Florian Bieber
From Encyclopedia Princetoniensis

INTRODUCTION / DEFINITION:

The Serb community in Bosnia and Herzegovina is the second largest (1991: 31.4%, 1,369,258) of the three dominant nations (Serbs, Bosniaks, Croats). Bosnian Serbs are also the largest Serb community outside of Serbia itself. The main dispute in Bosnia arose from the dissolution of Yugoslavia, when most Serbs did not support the country's independence, but instead joined the Serbian war-effort to dismember Bosnia and attach Serb controlled areas to Serbia. While this plan was thwarted, the Dayton Peace Accords that ended the war recognized the Serb Republic (Republika Srpska, RS) as one of the country's two entities. Bosnian statehood does not enjoy strong support among Bosnia Serbs and many prefer RS becoming independent or joining Serbia. On the other hand, many Bosniaks and Croats oppose the existence of the RS, considering that it was established through ethnic cleansing and there was only a slim majority of Serbs living on its pre-war territory.

Currently the RS enjoys far-reaching autonomy as a weak federal state. Since its recognition in 1995 through the Dayton Accords, both the autonomy of the RS and its Serb dominance have been weakened by the Office of the High Representative (OHR), the international agency that oversees the peace process. In recent years, the RS leadership has sought to reverse the erosion of powers of the entity.

Relations between Serbs and other nations in Bosnia have been largely peaceful since the end of the war, but contacts remain limited as most Serbs live separately from Bosniaks and Croats within Bosnia.

HISTORICAL EVOLUTION:

Bosnia and Herzegovina, with a heterogeneous population, has been contested between Croat and Serb national movements since the late 19th century. Bosnia saw the conversion of a significant part of the Slavic population under Ottoman rule (until 1878) to Islam. Croat and Serb nationalist movements claimed the converts to be either Croats or Serbs, while historical evidence suggests that few inhabitants had any national identity

before the late 19th century. Many Serbs felt disadvantaged in the Habsburg Monarchy which ruled Bosnia and Herzegovina between 1878 and 1918. The emerging Serbian nation state also laid claim to Bosnia. In this context Gavrilo Princip, a Bosnian Serb and member of a nationalist movement, assassinated Archduke Ferdinand in June 1914, triggering World War I. Following the war, Bosnia became part of Yugoslavia (until 1929 Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes). In interwar Yugoslavia, a centralist monarchy under the Serb Karadjordjević dynasty dominated the country, resulting in widespread dissatisfaction among non-Serbs, whereas most Bosnian Serbs supported the state (Bataković 1996: 64-100). During World War II, Bosnia was annexed by fascist-led Croatia. The state engaged in genocide against the Jewish and the Serb populations. Many Serbs joined either the royalist and nationalist Četnik movement which sought to reestablish a Yugoslavia under Serb predominance or the Partisan movement, together with Croats and Muslims, which under leadership of the Communist Party strove to reconstitute a Federal Yugoslavia (Hoare 2006). As the Partisan movement won, Bosnia, which had ceased to exist as a distinct unit in 1919, became one of the six federal republics of Communist Yugoslavia. Communist Serbs held dominant positions in the republic, but a policy of promoting national equality sought to ensure the representation of all nations. While other republics had a dominant nation, Serbs, Muslims (following their recognition as a nation in the 1960s) and Croats had equal standing in the republic. This period saw a repression of nationalism expressed by all three nations in Bosnia, while at the same time an elaborate 'ethnic key' sought to ensure representation of members of all three nations through the republic (Andjelić 2003, 39-40).

During the first free elections in Bosnia in 1990, most Serbs, as well as Croats and Muslims, voted for nationalist parties. The Serb Democratic Party (SDS), the dominant party among Bosnian Serb voters, supported an extreme nationalist policy and opposed Bosnian independence from Yugoslavia. The overwhelming majority of Muslims (after 1993, Bosniaks) and Croats on the other hand supported Bosnian independence. This split was reflected in a referendum on independence

Bosnian Serb war leader Radovan Karadzic, right, and his general Ratko Mladic, left *(Source: Daily Mail UK).*

which was boycotted by most Serbs and supported by most Croats and Muslims. Following Bosnia's declaration of independence, the Bosnian Serb leadership of the SDS, headed by Radovan Karadžić, sought to carve out a Serb-dominated territory to join Serbia. (However, many Serbs remained loyal to the Bosnian government and did not support the partition of Bosnia advocated by the SDS and Serbia under leadership of Slobodan Milosevic.) This dispute triggered the 1992-95 war and led to the establishment of a Serb Republic. Non-Serbs were systematically 'ethnically cleansed' from the territory to which the new RS laid claim or mass murdered (Shoup/Berg 1999: 128-187). In total, more than 100,000 inhabitants of Bosnia died in the three and a half year war, approximately two-thirds were Bosniaks and a quarter were Serbs—most of the Bosniak victims were civilians, whereas most Serb victims were soldiers (IDC 2007, 33-35).

The war ended with the Dayton Peace Accords in 1995, which established a highly decentralized Bosnia with the Serb Republic as one of the country's two entities. Whereas before the war Serbs had lived intermingled with the other groups throughout Bosnia, the war lead to a far-reaching homogenization of the territory. The state itself is governed by a complex power-sharing system, while Serbs enjoy political predominance in the unitary RS. After the war, the RS has maintained close ties with neighboring Serbia (and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia until 2003), sanctioned by agreements on special relations that entities are entitled to conclude with neighboring countries. Cooperation at the state-level in Bosnia has been cumbersome and often only possible through imposition by external actors (Bose 2002).

The signing of the Dayton Peace Accords. From left to right: Serbian President, Slobodan Milosevic; Bosnian President, Alija Izetbegovic; and Croatian President, Franjo Tudjman *(Source: U.S. Department of State)*.

RESOLUTION / STATUS:

The peace process has been overseen by a strong international presence in form of a military mission (first IFOR, then SFOR, and EUFOR) under NATO leadership and a civilian mission which oversees the political process (OHR). The OHR has been able to dismiss officials and enforce compliance with the peace agreement. Since 2003 the EU has taken a more prominent role, first by taking over the police mission, followed by the

peacekeeping operation and through a Special Representative (EUSR) doubling as High Representative. Post-war developments have been shaped by ethnic autonomy, while the peace plan encouraged the return of refugees (around half of the four million inhabitants were displaced during the war). Nevertheless, over 160,000 Bosniak and Croat refugees have returned to the RS between 1996 and 2010. Still, the RS is estimated to have an approx. 80-90 percent Serb population, while according to some estimates, only 4 to 7 percent of the Federation population are of Serb background (Bieber 2006: 32, 64, 77).

The political system of Bosnia is complex and cumbersome, relying on international intervention to overcome deadlock. Most political parties, as most other institutions and society more broadly are divided along ethnic lines, rendering cooperation often difficult. In the RS, support for independence has been strong but oscillating, depending on the political salience of the issue. Since 2006, the RS has been dominated by the Alliance of Independent Social Democrats (SNSD) led by Milorad Dodik, who adopted a strong nationalist platform and has sought to carve out maximum autonomy for the RS. Most Serb parties in Bosnia share the support for a strong and autonomous RS, but differ on the degree of confrontation with other nations and international actors they are willing to engage in. Some parties in the Federation seek to reach out to the entities' Serbs, but parties rarely campaign in both entities and reach out beyond their core ethnic constituency (Bieber 2006: 103-107).

The key challenge has been the lack of consensus on the state and its political system and degree of decentralization. International intervention has substantially advanced governance and weakened the discriminatory polices in both entities, particularly in the RS toward other nations, but also created a dependence of the political system on further external assistance. The confrontation with the past, in particular with war crimes committed during the 1992-95 war remains driven largely by external actors. The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) has sentenced a number of leading Bosnian Serb commanders for war crimes and genocide in Srebrenica. Although the RS government recognized the mass murder of Muslims in Srebrenica following a detailed report commissioned by the government under international pressure, in political discourse war crimes are often down-played or denied and war criminals are glorified. This has been fueled by the perception that few non-Serbs have been sentenced for crimes against Serbs by the ICTY (Subotić 2009: 159-160).

PROSPECTS / ANALYSIS:

The prospect of renewed conflict has decreased and levels of violence have been low in recent years. Key controversies revolve around amending the constitution (part of the Dayton Peace Accords) to render the political system more functional and to secure Bosnia's ability to operate without international involvement. Whereas most Bosnian

Serb parties support a loose federation with great autonomy for the RS, most Bosniak parties advocate more centralized institutions and the eventual abolition of the RS. The international military mission has been decreased to a symbolic minimum and the power and the strength of the OHR has decreased and is to be taken over by the European Union. In recent years, tensions between the RS and international actors have increased amidst suggestions by the RS leadership that the entity would have a right to self-determination and suggesting the possibility of a referendum on more autonomy or even independence. The declaration of independence of Kosovo in 2008 and the International Court of Justice decision in 2010 have been interpreted by the RS to facilitate the entities' possibility of independence. International actors have decisively ruled out any break up of Bosnia and there appears to be no political support in either Croatia or Serbia for such a scenario.

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Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina

By EPRSauthor
From European Parliamentary Research Service
January 8, 2014

Bosnian Croats, the smallest of the country's three main communities, complain of a lack of political power. Many left Bosnia during the war and a majority settled in Croatia. In what is now Republika Srpska, only 5-10% are thought to have returned. Several estimates have been made, that range from 434 000 to 570 000, significantly less than in 1991 census when there were 760 000.

In October 2013, according to preliminary results of the 2013 census, the Federation had an estimated population of 2 371 603. Data on ethnicity will be published in 2014, however, since many Croats have left, fewer are expected than in 1991. This might make the Croat demand for equal treatment more difficult to achieve, and it could be that Bosnia is seen to be turning into a bi-national state. The 2013 Progress report criticises the new Coordination Body of Ministers of Education of the Cantons with a Croat majority, which may fragment decision-making even more.

Bosnian Croat soldiers held prisoner by Bosnian Serbs during the Bosnian War *(Source: The Atlantic).*

CONSTITUTIONS

In the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), cantons were created by the Bosniak-Croat Washington Agreement of 1994 and then outlined by the Dayton Agreement in 1995. Three of the ten cantons of the Federation have a Croat majority (Posavina, West Herzegovina, and West Bosnia), whereas two (Central Bosnia and Herzegovina-Neretva) are mixed, with legislative protection of the constituent ethnic groups.

According to the preamble of the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina, there are three constituent peoples: Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs. This is repeated in article 1 of the Constitution of the Bosnia and Herzegovina Federation concerning the Bosnians and Croats as constituent peoples. The constitution also specifies the composition and procedures of the Parliamentary Assemblies and of the Governments in order to balance and protect the interests of Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs.

CROATIAN POLITICAL PARTIES

The two main Croatian political parties, HDZ and the HDZ 1990 share the common goal of the creation of a new Entity that would be dominated by Croats. The Bosnian Croats have found an ally in Republika Srpska, whose president Milorad Dodik is empowered by any division inside the Federation. There is also a plan to change the set-up of the cantons: notably the fusion of the three southern cantons into one would create a bigger Croatian-dominated territory. Croatia is wary of intervening in Bosnian affairs, but in a common statement of 22 March 2011 on the political crisis in Bosnia, the Croatian president and Prime Minister underlined the territorial integrity of BiH but restated the importance of equality of the three constituent peoples. In December 2013 a poll indicated that a majority of Bosnian Croats support the creation of a third entity in BiH.

Leader of the Croatian Democratic Union of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Dragan Covic exchanges gifts with Pope Francis *(Source: Getty Images).*

Bosnia Crisis: Serbs, Croats and Muslims…

By Tony Barber
From Independent
August 8, 1992



Map of various ethnic and religious groups in the modern-day Yugoslavia countries. *(Source: HistoryPlace.com).*

Estimates vary of the death toll in 13 months of civil war in what was Yugoslavia, but it certainly runs into many thousands, making the conflict the most violent in Europe since the Second World War. The immediate origins of the war lie in the collapse of the post-1945 Communist order and subsequent clashes between a variety of militant nationalisms. But the deeper roots lie far back in history.

The main rivals are the Serbs and Croats, two Slavic peoples with similar languages - though Serbian is written in Cyrillic and Croatian in Latin script - but whose histories are very different.

The Serbs are Orthodox Christians whose religion was crucial in keeping alive their national identity during almost four centuries of Ottoman Turkish occupation. Of the nations that formed Yugoslavia in 1918, the Serbs were alone in having liberated themselves from foreign rule and set up an independent state in the 19th century.

The Croats spent centuries under the Austro-Hungarian empire and their Catholicism and Central European outlook were equally important in shaping their identity. They resented the fact that the first Yugoslav state, which lasted from 1918-1941, was to a great extent Serbia writ large, with a Serbian king and army and a Serb- dominated system.

When the Nazis dismembered Yugoslavia in 1941, they created a fascist puppet state of Croatia, which incorporated most of Bosnia. This state slaughtered hundreds of thousands of Serbs and Jews. From 1941-1945 more than a million Yugoslavs died, more than half at the hands of each other.

Tito rebuilt Yugoslavia as a Communist federation of six equal republics, but ethnic antagonisms were never far below the surface. The Serbs disliked Tito's recognition of the Macedonians and the Muslims of Bosnia-Herzegovina as distinct nationalities.

The effect of recognition of the Muslims - Slavs converted to Islam under Turkish rule - and growth in the Muslim population was to turn Bosnian Serbs into a minority in a republic where they had been the largest ethnic group.

The collapse of Communism in 1990-91 led to the election of government in Slovenia and Croatia committed to independence. Although the Serb-led Yugoslav army tried briefly to prevent Slovenian independence, the Serbs' main concern was Croatia. Croatia had a 600,000-strong Serbian minority, descendants of Serbs who had fled Turkish rule centuries earlier. With the memory of Second World War atrocities behind them, the Serbs were unwilling to live in an independent Croatia again. For their part, the Croats viewed the Serbian minority as a group that had enjoyed special privileges under Communism.

Supported by the army and Serbia itself, the Serbs rose in armed rebellion. They now control about a quarter of Croatia and have set up two autonomous regions that are under the protection of United Nations forces sent in to keep a fragile peace. Croatia has vowed to recapture these regions, by force if necessary.

In Bosnia, three nationalities lived before the latest conflict in inextricably mixed communities: the Muslims with 44 per cent of the population, the Serbs with 32 per cent and the Croats with 17 per cent. The communities lived in relative harmony. After the European Community demanded a referendum on independence in Bosnia in February, they split on ethnic lines. Muslims and Croats supported independence but the Serbs boycotted the vote and, again with the army's support, began a fight for territory.

The feature of the Croatian and Bosnian wars that has caught the world's attention has been the Serbian expulsion of Croats, Muslims and smaller nationalities from their native areas in an effort to make the regions purely Serbian. This policy of 'ethnic cleansing' is responsible for the huge wave of Muslim refugees flooding into many European countries. The detention camps where Serbs are holding large numbers of Muslim prisoners are not, however, places of extermination in the Nazi sense. The primary

Serbian goal is to remove Muslims from an area comprising about two-thirds of Bosnia so that this territory can be merged into one lump with the two autonomous Serbian regions of Croatia and Serbia proper. This will be 'Greater Serbia'.

At the same time, the Croatian army has helped Croats in Bosnia to take over much of the west of the republic that lies near Croatia's Adriatic coast. Just as the Serbs have declared an 'Independent Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina', so the Croats have proclaimed an autonomous region of Herzeg-Bosnia with Mostar as its capital. De facto, Croatia has colluded with Serbia in carving up Bosnia, although it has escaped with much less international censure.

The real losers, then, are the Muslims, who have been left with almost no land. Both Serbs and Croats have claimed that Muslims are not a genuine nationality but are 'really' Serbs or Croats beneath their religion. Both have also claimed Bosnia-Herzegovina as part of their own historic territory. The Muslims might once have preferred to stay in a united Yugoslavia where their ethnic and religious rights were protected, but now they are locked in a struggle for their very survival.

Chapter III: Three Ethnic Groups
Study Questions

Created by Student Interns, The Echo Foundation

1. What are the three main ethnic groups of modern-day Bosnia-Herzegovina?
2. Describe the Bosniaks in terms of religion, language, culture.
3. Describe the Serbs in terms of religion, language, culture.
4. Describe the Croats in terms of religion, language, culture.
5. What issues exist between the three groups today?
6. Is the presence of the three groups a hinderance or an advantage to the growth of modern day Bosnia?
7. Discuss some examples of present-day conflict between the three ethnic groups.
8. How does the country acknowledge all three ethnic groups today?
9. What is the manifestation of trying to acknowledge all these ethnic groups?
10. Where is the largest population of Bosniaks in the United States?
11. Do you identify more closely with other members of your religion, nation, or political persuasion? Why?
12. Find an example of another multi-ethnic state that has been successful. What is different between that country and Bosnia?

Chapter IV: Bosnian War

Photo Copyright Ron Haviv/VII

"One shouldn't be afraid of the humans. Well, I am not afraid of the humans, but of what is inhuman in them."

Ivo Andric, 1961 Nobel Peace Prize in Literature

Timeline: Break-up of Yugoslavia

From BBC News
May 22, 2006

1991-1992: DISINTEGRATION

Yugoslavia was first formed as a kingdom in 1918 and then recreated as a Socialist state in 1945 after the Axis powers were defeated in World War II.

The constitution established six constituent republics in the federation: Bosnia-Hercegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Slovenia. Serbia also had two autonomous provinces: Kosovo and Vojvodina.

By 1992 the Yugoslav Federation was falling apart. Nationalism had once again replaced communism as the dominant force in the Balkans.

Slovenia and then Croatia were the first to break away, but only at the cost of renewed conflict with Serbia.

The war in Croatia led to hundreds of thousands of refugees and reawakened memories of the brutality of the 1940s.

By 1992 a further conflict had broken out in Bosnia, which had also declared independence. The Serbs who lived there were determined to remain within Yugoslavia and to help build a greater Serbia.

Displaced Bosnian Muslims during the Bosnian War (*Photo Copyright Ron Haviv/VII*).

They received strong backing from extremist groups in Belgrade. Muslims were driven from their homes in carefully planned operations that become known as "ethnic cleansing".

By 1993 the Bosnian Muslim government was besieged in the capital Sarajevo, surrounded by Bosnian Serb forces who

controlled around 70% of Bosnia.

In Central Bosnia, the mainly Muslim army was fighting a separate war against Bosnian Croats who wished to be part of a greater Croatia. The presence of UN peacekeepers to contain the situation proved ineffective.

1995: DAYTON PEACE DEAL

American pressure to end the war eventually led to the Dayton agreement of November 1995 which created two self-governing entities within Bosnia - the Bosnian Serb Republic and the Muslim(Bosnjak)-Croat Federation.

The settlement's aims were to bring about the reintegration of Bosnia and to protect the human rights but the agreement has been criticised for not reversing the results of ethnic cleansing.

The Muslim-Croat and Serb entities have their own governments, parliaments and armies.

A Nato-led peacekeeping force is charged with implementing the military aspects of the peace agreement, primarily overseeing the separation of forces. But the force was also granted extensive additional powers, including the authority to arrest indicted war criminals when encountered in the normal course of its duties.

Croatia, meanwhile, took back most of the territory earlier captured by Serbs when it waged lightning military campaigns in 1995 which also resulted in the mass exodus of around 200,000 Serbs from Croatia.

1999: KOSOVO INTERVENTION

In 1998, nine years after the abolition of Kosovo's autonomy, the Kosovo Liberation Army - supported by the majority ethnic Albanians - came out in open rebellion against Serbian rule.

The international community, while supporting greater autonomy, opposed the Kosovar Albanians' demand for independence. But international pressure grew on Serbian strongman, Slobodan Milosevic, to bring an end to the escalating violence in the province.

Threats of military action by the West over the crisis culminated in the launching of Nato air strikes against Yugoslavia in March 1999, the first attack on a sovereign European country in the alliance's history.

The strikes focused primarily on military targets in Kosovo and Serbia, but extended to a wide range of other facilities, including bridges, oil refineries, power supplies and communications.

Ethnic Albanian refugees fleeing Kosovo (*Source: BBC UK)*.

Within days of the strikes starting, tens of thousands of Kosovo Albanian refugees were pouring out of the province with accounts of killings, atrocities and forced expulsions at the hands of Serb forces.

Returning them to their homes, along with those who had fled in the months of fighting before the strikes, became a top priority for the Nato countries.

Meanwhile, relations between Serbia and the only other remaining Yugoslav republic, Montenegro, hit rock bottom, with Montenegrin leaders seeking to distance themselves from Slobodan Milosevic's handling of Kosovo.

2000-2003: MILOSEVIC OUSTED

Yugoslavia has disappeared from the map of Europe, after 83 years of existence, to be replaced by a looser union called simply Serbia and Montenegro, after the two remaining republics.

The arrangement was reached under pressure from the European Union, which wanted to halt Montenegro's progress towards full independence. However, Montenegrin politicians say they will hold a referendum on independence in 2006.

The death of Yugoslavia is only one of many momentous changes that have occurred since the end of the Kosovo conflict.

Slobodan Milosevic lost a presidential election in 2000. He refused to accept the result but was forced out of office by strikes and massive street protests, which culminated in the storming of parliament.

He was handed over to a UN war crimes tribunal in The Hague, and put on trial for crimes against humanity and genocide.

Kosovo itself became a de facto UN protectorate, though some powers have begun to be handed back to elected local authorities. One of the main problems in the province is getting Serbs who fled as Yugoslav security forces withdrew in 1999, to return to their homes.

Conflict between Serbs and ethnic Albanians threatened to erupt in late 2000 in the Presevo valley, on the Serbian side of the Kosovo border, but dialogue between Albanian guerrillas and the new democratic authorities in Belgrade allowed tensions to evaporate.

There was, however, a major outbreak of inter-ethnic violence in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia in 2001, again involving the Albanian minority. This was contained by Nato peacekeepers and ultimately resolved by political means.

2006: DEATH OF MILOSEVIC

Slobodan Milosevic was found dead in his cell in The Hague on 11 March 2006.

His long-running trial had been hit by repeated delays - partly because of his poor health - and no verdict had been reached.

A man mourning the death of Slobodan Milosevic, former Serbian President (*Source: NBC News)*.

A Dutch investigation concluded that he had died of a heart attack, dismissing claims by his supporters that he had been poisoned.

He was buried in his Serbian home town, Pozarevac, but the Serbian government had refused to allow a state funeral.

Serbia meanwhile came under intense international pressure to find and hand over General Ratko Mladic, the former Bosnian Serb commander topping the UN tribunal's list of wanted war crimes suspects, alongside his fugitive wartime political ally Radovan Karadzic.

Belgrade's failure to catch Gen Mladic set back its hopes for eventual EU membership, as the EU decided to suspend talks on forging closer ties.

In Kosovo reconciliation between the majority ethnic Albanians, most of them pro-independence, and the Serb minority remained elusive.

Several rounds of UN-mediated talks have been held, without any significant breakthrough. The UN wants to find a solution for Kosovo's disputed status by the end of 2006.

The state union of Serbia and Montenegro is all that remains of the federation of six republics that made up former Yugoslavia - but in a referendum on 21 May, Montenegro narrowly voted for independence from Serbia.

Montenegro's Prime Minister Milo Djukanovic led the campaign for independence, although the population was deeply divided as there are close cultural links between the two peoples.

Bosnian Genocide

By Sandro Krkljes
From World Without Genocide, Mitchell Hamline School of Law
March 2014

The end of the Cold War and the decline of Communism greatly altered the international political scene – the reunification of Germany, the rapid democratization of Russia, and the velvet divorce of Czechoslovakia from Communist influence, among some of the changes. The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was one of the more liberal communist regimes, led by the enigmatic dictator Josip Broz Tito. Tito kept tight control over the various ethnic, religious, and nationalist groups under the umbrella of a 'greater Yugoslavia.' After Tito's death, politicians began exploiting nationalist rhetoric, pitting the Serbs, Croats, and Bosniaks against each other and igniting the flame of nationalist fervor. The multi-ethnic republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina quickly became the site of the deadliest warfare and the target of an 'ethnic cleansing.' The genocide in Bosnia claimed the lives of an estimated 100,000 people.



Breakup of the former Yugloslavia into six modern-day countries (*Source: BBC UK)*.

Bosnia-Herzegovinia, and the other six nations that made up the former republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), is located in southeastern Europe (also known as the Balkans) along the coast of the Adriatic Sea between Italy and Romania. The population of Bosnia is about 3.8 million, with 48 percent Bosniaks (also known as Bosnian Muslims), 37 percent Serbs, and 14 percent Croats. Bosnia is slightly smaller than West Virginia, but with more than double the population.

BACKGROUND OF YUGOSLAVIA

The country of Yugoslavia, located in southeastern Europe on the Adriatic Sea, has a complex history and is a mosaic of peoples, languages, religions, and cultures.[1] Yugoslavia comprised many different ethnic groups with varying religious and cultural backgrounds. Tension between the groups existed in the past and continues to exist today.

The three major ethnic groups in Yugoslavia were the Serbs, Croats, and the Slovenes. Although all three derived from Slavic backgrounds, there were many differences among them. The Serbs, under Ottoman control, were of the Eastern Orthodox religion, spoke the Serbian language, and used the Cyrillic alphabet. They held the biggest territory and were also the largest of the three. The Croatians, under French and Austro-Hungarian control, were predominately Catholic and spoke the Croatian language. They were the second largest population group and had the greatest amount of natural resources. Finally, the Slovenians, under Austro-Hungarian control, were also Catholic and spoke the Slovenian language.[2] The table below illustrates the three ethnic groups and the differences among them.

	Religion	**Political Affiliation**	**Language**	**Alphabet**
Croatia	Catholic	Federalism	Croatian	Gaj's Latin
Serbia	Orthodox	Centralism	Serbian	Cyrillic
Slovenia	Catholic / Protestant	Federalism	Slovene	Modification of Gaj's Latin

With the end of World War I and the fall of the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian empires, these three major ethnic groups joined together to form the first state that was the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes in December of 1918. There were many reasons for the three to unite and form a country of their own, including gaining human rights, enhancing protection from larger foreign empires and countries, and obtaining security and autonomy.[3] Many believed that the only way for southern Slavs to regain lost freedom after centuries of occupation under the various empires would be to unite and create a state of their own to free themselves from tyrannies and dictatorships.

The country of Yugoslavia was formed in 1929. During the first few years after the birth of the new country, national dissatisfaction grew between the three groups and many disliked the idea of a new state. Much of the turmoil between the different cultural and religious backgrounds of the groups resulted in political separations. Croatians resented the idea of centralism,[4] the favored government of the king and of the Serbs. The Croatians instead wanted a federalist state.[5] Both Croatians and Slovenians resented Serbian domination in government and military affairs.[6] Within the three ethnic groups, a variety of political parties formed and tensions kept rising. Bosnia, located in southeastern Europe along the Balkan peninsula, with a population of about 3.8 million, was caught in the middle of this rising tension. About half of the country of Bosnia is composed of Bosniaks (also known as Bosnian Muslims), thirty-seven percent are Serbs, and fourteen percent are Croatian.

During World War II, Josip Broz, known as "Tito," successfully held the country together under a communist/socialist dictatorship. Tito worked to ensure that no ethnic group dominated the federation and he successfully implemented a multi-ethnic peaceful co-existence. Political mobilization along ethnic lines was banned and state authorities worked hard to defuse ethnic tensions and create an overarching Yugoslav identify.[7]



Not only did Tito work to diffuse ethnic differences among the people, but there was also great economic reform. In 1945, the economy of Yugoslavia began to develop differently than its socialist counterparts by creating a unique form of decentralized market socialism based on workers self-management. The original state-control of industry was localized and councils were created for respective industries. Tito ensured that the regions kept trading with one another and "profits were distributed amongst the workers in each individual firm, and some functions of state control were relinquished and allocation became more relied on the basic mechanisms of the market to ensure self-management and proper distribution."[8] Although this economic model worked was viewed as a success, it was not intended to be a long-term solution. In the late 1980s, Yugoslavia's debts soared to unsustainable levels and eventually the economic bubble burst, spreading fear into all regions of Yugoslavia.

Much has been written about Tito and many praise him as one of the greatest political leaders of World War II because he was able to keep the country united. Expert Richard West argues that Tito was an indispensable leader and that the country of Yugoslavia relied on him to maintain peace and stability within the country and to keep it from separation. Without him, the "strings that tied the nation together were broken."[9]

CIVIL WAR

After Tito's death in 1980, the various groups lost their economic integration and many old tensions were reignited and disrupted the thirty-five year peace that existed under

Tito's reign.[10] His death left a power vacuum and ambitious politicians such as Slobodan Milosevic of Serbia and Franjo Tudjman of Croatia competed for power. Slobodan Milosevic rose to power in 1987. With his view of a "Greater Serbia," Milosevic began a propaganda campaign that incited feelings of hatred among the people of Yugoslavia. Both Tudjman and Milosevic realized sooner than most that rousing nationalist passions was an effective way to exploit the Yugoslav upheavals for their own power.[11] Milosevic's vision of an ethnically pure Serb-dominated state understandably scared the other six regions (Slovenia, Macedonia, Croatia, Montenegro, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, and Vojvodina) of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, causing them to question their future in the Republic.[12]

Talks of independence began to spread throughout the six republics, and Slovenia and Croatia were the first to declare independence. Although Slovenia left Yugoslavia relatively peacefully, this was not the case for the other regions. The tensions between the Croats, Serbs, and others were exposed and proved too great to be dealt with in peaceful terms. War finally broke out. Bosnia was the most ethnically heterogeneous of Yugoslavia's republics, with 43 percent Muslims, 35 percent Orthodox Serbs, and 18 percent Catholic Croatians, and suffered the worst fate.[13] The multi-ethnic republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina quickly became the site of the deadliest warfare and the target of 'ethnic cleansing.'

Serbian forces used tactics similar of Nazi Germany in their ethnic cleansing campaign (*Photo Copyright Ron Haviv/VII*).

Like the Nazis' "cleansing" Europe of its Jews, the Serbs' aim was the "ethnic cleansing" of any Bosniak or Croat presence in Serbian territory.[14] Human rights violations occurred in many different forms, including curfews, forced relocations, rape, castration, imprisonment in concentration camps, and killings. Journalist Mark Danner describes the Serbs' plan of attack in city after city was as follows:

1. *Concentration* – urge Serb residents of the city to leave, while surrounding the town and bombarding it with artillery fire.
2. *Decapitation* – execute the leaders and intelligentsia of the town.
3. *Separation* – separate the women, children, and old men from the men of "fighting age."
4. *Evacuation* – move women, children, and old men to concentration camps or national borders.
5. *Liquidation* – execute the men of "fighting age."[15]

The most famous example of this plan of attack was the massacre at Srebrenica, a Bosniak-dominated town under weak UN protection. In July of 1995, Serb General Ratko Mladic marched into Srebrenica, separated the women and children from the men, and murdered approximately 7,000 Bosniak men and boys. It was the single largest massacre in Europe since World War II.[16] For those who were not killed in the initial massacre, many were sent to one of 381 concentration or detention camps in Bosnia. Inhumane living conditions, beatings, torture, and mass executions were daily occurrences at these camps and claimed the lives of around 10,000 people over the course of the war. Women were often taken to rape camps where they were raped and tortured for weeks and months until they became pregnant. It is estimated that 20,000 rapes occurred between 1992 and 1995 in Bosnia.[17]

A Bosnian Muslim woman traumatized by rape during the Bosnian War. Sadly, she is one of thousands of women who had similar experiences.

Reports of mass killings and rape had slowly came out of Bosnia, and once photos and videos of concentration camps like Omarska and Trnopolje were published by Western journalists, the reports captured the world's attention. According to author Samantha Power, "No other atrocity campaign in the twentieth century was better monitored and understood by the U.S. government than the Bosnian genocide." However, despite the wealth of information and irrefutable evidence of genocide, the U.S. government under both Presidents George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton initially chose isolationist policies, citing the lack of U.S. interests at stake in the conflict.

Bosniak prisoners in Trnopolje concentration camp (*Photo Copyright Ron Haviv/VII*).

In July of 1992, the first international press reports, photos, and videos of the conflict in Bosnia were published, eerily evoking memories and images of the horror of the Holocaust fifty years earlier.[18] Despite the public outrage created by these reports, the international community still refused to intervene. A year later, after Serbian forces had taken over several Bosniak-dominated cities, the UN established six safe areas that were to be protected by international peacekeepers.[19] However, with very few weapons and orders not to fire unless in self-defense, these peacekeepers were highly ineffective.

After the fall of Srebrenica, which had been designated as one of the UN safe areas, the Croatians and Bosniaks combined their forces to launch Operation Storm, an offensive campaign to push Serbian forces out of the Krajina region in the northwest corner of Bosnia. For the previous two years, Bosniak and Croat forces led separate efforts against the Serbs.[20] Yet by combining their forces, the Croatian-Bosniak offensive was able to push Serb forces, as well as 200,000 civilians, out of Krajina and into other Serb-dominated areas.[21] Although Operation Storm succeeded in pushing back Serbian forces, it also created one of the largest refugee populations in Europe.

The defeat of the Bosnian Serb forces led to the realization that a settlement in Bosnia and Herzegovina must be negotiated as soon as possible, leading to a peace agreement. This agreement, called the Dayton Accords, was signed in Dayton, Ohio, on December 14, 1995. The Accords ended the conflict in Bosnia and stationed 60,000 NATO troops to keep the peace. The initial purpose of the Dayton Accords was to act as a transitory document and to freeze military confrontation. However, there were various shortcomings. The agreement has been criticized for allowing international actors to shape the post-war transition, without input form the Bosnian people and government.[22] It also left the region politically unstable and fractious since its implementation in 1995.

INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA



The Yugoslav War is often referred to as the deadliest conflict in Europe since World War II. According to the International Center for Transitional Justice, from 1991-1999, about 140,000 people lost their lives and about 4 million were displaced as political refugees.[23] In response to this conflict, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) was formed.

The ICTY is a United Nations court that was established by Resolution 827 of the United Nations Security Council in May 1993. It is the first war crimes court ever created by the United Nations and the first international war crimes tribunal since the tribunal held in Nuremberg, in 1946 after World War II. [24] The ICTY was set up to prosecute serious crimes committed during the war in the former Yugoslavia and to try its chief organizers, planners, and perpetrators. The Court's indictments address crimes committed from 1991 to 2001 against members of various ethnic groups in Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Kosovo, and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. The proceedings at the ICTY prosecute people on two levels: (1) individual acts; and (2) in a position of authority for acts to be carried out.[25]

The Tribunal has indicted 161 individuals for crimes committed against thousands of victims during the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia. It has concluded proceedings for 136 individuals, with 25 proceedings ongoing. While most of cases are against Serbs or Bosnian Serbs, charges have also been brought against defendants of other ethnic groups, including Croats, Bosnian Muslims, and Kosovo Albanians for crimes committed against Serbs.[26]

The Yugoslav tribunal is a hybrid court; it combines elements of the Anglo-American common-law adversarial system and the European civil law system. In our common-law



system, factual determinations are driven by lawyers, with a judge perceived as an impartial figure of authority. The rules of evidence assume that most cases will be submitted to juries, whose members must be shielded from evidence that might lead them to erroneous conclusions. In the civil-law system, factual determinations are driven by the judge, who decides which witnesses to hear after all the evidence has been submitted in a dossier. Little evidence is presented in court because, as a professional, the judge is trusted to sort out the relevant evidence and give it the appropriate weight.

One of the most noteable features of the adversarial system in the hybrid court is the cross-examination of witnesses. The civil-law approach is noted for the judge's determination to resolve all ambiguities. The guilt of the accused must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Evidence brought to the tribunal is treated in terms of weight rather than admissibility. Very little evidence is excluded, but a lawyer must anticipate how to persuade the judges to give evidence the weight he or she thinks appropriate.

The Yugoslavia tribunal combines facets of both systems, as the judges and lawyers who populate the court come from both common-law and civil-law traditions in almost equal proportions. The sixteen permanent judges are elected by the United Nations General Assembly and most are professional judges who rose to the highest ranks of judicial office in their home countries, with an occasional academic or diplomat included.

IMPLICATIONS FOR JUSTICE AND IMPUNITY

The International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia has contributed to justice in many ways and set precedents for international law. One of the most important ways the ICTY has contributed to the broader issues of impunity and transitional justice was by holding the political leaders of Yugoslavia accountable.

Transitional justice refers to the set of judicial and non-judicial measures that have been implemented by different countries to redress the legacies of massive human rights abuses. These measures include criminal prosecutions, truth commissions, reparations programs, and various kinds of institutional reforms.[27] The elements of a comprehensive transitional justice policy are:

- Criminal prosecutions, particularly those that address perpetrators considered to be the most responsible.
- Reparations, through which governments recognize and take steps to address the harms suffered. Such initiatives often have material elements (such as cash payments or health services) as well as symbolic aspects (such as public apologies or day of remembrance).
- Institutional reform of abusive state institutions such as armed forces, police and courts, to dismantle—by appropriate means—the structural machinery of abuses and prevent recurrence of serious human rights abuses and impunity.
- Truth commissions or other means to investigate and report on systematic patterns of abuse, recommend changes, and help understand the underlying causes of serious human rights violations.

The Tribunal has laid the foundations for what is now the accepted norm for conflict resolution and post-conflict development across the globe, specifically that leaders suspected of mass crimes will face justice. Also, by holding leaders accountable, the Tribunal has dismantled the tradition of impunity for war crimes. The Tribunal indicted individuals at all government levels, including heads of state, prime ministers, army chiefs of staff, and government ministers from various parties of Yugoslavia.[28] As these individuals are brought to justice, the country, its citizens, its victims, and its diaspora can at last have finality and move on with their lives.

Not only does the ICTY convict prominent individuals who have committed heinous crimes, but it also provided the victims, and especially hundreds of Yugoslav women who have been raped, an opportunity to voice the horrors they witnessed and experienced. The Tribunal has allowed them to be heard and to speak about what had happened to them and their families. A final achievement of the ICTY is that the Tribunal has helped in creating an accurate historical record of the war. It has contributed in establishing the facts of the events, which has also help to bring closure to the victims.

The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia has also been very important in developing the field of international law, as it has proved that efficient and transparent international justice is possible.[29] Some of the success of the Tribunal has

inspired and motivated the creation of other international criminal courts such as the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and the Special Court for Sierra Leone.[30] National courts set up in Kosovo, East Timor, and Lebanon to deal with war crimes have also borrowed heavily from the Yugoslav tribunal. The ICTY has been a great model for the implementation of mechanisms such as giving due process to the accused and court's ability to promote peace in the areas affected by conflict for other nations and other Tribunals to follow.[31] Although the Court has done much to bring about peace and develop international law, many victims voices and claims have not been met.

World Without Genocide, March 2014. By Sandro Krkljes, World Without Genocide Associate, William Mitchell College of Law.

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[5] A system of government in which sovereignty is constitutionally divided between a central governing authority and constituent political units (such as states or provinces). Federalism is a system based upon democratic rules and institutions in which the power to govern is shared between national and provincial/state governments, creating what is often called a federation.
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United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina - Background

Prepared By the Peace and Security Section of the Department of Public Information
From United Nations
2003

BACKGROUND

Fighting in Bosnia and Herzegovina came to an end on 11 October 1995. From that date until 20 December 1995, forces of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) monitored a ceasefire put in place to allow for peace negotiations being launched in Dayton, Ohio. On 21 November 1995, in Dayton, the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina was initialled along with 11 associated annexes (together, the "Peace Agreement"). On 8 and 9 December 1995, the Peace Implementation Conference met in London, appointing the High Representative for the Implementation of the Peace Agreement on Bosnia and Herzegovina. On 14 December 1995, the Peace Agreement was signed in Paris by the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of Croatia, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia as well as the other parties thereto.

In signing the Agreement, the three Balkan States undertook a broad Commitment to: conduct their relations in accordance with the United Nations Charter, fully respect the "sovereign equality of one another", settle disputes by peaceful means, and "refrain from any action against the territorial integrity or political independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina or any other State. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Bosnia and Herzegovina recognized each other as "sovereign, independent States within their international borders". On behalf of the Republika Srpska, the Bosnian Serb entity within Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia signed those parts of the accords that concerned that party.

The agreement with its 11 annexes covered a broad range of issues including:

- military aspects of the peace settlement;
- regional stabilization;
- delineation of an Inter-entity Boundary Line between the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska;
- holding of democratic elections;
- human rights;
- assistance to refugees;

- civilian implementation of the Peace Agreement;
- an International Police Task Force.

The parties agreed to a ceasefire which had begun in October 1995, withdrawal of UNPROFOR and deployment of a NATO-led multinational Implementation Force, to be known as IFOR. All final decisions concerning military aspects of the implementation were to be made by the IFOR Commander. Full cooperation was pledged with "all entities involved in the implementation plan", including the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) located at The Hague.

Heavy fighting between Serbs and Bosniaks caused smoke and flames in the village of Ljuta (*Source: The Atlantic)*.

The parties requested designation of a High Representative for the Implementation of the Peace Agreement on Bosnia and Herzegovina, who was to mobilize and coordinate all civilian activities and be the final authority regarding civilian implementation of the peace settlement. They also called for the Security Council to create a United Nations International Police Task Force to monitor law enforcement activities and facilities, advise and train law enforcement personnel, and respond to requests for assistance.

On 15 December 1995, the Security Council, by its 1031(1995), endorsed the establishment of a High Representative to "mobilize and, as appropriate, give guidance to, and coordinate the activities of the civilian organizations and agencies" involved with the civilian aspects of the Peace Agreement. In the same resolution, the Council welcomed the deployment of IFOR in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and noted the invitation of the parties for that force to remain for a period of approximately one year. [In December 1996, the Security Council authorized Member States to set up a multinational Stabilization Force (SFOR) to succeed IFOR.]

On 20 December 1995, IFOR took over from UNPROFOR whose mandate was thus terminated. On 21 December 1995, the Security Council, by its 1035 (1995), decided to establish the United Nations International Police Task Force (IPTF) and a United Nations civilian office, brought together as the United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH).

Following the successful conclusion of its mandate, UNMIBH was terminated on 31 December 2002, in accordance with Security Council resolution 1423 (2002) of 12 July 2002. The European Union Police Mission (EUPM) took over from UNMIBH from 1 January 2003.

ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONS OF UNMIBH

UNMIBH's mandate was to contribute to the establishment of the rule of law in Bosnia and Herzegovina by assisting in reforming and restructuring the local police, assessing the functioning of the existing judicial system and monitoring and auditing the performance of the police and others involved in the maintenance of law and order.

UNMIBH was headed by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) and the Coordinator of United Nations Operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina, who exercised authority over the IPTF Police Commissioner and coordinated all other United Nations activities in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The main components of the Mission were: IPTF; the Criminal Justice Advisory Unit; the Civil Affairs Unit; the Human Rights Office; the Public Affairs Office; and the Administration, including the United Nations Trust Funds. [From 1998 to 2000, UNMIBH also included the Judicial System Assessment Programme (JSAP).] The Mission had a nation-wide presence with regional headquarters in Banja Luka, Bihac, Doboj, Mostar, Sarajevo, Tuzla and a district headquarter in Brcko.

Canadian peacekeepers on a mountain in Bosnia (*Source: Canada Live)*.

International Police Task Force. IPTF was involved in changing the primary focus of the local police from the security of the state to the security of the individual. The police forces were largely downsized from their over-represented ethnic groups and war-time numbers to the cap set by restructuring agreements. IPTF helped to recreate multi-ethnic police forces to make sure that they were professional and effective. This restructuring and reform function expanded beyond the Ministry of Interior with IPTF being involved in the establishment and training of Court Police, the State Border Service and the Bosnia and Herzegovina police contingent selected for duty in UN peacekeeping missions outside the former Yugoslavia. IPTF was

also closely involved in the recruitment, selection, training and deployment of police cadets from under-represented ethnic and gender groups at the two police academies, as well as in encouraging the return and transfer of experienced officers. IPTF was responsible for basic training courses in human dignity and transitional training and for advanced training courses for command and senior officers in both entities of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Under a specific training mandate, IPTF also provided specialized training in Organized Crime, Drugs and Crowd Control and Major Incident Management. In addition, IPTF supported local police through the co-location of its personnel at the Interior Ministries, Public Security Centres and Police Stations, and by providing expert support to investigation of special cases. Other IPTF tasks included weapons inspections, prison inspections and monitoring the enforcement of traffic and crime control.

Human Rights Office. Under the specific mandate of Security Council resolution 1088 (1996), the work of UNMIBH included "investigating or assisting with investigations into human rights abuses by law enforcement personnel." As the component tasked with implementing UNMIBH's human rights mandate, the Human Rights Office's primary objectives were to: (a) investigate human rights violations by law enforcement agents; (b) design remedial measures to correct such violations; and (c) monitor and ensure the implementation of the corrective measures. To implement those objectives, the Human Rights Office carried out investigations into serious incidents of police misconduct and conducted comprehensive inspections of law enforcement agencies to address persistent or endemic institutional deficiencies. In addition, the Office was tasked with ensuring that only those local police who met minimum eligibility requirements exercised police powers in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This was done by maintaining a registry of local police personnel; selecting and certifying police; conducting background checks on all police officers; maintaining a database of all law enforcement agents who acted in non-compliance with IPTF; and reviewing applications for new recruits, particularly those of minority ethnicities.

Judicial System Assessment Program. JSAP was established in accordance with Security Council resolution 1184 (1998) of 16 July 1998. The Programme was mandated to monitor and assess the court system in Bosnia and Herzegovina as part of an overall programme of legal reform under the overall coordination of the High Representative. Teams of international and national lawyers carried out assessments of the legal institutions in Bosnia and Herzegovina and made recommendations for action. At the end of 2000, this responsibility was transferred to the Independent Judicial Commission within the Office of the High Representative.

Criminal Justice Advisory Unit. To foster cooperation between the police and the criminal justice system, and to retain a support and advisory function, UNMIBH

established the Criminal Justice Advisory Unit. This unit monitored key court cases, carried out liaison between police and the judiciary, advised IPTF on legal procedural matters and trained local police in the implementation of criminal procedures.

Bosnian woman and U.N. police force (*Photo Copyright Ron Haviv/VII*).

Civil Affairs. The role of the Civil Affairs Unit was to provide expert advice and assistance to all UNMIBH units on policy development, strategic analysis and programme implementation. In the field, the Civil Affairs Coordinators were the representatives of the SRSG. The Civil Affairs officers maintained liaison with local authorities and international organizations to advance mandate implementation. They sought to build confidence between all citizens and to ensure that the strategic vision, policy and priority guidelines for UNMIBH components were implemented effectively. At headquarters, the Civil Affairs was also responsible for comprehensive reporting and analysis of developments relevant to the UNMIBH mandate.

Public Affairs Office. The main function of the Public Affairs Office was to support the Mission by the development, management and implementation of a public information strategy. The Public Affairs Office was comprised of the Spokesman's Office, Radio, Television, Public Relations, Media Monitoring and Print Units.

Administration. The Administration managed the human resources and material assets of UNMIBH, the United Nations Mission of Observers in Prevlaka (UNMOP), and United Nations liaison offices at Belgrade and Zagreb, and provided logistic, communication, transport and financial support.

Trust Funds. Two separate Trust Funds were established by the UN Secretary-General in March 1994 (Restoration of Essential Public Services in Sarajevo) and in 1996 (Police Assistance Programme). The Funds helped in the implementation of several important projects.

Coordination of the UN System. In his role as coordinator of the United Nations operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the SRSG focused on programmes which support the return of refugees and displaced persons; demining; the promotion of human rights;

the welfare of children; education and culture; elections; and rehabilitation of infrastructure and economic reconstruction.

UNMIBH closely worked with the High Representative for the Implementation of the Peace Agreement, appointed by the London Peace Implementation Conference and approved by the Security Council, and whose task was to mobilize and coordinate the activities of organizations and agencies involved in civilian aspects of the peace settlement in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and monitor the implementation of that settlement.

OVERVIEW

On 2 December 2002, the Secretary-General submitted to the Security Council his final report (S/2002/1314) on UNMIBH in which he gave an overview of the activities of the Mission. Below is the summary of that report.

1996-1999

A political cartoon depicting the credibility of U.N. forces in Bosnia after Srebrenica.

UNMIBH began its operations under inauspicious conditions. As a result of the conflict, over 200,000 people had died, 20,000 were missing and 1.2 million were internally displaced. The country was divided along ethnic lines. The fratricidal war, in which civilians were the principal target and victims, had left a legacy of hatred and widespread fear of retribution.

Numbering over 44,000 - three times peacetime strength - the local police forces were mono-ethnic paramilitary units, organized in three parallel structures, and entirely unsuited to civilian law enforcement. Instead of attempting to provide citizens of minority groups with some sense of security, police forces continued to discriminate against, harass and intimidate citizens who were not of their own ethnicity. Reinforcing the ethnic division, freedom of movement was non-existent, blocked by police checkpoints along the Inter-Entity Boundary Line and between communities in the

Federation. Moreover, police forces were corrupt and politically dominated. Within this highly volatile setting, UNMIBH focused on civilian security. The presence and intensive patrolling of almost 2,000 IPTF monitors made a crucial contribution to creating a stable environment.

As the immediate post-conflict crisis began to subside, UNMIBH began addressing the broader issues of the mandate. Freedom of movement was significantly improved in 1998 through the introduction of uniform vehicle licence plates, a joint initiative by UNMIBH and the Office of the High Representative. The introduction of IPTF procedures for selection and recruitment, which included sanctioning police officers for non-compliance, alongside two major restructuring agreements (in 1996 for the Federation and in 1998 for the Republika Srpska), which set targets for the force numbers and minority representation, laid the foundations for police reform. Highly qualified personnel were increasingly deployed and IPTF advisers placed in the cantonal and entity interior ministries provided closer monitoring. Recognizing the inextricable link between policing and an effective judicial system towards establishing the rule of law, UNMIBH created the Judicial System Assessment Programme in 1998.

Mandate implementation: 2000-2002

By 1999, security had further stabilized and the first significant returns of displaced persons to their pre-war homes began. The Mission then concentrated on implementing the substantive aspects of its mandate. It was evident that sustainable police reform and restructuring could not be tackled through training and intensive co-location alone. A conceptual model constituting the baseline of concrete police reform and restructuring was drawn up. This formed the basis of a two-year mandate implementation plan comprising specific goals, projects, benchmarks and timelines. Three levels were addressed: (a) the individual police officer; (b) law enforcement institutions; and (c) the relationship between the police and the public. The plan was organized in six core programmes and its end goals were set out as follows: certification of individual officers; accreditation of police administrations; and the establishment of self-sustaining mechanisms for State and regional level inter-police force cooperation. The plan became the primary reference document for the Mission's activities, both with local interlocutors and the international community. It brought transparency to UNMIBH work, engendered ownership, transparency and accountability amongst law enforcement personnel and institutions, and provided a clear outline for the Mission's reporting mechanisms.

<u>Core programme one: police reform</u>

The main aim of core programme one: police reform was to ensure that individual police officers met international standards of professional and personal integrity to gain the

respect and confidence of the general public. This required checking wartime backgrounds, professional performance, legality of housing, verification of educational credentials, completion of IPTF compulsory training, proof of citizenship and criminal records. A comprehensive data bank - the local police registry - was set up to store full background information on all law enforcement personnel. Full certification demanded a three-phase process: (a) registering serving police officers; (b) initial screening prior to awarding provisional authorization; and (c) a final in-depth check leading to full certification. Provisional authorization was removed from those law enforcement personnel who failed to comply with these policing standards. Local internal control units were established in all police administrations.

Of the 44,000 personnel, including administrative staff, 23,751 officers were registered. Of these, 16,803 were granted provisional authorization, of whom 15,786 were granted full certification (8,311 in the Federation, 5,692 in the Republika Srpska, 263 in Brcko District, 1,351 in the State Border Service and 169 in the Federation court police).

The second aim of the programme was to raise the professional skills of the police to internationally accepted standards, a task made more difficult by lack of funding and qualified instructors. UNMIBH provided over US$ 500,000 from its Trust Fund for the Police Assistance Programme and professional police training expertise for two police academies, which opened in Sarajevo in October 1998 and Banja Luka in July 1999. In April 2002, permanent training facilities were opened for officers serving with the State Border Service. All police officers, new recruits and returning former officers attended the Mission's mandatory training courses, which comprised a week-long human dignity course and a three-week transition course. Training in specialized areas such as riot control, traffic policing, firearms and management significantly expanded basic policing capacity. Aiming towards self-sustaining police reform, strong emphasis was placed on "training the trainers".

Core programme two: police restructuring

Core programme two: police restructuring sought to ensure that every police administration had adequate resources, had an efficient organizational structure, including external and internal redress mechanisms, was insulated from political interference and had appropriate multi-ethnic representation and gender balance. Comprehensive systems analyses of all law enforcement administrations began in 2002 and a package of reforms and recommendations was developed in cooperation with local authorities. This stage was completed in November and local change management teams in charge of implementing both the basic and longer-term recommendations were deployed in all police administrations.

To minimize political interference in police work, a two-year project was launched to establish independent police commissioners at the cantonal level and directors of police at the entity level. Independent police commissioners were appointed in all 10 Federation cantons. Directors of police were put in place in the Republika Srpska and in the Federation.

The deployment of minority police officers was one of the Mission's most labour-intensive tasks. To increase ethnic representation and address gender balance, four programmes were implemented: (a) voluntary redeployment for minority law enforcement personnel; (b) selection of minority cadets for the two police academies; (c) refresher training programmes for returning former police officers; and (d) recruitment campaigns to encourage female enrolment at the academies. As a further incentive to returning minority officers, UNMIBH also provided housing assistance in cooperation with government ministries and non-governmental organizations. Seventeen rounds of voluntary redeployment took place. A total of 935 cadets were trained through 10 classes at the academies, and at the time of Mission's withdrawal another four classes comprising 465 cadets were undergoing selection and field training. Twelve refresher courses were conducted. By the end of UNMIBH's mandate all police administrations had minority representation, averaging ten per cent throughout the police force. Recruited female police officers numbered 450 (representing almost 4 per cent of the police force in the Federation and over 2 per cent in Republika Srpska) and over 170 female cadets were in training. Brcko District, the State Border Service and the court police were fully multi-ethnic.

Core programme three: police/criminal justice system

Policing is only one component of the rule of law. If a police force is to be fully effective, it must operate within a coherent legal framework, and with an independent and accountable prosecutorial service and judiciary. The Mission's two-year Judicial System Assessment Programme successfully charted core weaknesses in the legal system. At the end of 2000, this responsibility was transferred to the Independent Judicial Commission within the Office of the High Representative. To foster cooperation between the police and the criminal justice system, and to retain a support and advisory function, UNMIBH established the Criminal Justice Advisory Unit. This unit monitored key court cases, carried out liaison between police and the judiciary, advised IPTF on legal procedural matters and trained local police in the implementation of criminal procedures. Specialized training courses to improve the quality of police crime reports was completed in all but one police administration (Canton 6 - Central Bosnia), where political obstruction remained. In July 2001, UNMIBH undertook to establish, train and deploy court police in

both entities. A multi-ethnic court police force was deployed in the Federation in October 2002, and a similar force was to commence operations in the Republika Srpska on 1 January 2003.

Core programme four: institution building and inter-police force cooperation

Without effective State law enforcement institutions and inter-police cooperation mechanisms, the ability to combat national, regional and transnational crime is severely limited. The challenge for UNMIBH was to establish State-level institutions within a new and complex structure comprising two entities, 10 cantons and a separate district. The goal was to establish a State Border Service across the country's 1,550-kilometre border. By the end of Mission's mandate, the Service controlled 100 per cent of the land borders and three international airports. The fourth remaining airport was scheduled to open shortly. This was an important achievement. The number of illegal migrants decreased from 25,000 in 2000 to a few hundred in 2002. Effective border control by the Service generated over $1.2 million for the Treasury in the first nine months of 2002, of which almost $900,000 was in seized goods. To increase State-level central information gathering, analysis and data distribution, and to handle the physical security of VIPs and facilities, a law establishing the State Information and Protection Agency was passed in May 2002. Three directors were appointed to the agency and a working group was established towards full deployment.

Four separate forums were set up under the chairmanship of UNMIBH to promote statewide and regional police cooperation. The Ministerial Consultative Meeting on Police Matters and the Joint Task Force were established to encourage intra-State police cooperation. At the regional level, the Committee of Ministers, comprising representatives from Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Croatia, and the Regional Task Force were established. In order to further strengthen local capacity to combat international crime, UNMIBH assisted with the establishment of a National Central Bureau of the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol) in Sarajevo. Both the State and regional level inter-police forums were handed over to local ownership.

To enhance police capacity to combat human trafficking, in July 2001 UNMIBH established the Special Trafficking Operations Programme (S.T.O.P.) for local police, monitored by IPTF officers. As of 23 November 2002, the Programme had carried out over 800 raids, identified 240 establishments suspected of activities involving trafficking, of which 151 were closed, and helped to repatriate 264 trafficked victims with the support of the International Organization for Migration (IOM). In addition to country-

wide access to NGO sponsored safe houses, three safe houses for trafficking victims were established in coordination with IOM.

Core programme five: public awareness

To create public trust and confidence in the police force, a series of national public awareness campaigns were conducted, emphasizing the core principles of democratic policing: police protection, accountability and impartiality. Police-sponsored community open days, school visits and demonstrations of law enforcement skills further increased public confidence.

Additional campaigns informed the public about the State Border Service and encouraged the recruitment of ethnic minority and female police officers. A bi-monthly newspaper on the State Border Service was published, radio news programming on UNMIBH activities sent to local stations, and a Mission web site was set up and updated daily.

Core programme six: participation in United Nations peacekeeping

UNMIBH considered Bosnia and Herzegovina's participation in United Nations peacekeeping operations as beneficial for harmonizing police and military cooperation in the country. The mission provided the authorities of Bosnia and Herzegovina with substantial support and advice on contribution to these operations. A multi-ethnic civilian police contingent from Bosnia and Herzegovina had served in East Timor (now Timor-Leste) since 2000, first with the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET), then transferring to the United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISET). A multi-ethnic group of United Nations military observers had been deployed to the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) since January 2001. In November 2002, a second multi-ethnic group of military observers was deployed to the United Nations Organizational Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC). A composite unit for United Nations peacekeeping missions (an integrated 60 person, company-sized logistics light transport company) was established. A procedure for future contributions was developed and responsibility was transferred to local ownership.

Trust funds

Two trust funds provided essential resources to UNMIBH mandate implementation. The Trust Fund for the Restoration of Essential Public Services in and outside Sarajevo, which had been established in 1994, received contributions totalling almost $21 million. In addition, interest income of more than $3 million was utilized to finance projects.

More than 540 projects were implemented in the fields of public health, shelter, water, energy, public transport, communications, education and sanitation. The Trust Fund for the Police Assistance Programme in Bosnia and Herzegovina received contributions of $16.3 million. These resources were used to implement core programmes aimed at assisting the local police and law enforcement institutions through the provision of uniforms and equipment, the financing of training courses and the restoration of police facilities.

Secretary-General's observations

Bosnian Special Police Support Unit in the town of Zenicav (*Source: Daily Mail UK*).

Concluding his 2 December 2003 final report on the Mission, the Secretary-General observed that through UNMIBH, the United Nations had demonstrated its ability to complete a complex mandate in accordance with a strategic plan and within a realistic and finite time frame. UNMIBH completed the most extensive police reform and restructuring project ever undertaken by the United Nations. A high standard of security throughout the country was established. Bosnia and Herzegovina had now all the mechanisms and institutions to participate fully in the regional and international fight against organized crime and terrorism. The State Border Service dramatically reduced the flow of illegal migrants, helped deter narcotics and human trafficking and reduce smuggling. The handover of long-term police monitoring to EUPM was an excellent example of cooperation and smooth transition between the United Nations and a regional organization. Integral to all these achievements was the innovative mandate implementation plan, which was being emulated in other United Nations peacekeeping missions and the Office of the High Representative.

UNMIBH, the Secretary-General continued, was entrusted with the implementation of only one, but crucial aspect of the Dayton Peace Agreements, that was the reform and restructuring of law enforcement agencies in Bosnia and Herzegovina and thus contributing to strengthening the rule of law. The Mission worked in close cooperation with other international organizations dealing with other civilian and military aspects of

the Dayton Agreements, such as the Implementation Force, the Stabilization Force, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). The overall coordination of the civilian international activities was carried out by the Office of the High Representative under the guidance of the Peace Implementation Council. The contribution of UNMIBH was thus a part of a broader effort by the international community aimed at strengthening the foundations of peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The Secretary-General said that by improving public security and reforming and restructuring the police, UNMIBH helped lay the foundation for post-war recovery and development. The high standard of returnee security encouraged the return of over 250,000 refugees to their pre-war homes. Police reform and restructuring in accordance with international standards created in Bosnia and Herzegovina what was termed "a police fit for Europe". The two trust funds both assisted police reform and contributed to the country's wider post-conflict recovery.

Throughout its mandate, UNMIBH assisted, and was assisted by other members of the United Nations family: UNHCR, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, the United Nations Children's Fund, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, the United Nations Population Fund and the World Bank. The Secretary-General said that they would continue to lend their full support to the recovery and development of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In close cooperation with UNMIBH, UNDP embarked in October 2002 on a three-year recovery programme for the Srebrenica region. The International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia provided invaluable support in screening suspected war criminals within the police force.

The Secretary-General thanked the Member States and police-contributing countries for their support of UNMIBH throughout its mandate. He expressed his deep appreciation to his Special Representative, Jacques Paul Klein, and the IPTF Commissioner, Sven Christian Frederiksen, for their strong leadership. He also paid tribute to their predecessors, who had laid the basis for the Mission's success. The Secretary-General offered his sincere gratitude to all the men and women of UNMIBH for "their tireless dedication and persistence to the promotion of peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina".

EUPM TAKES OVER

The European Union Police Mission took over from UNMIBH from 1 January 2003 and every effort was made to ensure a seamless transition. UNMIBH cooperated closely with the EUPM planning and advance teams. The IPTF Commissioner continued as the first EUPM Commissioner. To ensure continuity, 119 IPTF officers were retained in their positions, many of them in sensitive areas, and transferred to EUPM on 1 January.

European Union Police Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The drawdown of the IPTF presence was completed at the end of December 2002 and a small liaison office was to remain in Sarajevo until June 2003 to ensure completion of the transition and deal with any residual issues that might arise.

Killing with Kindness: The UN Peacekeeping Mission in Bosnia

By John F. Hillen III
From The Cato Institute
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The recent onset of clashes between UN and Serb forces in Bosnia is the latest evidence that the UN-led intervention in the former Yugoslavia is fundamentally flawed. That operation prolongs the fighting and suffering instead of contributing to a secure environment in which the local parties might negotiate a lasting peace settlement. The UN intervention has imposed an artificial life-support system on a Balkan society bent on continuing to fight. The "middle way" between traditional passive peacekeeping and large-scale coercive intervention has left all the local parties with greater incentives to continue the conflict than to negotiate a settlement.

That situation exposes the many weaknesses of international humanitarian intervention in violent intrastate struggles. Rather than prolong a policy that seems destined to fail, the United States should advocate the termination of the UN operation and urge the European countries, which have the most at stake, to take measures to contain the Yugoslavian conflict.

INTRODUCTION

The UN operation in the former Yugoslavia was undertaken to assuage Western consciences about the barbarity taking place in a "European" war. The international community, under the aegis of a UN peacekeeping mission, has conducted a series of "may-work" and supposedly low-risk initiatives centered around a humanitarian intervention. That middle way is certainly more than doing nothing, yet it is profoundly short of the prolonged and expensive military intervention that would undoubtedly be required to effectively suppress the fighting. As Lawrence Freedman, a professor at King's College in London, has pointed out, the middle alternative has "turned out to be a collection of half-measures that left unbridgeable gaps between the ends proclaimed and the means adopted."(1) In other words, the strategy of the intervention--the relationship between ends and means--is inherently flawed.

PEACEKEEPING ASSUMPTIONS

The purpose of a UN peacekeeping force is to sustain and support a stable environment conducive to peace negotiations and a lasting settlement. That goal presupposes that such

an environment exists, at least in the form of an observed cease-fire, and some willingness to negotiate on the part of the belligerents. The relationship between the peacekeepers and the resolution of the conflict is indirect and oblique. The peacekeepers do not "create" or "cause" conflict resolution, they merely help belligerents to contribute to a more stable political and military environment that could conceivably lead to conflict resolution. The United Nations has written that the purpose of its military intervention in the former Yugoslavia is to control the conflict, fostering a climate in which negotiations between parties could be promoted, preventing the resumption or escalation of conflict, providing a breathing-space for the continued efforts of the peacemakers and supporting the provision of essential humanitarian assistance.(2)

UN officials hope that the passive military efforts of the peacekeepers will indirectly contribute to "fostering" such a climate. The power to directly "create" that climate lies, of course, with the local belligerents. In short, peacekeeping is a technique designed to help those who wish to help themselves.

Consequently, the chief operational imperative of UN peacekeeping missions has always been that the consent and cooperation of the belligerents are the key to success. As the United Nations itself has maintained throughout its existence, peacekeeping's "effectiveness depends on voluntary cooperation."(3) In extraordinary circumstances, when one powerful and threatening belligerent party can be identified, the United Nations may authorize the use of force to compel that belligerent to accept a solution and impose a peace on the region. But that is not peacekeeping; it is known in the UN lexicon as peace enforcement. That is an important distinction that has become dangerously blurred in recent years.

BLENDING PEACEKEEPING AND PEACE ENFORCEMENT: AN UNHAPPY MIX

The heady optimism after the end of the Cold War and the military success of the Persian Gulf War prompted the United Nations to propose a more robust and muscular form of peacekeeping. In An Agenda for Peace, UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali proposed a departure from traditional peacekeeping operations, which used modest numbers of armed forces and employed passive military operations to sustain an existing peace agreement. The "peace-enforcement" units proposed by Boutros-Ghali would be more heavily armed than traditional peacekeepers and able to use active military force to compel belligerents to accept a stable and peaceful environment.(4)

The UN operation in the former Yugoslavia has been the first test of that new kind of operation. Specifically, the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Bosnia-Herzegovina has sought to find a middle way between traditional peacekeeping missions

that "sustain" a peaceful environment and large-scale enforcement operations that use active military force to "create" such an environment. The middle way has proved elusive, however, and in January 1995 the secretary general retreated from An Agenda for Peace and stated,

The UN operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina . . . [was] given additional mandates which required the use of force. These were incompatible with existing mandates requiring consent of the parties, impartiality, and the non-use of force. The resultant combination was inherently contradictory. It jeopardized the safety and success of the peacekeeping mission.(5)

What the secretary general did not recognize is that, along with the strategic incoherence of those operations, the effort to pump vast amounts of humanitarian aid into the former Yugoslavia and to use UN forces to keep a lid on tensions in the region has backfired. The middle way forced on the United Nations by a hesitant international community has contributed to the problem, rather than helped to foster a solution.

UNPROFOR armoured military vehicles in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

As a compromise between the ideal and the reality, the United Nations launched a limited intervention that emphasizes the provision of humanitarian aid. "Limited" is a relative term, however. UNPROFOR is by far the biggest and most expensive UN "peacekeeping" operation of all time. In addition, "mission creep" has plagued the operation, and the UN forces, by virtue of their being in Bosnia to "do something," have gradually acquired additional missions such as the protection of "safe areas" and the enforcement of heavy weapons exclusion zones. Those missions require a heavily armed and armored force with naval and combat air support, yet the overall purpose of the UN operation is still to play a passive and impartial supporting role to foster a negoti- ated peace. There is, at the very least, a severe tension between those two objectives.

The most serious flaw in the strategy is that the enormous military, civil, and humanitarian effort is not coherently tied to any policy that would convince the belligerents that they have more to gain by negotiating than by fighting. The United Nations itself recognized that it was dangerous to deploy a peacekeeping force without the political prerequisites of success, such as a previously concluded settlement and the consent and cooperation of the belligerents. Nevertheless, the Security Council thought that the force "could be an interim arrangement to create the conditions of peace and security required for the negotiation of an overall settlement of the Yugoslav crisis."(6) The danger in that language is the mandate to "create" conditions, a task that has historically been successfully undertaken only by expensive collective coercive military action in Korea (1950-53), some parts of the Congo operation (1960-64), and the gulf war (1990-91).

UNPROFOR is not supposed to be a coercive mission, although NATO airpower has been used for limited enforcement actions.(7) The key operational imperative of the mission is still the willing consent and cooperation of the belligerents.(8) However, there are no incentives for the belligerents to cooperate, and the UN intervention has produced an operational environment in which it is easier for the local factions to go on fighting and forget about negotiating for peace. The UN mission is hopelessly mired. There is no peace to sustain, there is no will on the part of the leading UN member states to incur the enormous costs in blood and treasure of imposing peace through force, and the middle way perversely encourages the belligerents to continue fighting.

The option of ending the UN intervention deserves to be fully explored, no matter how morally repugnant it might seem to European and American advocates of intervention. It may well be that nonintervention would have resulted in a more sustainable political solution to the Balkans conflict.

PROLONGING THE BALKAN WARS

Intervention in the Balkans under the auspices of the United Nations is an enormous enterprise and one in which America is heavily involved. The principal function of the intervention is to protect vast quantities of humanitarian aid--principally for the citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina. By May 1994 that effort involved over 33,000 UN military troops, 600 UN military observers, 3,000 UN civilian administrators and staff, and hundreds of humanitarian organizations.(9) The U.S. commitment includes 600 ground troops in Macedonia, the bulk of the air forces and command infrastructure to enforce the no-fly zone over Bosnia, and a substantial portion of the logistics effort to deliver aid (not to mention 30 percent of the $2 billion annual cost).(10)

That well-intentioned international effort keeps Bosnian society functioning at a level that is just tolerable enough to keep any of the belligerents from negotiating seriously for peace. Freed from the need to keep the basic infrastructure of Bosnia in operation and under no significant political pressure to bargain with their adversaries, the warring factions all feel they have at least as much to gain by continued fighting as by negotiation.

A British brigadier general, having recently served in the UN force in Bosnia, admitted that the UN intervention has prolonged the ability of all sides to continue fighting.(11) Washington Post reporter John Pomfret also recognized that perverse side effect as early as November 1993.

Roads improved by the UN to ease access for food and medical convoys will also make it easier for the three Bosnian factions to move troops and guns. Much of the UN aid, meant for women and children, will end up in the stomachs of gunmen. Fuel for hospitals and power stations will be siphoned into military vehicles. UN provisions will bolster the flimsy economies of all three factions. UN aid is for sale in any town in Bosnia. If such supplies did not exist, many Western officials here say, pressure could mount for the three sides to sue for peace.(12)

The three factions--Muslims, Serbs, and Croats--have become adept at manipulating the United Nations to advance their war aims. As an example, in October 1993 a Swedish battalion was forced to deliver 10,000 gallons of vehicle fuel to Serb forces in order to enter the safe area of Tuzla. The irony of the episode is that the Swedes were sent to protect Muslim-held Tuzla from the now refueled Serbian armored forces in the area.(13)

NATO air strikes cause fire at Bosnian Serb ammunition depot in Pale on August 30, 1995 (*Source: The Atlantic*).

That UNPROFOR cannot avoid being manipulated is a result of deploying peacekeepers in an unsuitable political environment. The rules of engagement for UNPROFOR, which reflect the ill-conceived attempt to mix the principles of peacekeeping with limited enforcement measures, are so ineffectual and

confusing that they were printed verbatim in Orbis under the title "UN Theater of the Absurd."(14) For example, even as the United Nations has authorized the active use of airpower to enforce the no-fly zone over Bosnia and target threatening forces on the ground, the exposed and vulnerable UN ground troops have been restricted to the defensive use of force in an attempt to maintain their impartial standing and protect their mission.

That improbable mix has not worked, as evidenced by the events of May 1995. On May 26 the United Nations twice bombed a Bosnian Serb ammunitions dump after the Serbs ignored UN ultimatums to abandon certain heavy weapons in the Sarajevo exclusion zone. The Serbs retaliated by taking hostage hundreds of poorly armed UN peacekeepers, some of whom were then chained to key military targets as human shields against further air strikes. The Serbs made clear that they no longer viewed the UN forces as impartial peacekeepers and accused UNPROFOR of "flagrant interference in the conflict" and "siding with one party"; they also declared all UN and NATO resolutions null and void.(15) The United Nations, for its part, accused the Serbs of "terrorist" acts and barely bothered to feign impartiality. Yet the international community still did not "have the guts to admit that this is a failure and get out," as a senior UN officer reportedly said in 1993.(16)

War weariness, crushing economic hardship, and conclusive battlefield defeats are admittedly brutal. But throughout history they have been the factors that have compelled warring opponents to sue for peace. Entrenched belligerents will not stop fighting until peace presents a better option for their people than war. Ironically and tragically, the UN intervention has postponed and diluted the suffering and hardship, which historically have been the basic incentives for most peace settlements in the Balkans and elsewhere. There is no doubt that unfettered fighting in the Balkans would be sharp and traumatic, but the middle way of the UN humanitarian intervention has prolonged the fighting, albeit at a less intensive level. The question that policymakers must ask themselves is whether the decision to avoid the short-term trauma of unrestricted warfare has increased the sum total of the war casualties over the long run.

Compounding the irony of the humanitarian intervention's prolonging the war in the Balkans is the lack of a comprehensive overall strategy for the UN effort--a strategy that ties the military means being exercised to the political goals of the Security Council. The root cause of that omission is the unwillingness of the major UN powers, because of the costs involved, to address the fundamental political causes of the conflict. Instead, the low-risk, may-work option of humanitarian intervention leaves the United Nations, in the words of Harvard University professor Stanley Hoffmann, "doomed to playing Sisyphus. . . . If the political causes are not removed, victims remain in danger and the intervention

will risk, at best, being no more than a Band-Aid, and at worst, becoming part of the problem."(17) Peacekeeping expert Mats Berdal has also recognized that danger and written that "when humanitarian operations serve as a substitute for dealing with the root cause of conflict or as compensation for diplomatic failures, formulation of realizable military objectives becomes extremely difficult."(18)

So what is the UN strategy for formulating realizable and sustainable military objectives in the former Yugoslavia? What are its 33,000 peacekeepers doing beyond the humanitarian mission? The simple answer, which discredits the Security Council but not the peacekeepers themselves, is everything and nothing. In more than 60 resolutions passed since the conflict began, the Security Council has enlarged or expanded the mandate of UNPROFOR over a dozen times.(19) Those resolutions have become increasingly disconnected from the situation on the ground and the military resources of UNPROFOR. The UN commanders in the field have reportedly quipped that they do not even bother reading the strategic directives from New York anymore.

Official UNPROFOR emblem
(*Source: Emblems for Battlefield)*.

The military missions--supervising protected areas, "pink areas," safe areas, and exclusion zones; protecting aid convoys; monitoring borders; and more--are all performed by an UNPROFOR with insufficient resources in an atmosphere of ad hoc crisis management. Neither the United Nations, the five-nation Contact Group (Britain, France, Germany, Russia, and the United States), nor the European Union has established a comprehensive and coordinated political process that the operations on the ground accompany and complement. Clearly, the belligerents are aware of the "finger-in-the-dike" nature of the measures taken by the United Nations and have factored it into their war plans. The warring parties have every incentive to look for ways to manipulate the blue-bereted, white-vehicled troops.

The UNPROFOR forces are left to hope for the best and ride their luck while hoping that the belligerents work out some balance of incentives among themselves to make peace.(20) But what incentives are there to come to the negotiating table? Quite simply, none. As William Durch of the Henry Stimson Center has written, "Openness to a settlement may stem from stalemate on the battlefield or from the mutual exhaustion of the local parties, which leads them to look more favorably at alternatives to fighting."(21)

The political, diplomatic, military, and humanitarian efforts of the UN intervention have not yet, after three years, provided such alternatives to the local parties in the Balkans. In fact, the intervention has kept natural incentives from surfacing while it has failed to provide any of its own.

THE UN'S UNINSPIRING RECORD OF INTERVENTION IN INTRASTATE CONFLICTS

The UN record of interventions in multifaction, intrastate conflicts is not good. For example, the United Nations has maintained an average of 6,000 peacekeepers in southern Lebanon since 1978 to restore peace and security to the area before turning it over to Lebanese authorities. Seventeen years, 200 peacekeeper deaths, and billions of dollars later, the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) is no closer to that goal than it was in March 1978.(22) The UN force was neither structured nor intended to force a peaceable solution. As noted earlier, peacekeeping doctrine dictates that the responsibility for a political solution rests principally with the belligerents. Even when it becomes painfully obvious that a solution is not forthcoming, however, there is typically no exit strategy for UN forces.

UN interventions tend to gather irresistible momentum. If a mission cannot succeed in its original mandate because of the noncooperation of the local actors, new reasons are sought to justify the intervention. In Lebanon, as in Bosnia, the UN force is now principally kept in place to administer humanitarian aid--a mission it was not meant to perform but gradually assumed throughout the 1980s. Now supporters of the Lebanon operation argue that the UN force cannot be withdrawn because it has "been sucked into the economic and political fabric of the wider society in which it operates and of which it has become an integral part."(23) UNIFIL injects $45 million into southern Lebanon annually, and its supporters argue that its withdrawal would cause economic collapse and heightened conflict. UNIFIL is now part of the problem, not part of the solution.

In late 1993 and 1994 the United Nations (belatedly) realized that it was in a similar situation in Somalia. With none of the Somali factions seriously interested in making a political accommodation and rebuilding their ruined society, the Security Council finally made the decision to withdraw all UN forces. After sustaining hundreds of casualties and devoting billions of dollars to an inconclusive intervention in a multifaction conflict, the United Nations was finally fed up.

UN military interventions have two basic goals. The first is to limit armed conflict. Although that goal involves the use of military personnel, it is not attained through compulsion or coercion. The belligerents make the initial decision to limit the armed conflict, and the United Nations helps them decide on the methods of policing the peace

agreement and the passive role that UN forces will play in that effort. If the essential political conditions for a peace agreement and the cooperation of belligerents do not exist, a passive UN military operation is ineffectual.

The second broad goal is promoting conflict resolution. That objective is heavily dependent on having a secure and stable environment in which armed conflict has been limited. The goal of conflict resolution is reached through a combination of economic, diplomatic, humanitarian, and political endeavors. As we have seen in Kashmir, Cyprus, and the Golan Heights, the achievement of the first goal does not necessarily lead to achievement of the second. Those missions, in their 46th, 31st, and 21st years, respectively, have been politically inconclusive. The belligerents prefer the indeterminate but stable status quo to meaningful negotiations.

In Somalia, Lebanon, and the Balkans, however, the status quo entails continued fighting to make and consolidate political gains. As Freedman noted, in Bosnia "the core problem [remains] what it [has] been for almost three years: how to persuade the Serbs to relinquish sufficient territory for the Bosnian government to concoct a viable state with honor served."(24) The operational characteristics of the UN effort, military and otherwise, do not seem coherently linked with that goal and the current situation. A UN mission can sustain peace when the parties are willing, or it can impose peace when the political will of major UN member states to sacrifice is great. What can be achieved by the middle way is nothing at best and something akin to the situation in the Balkans at worst.

THE U.S. RECOIL FROM MASSIVE INTERVENTION

Former U.S. President Bill Clinton meets with Balkan leaders in an attempt to end the war (*Source: Getty Images)*.

The nature of U.S. foreign policy, shaped by the media and a preoccupation with aggressively promoting "values," serves to unduly limit debate on America's policy options in such complex situations as the conflict in the Balkans. In the case of Bosnia, policy options cover a bewilderingly wide spectrum, ranging from

full-scale multilateral military intervention to ignoring the problem. Interventionists who cite the alleged moral imperative for decisive action have had three years in which to make their case, but many have finally absorbed enough of the practical complexities and costs of a Balkan entanglement to retreat from their calls for a U.S.-led armed intervention.

In 1992 the Washington Post insisted that America had a "moral imperative" to stop the fighting; in early 1993 the New York Times began to call for debate about what could be accomplished with an American intervention force.(25) By late 1993 the Times seemed to have already decided the debate for itself and called on Clinton to "avoid a Bosnian quagmire."(26) The analyses of knowledgeable professionals like Gens. Colin Powell and John Shalikashvili have apparently induced some badly needed caution. The bottom line with a military intervention is that the forces must have objectives that are clearly defined, achievable, sustainable, and decisive enough to stand as politically important on their own. An intervention must also attract widespread domestic support, which would certainly prove difficult in the former Yugoslavia, given the high-cost, low-return nature of such a mission.(27)

Despite the retreat of some early interventionists, the debate about intervention goes on and now largely consists of quibbling about just how much force short of an American ground troop deployment can be used. The chief proponents of coercion are fascinated by airpower, which, as Eliot Cohen, coauthor of the major study on airpower in the gulf war has written, "is an unusually seductive form of military strength because, like modern courtship, it appears to offer gratification without commitment."(28) Cohen goes on to highlight the turnabout of liberal columnists, such as Anthony Lewis, who denigrated the effectiveness of surgical strikes in Operation Desert Storm but now insist that the same aircraft and missiles could have stopped Serbian aggression in the Balkans.

President Clinton's foreign policy team has ignored the case for no intervention at all. Indeed, any ideas along that line have not even been given short shrift because they are considered morally irresponsible and ethically bankrupt. The case for nonintervention may not seem inspiring, lofty, or noble, yet it is a solidly practical policy option that deserves a more thorough examination than it has been given by the administration's foreign policy team and analysts outside government.

Two points, one of which is somewhat understood and one of which is not, are paramount in the dynamics of the situation in the former Yugoslavia. The costs of a full-scale military intervention are somewhat understood, at least by the American public. It appeared for a time that Clinton also understood those costs, as administration officials long maintained that U.S. troops would not be sent to Bosnia except to enforce a peace

agreement or to assist in the evacuation of UN peacekeepers. But Clinton reversed that policy after the Bosnian Serbs seized UN troops as hostages in late May 1995; he offered U.S. troops to assist in the "redeployment" of UN forces, despite strong opposition from Congress and the American public.(29) What is even less understood than the danger of intervention is that the more limited measures Clinton has pursued all along--in an attempt to show that the administration is "doing something"-- are actually contributing to the intractability of the Yugoslavian conflict.

RECOGNIZING THE PREROGATIVES OF POWER

As Henry Kissinger has recently noted, much of America's foreign policy calculus, both in the past and today, is not a rational calculus at all but a reflection of altruistic values.(30) The Clinton administration has essentially sought to inject its concept of values into the definition of America's foreign policy responsibilities as a great power. The policy implication of a values-oriented strategy is that America must now take responsibility for those in the international community who do not wish to take responsibility for themselves. That classic pillar of Wilsonian thought holds America hostage to an age-old syllogism: "something must be done, this is something, therefore we must do it." It is an inherently interventionist philosophy.

In the Balkans that bias has meant that the policy option of nonintervention has been virtually ignored. The Clinton administration, to its credit, has never advocated massive intervention approaching the scale of the gulf war. It has, however, been preoccupied with reassuring Americans and Europeans alike that the United States remains engaged in Europe.(31) U.S. actions in support of limited operations in Bosnia are designed more to assuage public conscience and satisfy the "CNN factor" than to have a conclusive impact on the conflict. Any options that move in the direction of closing the intervention down are dismissed out of hand as morally irresponsible.

The evidence suggests that the tentative UN-led intervention in the Balkans is probably the morally irresponsible course. As excruciating as it might be to passively witness the humanitarian tragedy of the Bosnian war, the international community's insistence on meddling to ease the global conscience has resulted in more, not less, suffering for the Bosnian people. There is rarely a painless way to end a conflict between factions that are intent on fighting; the question is whether one feels better about paying less up- front or taking more tragedy in installments.

Although the UN-NATO intervention may have inhibited some fierce fighting and the attendant bloodletting in the immediate term, the prolonged, albeit less intense, war may prove to be the greater tragedy. The UN operation has essentially placed Bosnia-Herzegovina on a life-support system that may save lives in the short term but that also

enables the fighting to continue year after year. So while U.S. support for the UN mission in Bosnia may have made Clinton administration officials more comfortable morally, the Bosnians will probably pay dearly in the long term for Washington's self-satisfaction.

Intervention is not necessarily a more powerful expression of leadership than is nonintervention. America believes it understands the responsibilities of being a great power; it must also learn to exercise the prerogatives of a great power. A great power reserves the right both to act and to not act. Some observers say that America loses credibility if it refuses any international challenge to the rule of law and world order. The prerogatives of power dictate the opposite--a great power is exactly that because it alone has the prerogative to decide where and when it becomes involved in international crises.(32) And, as a great power, it needs to distinguish between crises that are important and those that are marginal and should be treated as such. The situation in the Balkans falls into the latter category.

Intervention in Bosnia, then, is no more evidence of American leadership than it is morally superior to nonintervention. An administration that will not debate or consider the advantages of closing down a well-intentioned but deeply flawed UN effort in the Balkans has failed both morally and in the exercise of leadership.

CONCLUSION: ENDING THE BOSNIAN INTERVENTION

The political and strategic incoherence of the Bosnian intervention is manifested on two levels. First, there is the question of engaging in a limited and modest political- military activity, "peacekeeping," in an environment unsuited for such an exercise. Soon after the UN troops were deployed to the Balkans in 1992, far in advance of a comprehensive policy about how they would contribute to reconciliation as part of a diplomatic master plan, it was obvious that the international community was hoping aspirin would cure a traumatic head wound. An attempt has been made to limit the inappropriate application of peacekeeping by authorizing more robust enforcement measures from the air, but that has merely amounted to a Band-Aid to go with the aspirin. On a second level, the humanitarian intervention that has become the raison d'àtre of the entire huge military effort has backfired and prolonged the war and the suffering of the Bosnians.

What should U.S. policy be, after three years of supporting a flawed intervention in the Balkans and getting our fingers burned in Somalia at the same time? The obvious answer is to look for an exit strategy, a piece of policy planning that has been absent in UN interventions in multi- faction, intrastate conflicts (witness UNIFIL in Lebanon). Unfortunately, three years of support for the Balkan intervention has left the United States with three unpalatable options: cut and run, reinforce and fight, or struggle on in ignominious ineffectiveness along with the rest of the international community. The

hindsight proffered recently with the publication of Robert McNamara's Vietnam memoirs would indicate that the option of disengagement would be the most advisable.

The Clinton administration should adopt a combination of diplomatic muscle, which leans on our European allies as much as the belligerents, and a phased unilateral disengagement from the Balkan intervention. The diplomatic effort should urge the Europeans to pursue policies aimed at containing the conflict in the strategic sense--preventing it from spreading outside the former Yugoslavia. There is, unfortunately, no guarantee that the Europeans will take Washington's advice on that point. Nonetheless, containing the conflict is clearly in the interest of the European powers, and if they elect not to pursue that aim, it is European, not American, interests that may be at risk.(33) The Clinton administration should make it clear that, while the United States is committed to multilateral consultation and diplomatic initiatives, Washington will not squander resources on risky policies that seek to address problems of only marginal strategic interest to America.

The administration should also work through the Security Council to lift the arms embargo and terminate the UN humanitarian operation in Bosnia. Although it is an open secret that the United States no longer actively enforces the arms embargo, the Clinton administration has retreated from its earlier policy of trying to officially lift the ban. Washington should instead make clear that it no longer intends to observe the prejudiced and ineffectual embargo and urge the European powers to follow suit. The way the embargo has been implemented is a sham. It has become an ineffective and cowardly policy option that reflects the unwillingness of the international community to make tough choices instead of following policies that offer appealing sound bites on Sunday morning talk shows.

It is perhaps even more important that the United States take advantage of its status as a permanent member of the UN Security Council to terminate the UN intervention in Bosnia. The Security Council, prompted by the need to "do something" about the war, authorized a UN intervention that is toothless but cruel. Perhaps the Security Council feels ennobled by passing an avalanche of resolutions, many of which the member governments know are completely unenforceable by the troops on the ground or in the air, but such posturing is costly both economically and morally. It is a luxury the United States can ill afford.

The United States must recognize the tragic irony of the flawed UN operation in Bosnia. Disengagement may not provide the American or the international community with the false comfort that intervention affords. But prolonging the conflict in the name of humanitarianism is likely to doom Bosnians to longer term pain. A sustainable

reconciliation in the Balkans cannot be engineered by the international community. Only a policy of disengagement that shifts responsibility back onto the belligerents carries the hope of eventual peace in that beleaguered region.

The Bosnian War and Srebrenica Genocide

From United to End Genocide
2015

In 1991, Ygoslavia began to break up along ethnic lines. When the republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Bosnia) declared independence in 1992 the region quickly became the central theater of fighting.

The Serbs targeted Bosniak and Croation civilians in a campaign of ethnic cleansing. The war in Bosnia claimed the lives of an estimated 100,000 people and displaced more than two million.

The heigh of the killing took place in July 1995 when 8,000 Bosniaks were killed in what became known as the Srebrenica genocide, the largest massacre in Europe after the Holocaust.

PRECURSORS TO GENOCIDE

The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was formed at the end of World War II, comprised of Bosnia, Serbia, Montenegro, Croatia, Slovenia, and Macedonia with numerous ethnic groups making up the population. This included Orthodox Christian Serbs, Muslim Bosniaks, Catholic Croats, and Muslim ethnic Albanians.

Tensions in the Balkans were common, but once President Josip Broz Tito came to power in 1943, he ruled with an iron fist and was typically able to keep them in check through a dictatorship. Though he was considered to be a "benevolent dictator" and at times quite ruthless, Tito's efforts ensured that no ethnic group dominated the country, banning political mobilization and seeking to create a unified Yugoslav identity. However, after his death in 1980, the order he imposed began to unravel.

The various ethnic groups and republics inside Yugoslavia sought independence, and as the end of the Cold War neared, the country spiraled out of control. Serb nationalism was fueled as Slobodan Milosevic rose to power in 1987. Milosevic used nationalist feelings to his advantage, making changes to the constitution favoring Serbs, creating a military that was 90 percent Serbian, and extending his power over the country's financial, media, and security structures. With the help of Serbian separatists in Bosnia and Croatia, he stoked ethnic tensions by convincing Serbian populations that other ethnic groups posed a threat to their rights.

ETHNIC CLEANSING BEGINS

Yugoslavia began to collapse in June 1991 when the republics of Slovenia and Croatia declared independence. The Yugoslav army, largely composed of Serbs, invaded Croatia under the guise of trying to protect ethnic Serb populations there. They took the city of Vukovar, carrying out mass executions of hundreds of Croat men, burying them in mass graves. This was the beginning of the ethnic cleansings that characterized the atrocities committed during the Yugoslav Wars.

Bosnia came next in April 1992. Following their independence, Serbian forces accompanied by Bosnian Serbs attempted to ethnically cleanse the territory of the Bosniaks. Using former Yugoslavian military equipment, they surrounded Sarajevo, Bosnia's capital city. Snipers hid in the hills and shot at civilians as they tried to get food and water. Mass executions, concentration camps, rape and sexual violence, and forced displacement were all extremely prevalent. The "siege of Sarajevo" is considered to be one of the most dramatic and representative parts Yugoslavia's breakup, with thousands killed over the course of nearly four years.

Attempts at mediation by the European Union were unsuccessful and the United Nations (UN) refused to intervene, aside from providing limited troop convoys for humanitarian aid. Later on, the UN tried to establish six "safe areas," including Srebrenica and Sarajevo, but these were ineffective. Peacekeepers did not have the capabilities to truly protect the people seeking refuge there, and all except Sarajevo eventually fell under Serb control.

GENOCIDE AT SREBRENICA

In July 1995, Serb forces, led by General Ratko Mladic, descended upon the town of Srebrenica and began shelling it. At this point, the enclave was protected by only 450 Dutch peacekeepers armed with light fuel and expired ammunition – their force was so weak that a Dutch commander had reported that the unit was no longer militarily operational a month prior. The peacekeepers requested support from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) but were denied. Srebrenica fell to the Serbs in one day.

Mladic expelled 25,000 women and children from the town, while his forces tried to hunt down approximately 15,000 Bosniak men who had tried to escape to safety in central Bosnia. Up to 3,000 were killed, either by gunshot or by decapitation, while trying to escape. Many Bosniaks sought refuge at a UN base in nearby Potocari, but were not safe there for long.

Serb forces caught up with them by the afternoon and the next day, buses arrived at Potocari to take them away, again separating the children and women from the men. Serb troops forced the Dutch peacekeepers to hand over their uniforms and helmets so that they could use them to lure civilians out of hiding and trick them into thinking they were headed to safety.

At the end of the four day massacre, up to 8,000 men and teenage boys had been killed, and many women were subject to torture, rape, and other forms of sexual violence. Thousands were buried in mass graves. In order to conceal their crimes, Serb forces dug up the original graves of many victims and moved them across a large piece of territory.

There were clear indications that an attack at Srebrenica was being planned, yet the international community did not equip the peacekeeping forces there with the support necessary to protect the thousands who either lost their lives or were terrorized. The atrocities committed at Srebrenica are considered to be the worst on European soil after the Holocaust.

A Bosnian woman prays near Srebrenica memorial.

THE RESPONSE

While the war was widely covered in the press and individual policymakers at times took strong stands against human rights abuses in Bosnia, in general the UN, the European Union, the United States and Russia minimized the aggressive nature of the conflict and treated the fighting as a conflict between equal warring parties. Seeking to avoid the moral responsibilities of responding to a genocide, many of these countries referred to the conflict as “ethnic cleansing” rather than “genocide”.

THE U.S. RESPONSE

Up until 1995, the American government refused to take the lead onBosnia. The U.S. resisted sending in their own troops, and also vetoed Security Council draft resolutions to increase the number of UN peacekeepers. During his campaign, Bill Clinton criticized the Bush administration for their lack of action, but when he was elected in 1992, his Administration followed the same pattern.

In 1995, American foreign policy toward Bosnia changed. Evidence of the atrocities being committed, including those at Srebrenica, was becoming common knowledge and the United States' lack of action was becoming an embarrassment. President Clinton told his national security advisers that the war was "killing the U.S. position of strength in the war" and he did not want failure in Bosnia to tarnish his chances at re-election. Despite all efforts to keep American troops out of Europe, he eventually realized that there was no effective way to end the war without it.

THE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE

The UN was hesitant to directly fight the Bosnian Serbs for fear of threatening their neutrality between nations and groups. The international community finally responded to the war after Serb forces took the town of Zepa, in addition to dropping a bomb in a crowded Sarajevo market. Senior representatives of the United States and its allies agreed to deploy NATO forces to Gorazde and defend the town's civilian population. This plan was later extended to include the cities of Bihac, Sarajevo and Tuzla.

In August 1995, after the Serbs refused to comply with a UN ultimatum, NATO forces in conjunction with Bosnian and Croatian forces began an aerial bombing campaign. With Serbia's economy crippled by UN trade sanctions and its military forces under assault in Bosnia after three years of warfare, Milosevic agreed to enter negotiations that led to a ceasefire. By the end of the war, roughly 100,000 people had died.

AFTERMATH

In November 1995, the Dayton Accords were signed in Dayton, Ohio, officially ending the war in Bosnia. This peace agreement established two semi-autonomous entities within Bosnia-Herzegovina: the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, inhabited primarily by Bosniaks and Bosnian Croats, and the

The signing of the Dayton Peace Accords.

Republika Srpska (which includes Srebrenica), dominated by Serbs, both with their own political structures, economies, and educational systems, though connected through a central government.

Refugees were guaranteed the right to return to their pre-war homes, but only a small number of Bosniaks opted to go back to Srebrenica, which had been re-inhabited by Bosnian Serbs who had also been internally displaced by the war. An influx of international assistance came after the fighting, including reconstruction efforts by non-governmental organizations, UN agencies, and foreign governments and militaries and over $14 billion in aid.

DAYTON'S DRAWBACKS

The Dayton Accords were successful in stopping the violence and allowing the region to create some form of normality, but it has turned out to be a somewhat of band-aid solution that set the stage for further divisions between Bosnia's ethnic groups. For instance, Bosnia has a three-member presidency requiring one Croat, one Bosniak, and one Serb to represent their constituencies, but because each member is able to veto legislation that is seen as threatening to his own group's interests, it has been nearly impossible to come to consensus for most of the important issues at the central-government level. Furthermore, this type of system still excludes other minority groups in the country such as the Roma and Jews.

The fact is that the Dayton Accords were not meant to be a long-term solution to the problems of the country; they were meant to stop the killing and secure peace. Eventually they were supposed to be replaced with a more streamlined government structure. The hope was that in working together and creating a unified Bosnian identity, the mistrust between ethnic groups would fall away – this has not been the case. Though they may live side-by-side, Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs essentially lead segregated lives. People identify themselves through their ethnicity rather than their citizenship.

The legacy of the Dayton Accords is evident within Bosnia-Herzegovina, as its economic development has lagged behind its Balkan counterparts. Unemployment remains a problem for a large portion of the country, and corruption is very prevalent. The country is currently trying to join the European Union, but a failure on the part of Serb, Bosniak, and Croat leaders to agree on details for a reform program have delayed their application for membership.

CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL

The UN Security Council passed resolution 827 establishing the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in the Hague, Netherlands in May 1993, before the war had even ended, after they were briefed on reports of massacres, rape and

torture, extreme violence in the cities, and massive suffering of the hundreds of thousands who had been expelled from their homes.

The ICTY was formed to end the impunity of the perpetrators of mass atrocities, and was the first tribunal to prosecute genocide. It also has given survivors of rape, torture, and other heinous crimes the opportunity to tell their stories of what they experienced and what happened to their loved ones and be heard.

The ICTY was slow to start. A chief prosecutor was not named until 1994, and even after, the governments of Serbia and Croatia refused to turn their war crimes suspects or share information with the tribunal until their membership to the EU was jeopardized due to their lack of cooperation.

NATO showed its weakness again when members failed to arrest suspects in Bosnia out of fear of endangering their forces. However, since delivering its first sentence in 1996, the ICTY has convicted more than 60 people involved with crimes against various ethnic groups in Bosnia, Croatia, Serbia, Kosovo, and Macedonia. More than 160 have been charged, including high and mid-level political, military, and police leaders from multiple sides of the conflict.

It was ruled in 2001 that genocide occurred in Srebrenica, and in 2007 the International Court of Justice stated that Serbia violated the Genocide Convention by not doing enough to prevent it.

Slobodan Milosevic's infamous Time cover page.

Former leader, Slobodan Milosevic received 3 indictments from the ICTY for war crimes and crimes against humanity in Kosovo in 1999, war crimes and crimes against humanity in Croatia between 1991 and 1992, and genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes in Bosnia between 1992 and 1995. His trial, delayed multiple times due to his health, began in February 2002 and he pled not guilty to all 66 counts of war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide. In 2006, he was found dead in his cell in The Hague, months before his trial was expected to end.

After evading arrest for over a decade, Ratko Mladic, the man accused of leading the siege of Sarajevo and orchestrating the genocide at Srebrenica, began his trial in 2012 and it is expected to end in 2015. He faces 11 charges, including 2 counts of genocide and has pled not guilty to all of them. His behavior in the courtroom has apparently ranged from

unremorseful to sarcastic to mocking, at times making gestures at the witnesses. The defense portion of the trial began in 2014, arguing that he was simply following orders – a common justification by those who have committed mass atrocities.

FINDING JUSTICE

Many survivors have had to live their lives not knowing what happened to their family members. Over 20,000 people are still missing. When Serb forces dug up graves with bulldozers and trucks in Srebrenica in an attempt to move them to hide their crimes, many of the bodies were scattered. As such, finding the remaining missing persons has been extremely difficult. Those who are found are almost impossible to identify due to the condition of their remains.

In 1995, President Bill Clinton founded the International Commission on Missing Persons (ICMP) to aid in the search and identification of missing persons found at disaster sites or war zones using forensic methods that matches the DNA of survivors to the unearthed remains. So far, the ICMP has been successful in identifying nearly 7,000 bodies in Srebrenica.

RECOGNIZING GENOCIDE

While both the ICTY and ICJ have considered the atrocities committed in the former Yugoslav region to constitute genocide, this has not been a shared sentiment around the world. Notably, both Russia and Serbia have denied that the Srebrenica massacre amounted to genocide.

In July 2015, the UN Security Council held a meeting in preparation for the 20th anniversary of Srebrenica, and reportedly Serbia asked Russia to veto a draft resolution that would formally condemn the massacre as genocide. Russia used its veto to kill the resolution, stating that calling the crimes a genocide would prompt further tensions in the region.

Serbia has acknowledged that the crimes at Srebrenica occurred but has never used the word genocide to describe them. Arrests for Srebrenica-related crimes were not made in Serbia until March of 2015. Denial also runs strong in the Serb-dominated Republika Srpska, with the Bosnian Serb leader Milorad Dodik called Srebrenica, “the greatest deception of the 20th century.

U.S. Ambassador to the UN Samantha Power was a journalist in Sarajevo when the attack on Srebrenica occurred and a first-hand witness to the suffering that the war caused. In response to Russia's veto, she said, "It mattered hugely to the families of the victims of the Srebrenica genocide. Russia's veto is heartbreaking for those families and it is a further stain on this Council's record".

Denialist rhetoric trivializes the experiences of victims and survivors, and minimizes the true weight of what occurred during the 1990s. Reconciliation cannot be possible without recognition of the crimes committed. Nothing can bring back their loved ones or erase their trauma, but by acknowledging these events as what they are, the survivors can begin the healing process and find closure for what they experienced.

UN indicts Bosnian Muslims for war crimes

From The Guardian
Last updated January 1, 2016

The UN tribunal today indicted three Bosnian Muslims for war crimes against Serbs and Croats, one day after sentencing a Bosnian Serb general to 46 years in prison for killing thousands of Muslims at Srebrenica. Two Muslim generals and a colonel were charged with responsibility for the execution of civilians and war prisoners, for using hostages as human shields under fire, and for the pillaging and destruction of towns and villages in central Bosnia in 1993.

The suspects were arrested by Bosnian police yesterday. Tribunal spokesman Jim Landale said it was not yet clear when they will be transferred to the UN detention unit near the Hague in the Netherlands.

The indictment and arrest of senior Muslim officers, and the tribunal's first genocide verdict yesterday, were the latest indications of the growing influence and acceptance of the tribunal's authority over crimes committed in the former Yugoslavia, especially after the surrender of ousted president Slobodan Milosevic in June.

Yesterday the tribunal convicted Gen Radislav Krstic of genocide in the UN-protected enclave of Srebrenica, where up to 8,000 Muslim men were slaughtered in one week in July 1995. Krstic was sentenced to 46 years in prison, the longest sentence decreed by the court so far.

The arrests of the three Bosnian Muslims marked the first time Muslim-Croat federation officials had detained war crimes suspects on their territory. The indictments were delivered to the Muslim-Croat federation of Bosnia on July 13 but kept sealed to the public until after their arrest, said Landale.

Mehmed Alagic, 54, and Enver Hadzihasanovic, 51 - both former generals - are the highest-ranking Muslims so far to be arrested on war crimes charges. Amir Kubura, 37, a senior officer, was also arrested.

Most of the serious crimes were committed by foreign Muslim volunteers who joined the Bosnians in what they called a jihad, or holy war, and who branded themselves mujahedeen, the tribunal said.

The 19-count indictment charged the three officers with failing to prevent men under their command from committing atrocities that they knew, or should have known, were about to happen. It did not accuse any of them of personally committing or ordering specific illegal actions, but said all three were experienced and professional officers accustomed to military command and discipline.

The indictment, seeking to bolster the argument of command responsibility, cited a booklet distributed to the all-Muslim troops instructing them to follow the tenets of Islam that forbid the killing or torture of women and prisoners.

But the booklet also said soldiers must follow orders if senior officers decide "on a different course of action," such as burning villages or crops, or even executing prisoners.

Most of the more than 100 suspects indicted by the tribunal, created in 1993 to prosecute war crimes in the former Yugoslavia, are Serbs. Three Muslims have stood trial so far. One was acquitted and two convicted.

Under the 1995 Dayton peace agreement that ended the 1992-95 Bosnian war, Bosnia is split into a Serb republic and a Muslim-Croat federation, loosely linked together by a three-member presidency and other national institutions.

Bosnia Plans to Expel Arabs Who Fought in Its War

By Nicholas Wood
From The New York Times
August 2, 2007

SARAJEVO, Bosnia and Herzegovina — When Fadhil Hamdani first came to Bosnia from Iraq in 1979 he had no idea he would stay so long. But after prolonged studies, marriage to a Bosnian woman, the birth of five children and citizenship, the years turned into decades.

Now he says he feels more Bosnian than Iraqi.

But the Bosnian government does not agree. It views him as a threat to national security and is putting Mr. Hamdani and other foreign fighters who have lived in Bosnia for many years on notice of deportation.

Arabs, the largest group among hundreds of foreign fighters, fought alongside the Bosnian Muslim Army during the war here, from 1992 to 1995, against Serbs and Croats. In return, they were given Bosnian citizenship.

Raffaq Jalili, a Moroccan wounded in the Bosnian War of 1992-95, became a citizen, but Bosnia's government has revoked his citizenship (*Source: Andrew Testa for The New York Times*).

Most left after the war, which tore apart Muslim, Serbian and Croatian communities and cost around 100,000 lives. But a number stayed on and settled down.

Bosnian officials say their policies are merely reversing decisions that were illegally made at the war's end. But Bosnian politicians and international officials say that the reversals are primarily motivated by a broader concern: that Bosnia should not be seen as a haven for Islamic militants.

Western officials and local politicians, mostly the Muslims' former opponents, have accused the former fighters of promoting radical Islam and damaging Bosnia's reputation in the process.

"Some of their structures have been very

active in promoting radical activities in the form of Wahhabism," said Dragan Mektic, Bosnia's deputy security minister, in a recent interview, referring to a strict form of Islam. "The public feel endangered."

Western governments have been encouraging the move.

Miroslav Lajcak, a Slovak diplomat who is the high representative of the international community in Bosnia and the senior international official here, has increased pressure on the government to move ahead with the deportations. So far, only two former combatants have actually been expelled, both last year.

"The presence of foreign fighters isn't particularly useful for building a modern democratic state," said a Western diplomat closely involved with the review, who spoke on the customary diplomatic condition of anonymity.

While many former fighters who stayed have managed to fit into Bosnian society, others stand out. Imad al-Hussein, a former medical student from Syria with a thick beard, became the public face of the Muslim fighters, or mujahedeen, after the war. He is one of six former fighters the government wants to expel first. The government has not publicly outlined its case against him.

His views do lie outside the norms of most Muslims here. For instance, he says that suicide bombings are justifiable but only within Israel. He said in a long interview that he and his former comrades had always acted within the law in Bosnia. But in response to the threat of being removed from his family's home by force, he said: "I keep asking myself, will I be able to contain my instincts. If you defend yourself on your doorstep you become a martyr. And that is a great temptation."

Other veterans are tensely biding their time, and they contend that there is nothing to connect them to any form of illegal activity. "If there was any evidence against us, then why have they let 12 years pass without prosecuting us," said Raffaq Jalili, a Moroccan wounded in the war.

Bosnia is still recuperating from the war, and international officials who play a large role here are working to resolve stark differences among the Muslim, Serbian and Croatian populations. The high representative — currently Mr. Lajcak — still has the power to make laws and fire local politicians.

Both Saudi Arabia and the United States say that Islamic extremists have used Bosnian passports to travel between the Middle East and Europe; some Bosnian government officials say that has been impossible to confirm.

Western intelligence services and their Bosnian counterparts also claim they have uncovered two major plots in the past six years by Islamic extremists in Bosnia to attack Western targets.

In October 2001, six Algerians were arrested by the Bosnian police and later were sent to prison at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba. In 2005, a Swedish man of Bosnian heritage and a Turk who had lived in Denmark were accused of possessing explosives and vests for making a suicide bomb. They were convicted and sentenced to prison in January.

It is not known how many foreign fighters remain in Bosnia — estimates vary wildly from more than a dozen to several hundred. The government says that a commission reviewed a list of more than 1,000 names and has revoked citizenship for about 420 people so far. Mr. Hamdani was the first to be notified by the commission, a year ago.

From 1996 to 2001, many of the former fighters occupied Bocinja, which had been a Serbian village in central Bosnia. The fighters lived there under Islamic Shariah law until they were evicted by the government, and they dispersed throughout central Bosnia.

Mr. Hamdani came to Bosnia when he was 18 and studied engineering in Zenica. By the time the conflict in Bosnia broke out in 1992, he was married and had two children.

It was only natural to fight for his adopted country, he said, as Bosnian Serb forces, backed by neighboring Serbia, attacked Muslims across the country. In February 1995, nine months before the end of the war, he was granted citizenship.

As with all the other cases under review, he had no right to appear before the commission, which met behind closed doors and sent him its decision in the mail.

“I think that it does not matter when you arrived in this country,” he said in an interview. “What matters is which unit you served with during the war.” Serbs and Croats say that Muslim members of the government gave out citizenship too freely.

Mr. Jalili, a former Moroccan customs officer, bears burn marks across his face and a deformed ear from a rocket-propelled grenade. In a hillside cemetery near Zenica, he showed the unmarked concrete pillars that mark the graves of Arab fighters from his unit.

Now he and his wife and two children live in Zenica on a disabled veteran’s pension. In March, he, too, was notified by mail that his citizenship had been revoked.

“When I first came here, everyone welcomed me,” he said. “Now we are being kicked out like dogs.”

The government says its grounds for removing citizenship are that at the end of the war, the government was not properly functioning, and therefore, passports issued then were not legitimate.

"Citizenship can be revoked upon the discovery of any procedural irregularity, even if you now fulfill the conditions for naturalization anyway," said Darryl Li, a legal researcher from Yale who is studying the veterans' cases. "Someone living in Bosnia for 15 or 20 years with a wife and children here now finds himself in the same legal situation as a new immigrant, except half his life has been bureaucratically erased."

Chapter IV: Bosnian War
Study Questions

Created by Student Interns, The Echo Foundation

Discussion Questions: Bosnian War

1. What conflict(s) sparked the start of the Bosnian War?
2. What were the first countries to declare independence from the former Yugoslavia?
3. Why did the end of communism lead to division in Yugoslavia but peaceful unification in Germany?
4. Has the region recovered from the war?
5. What lasting impacts has the war had on the region? How and why?
6. Did the war reduce or increase conflict between the three ethnic groups?
7. Has the war resolved the conflicts?
8. If not, what are some examples of lasting conflict between the three ethnic groups?
9. Will the region ever recover from the destruction caused by the war? Why?
10. What are some possible solutions to the conflict between the three ethnic groups today?

Discussion Questions - International Intervention

1. Discuss the role of the UN. How did the UN first get involved?
2. Do you believe the UN failed or succeeded in Bosnia? Why?
3. What is the Dayton Accords? When was it created and by whom? What was its goal? How has it succeeded or failed?
4. How does the U.S. intervention in Bosnia compare to our involvement in world conflicts today?
5. What was the Serbs reaction to the UN Intervention in the 1990s?

6. What did the UN's performance in Bosnia say about the efficacy of peace keeping programs? What were the consequences for global governance in general?

7. What organization conducted the war crime tribunal? Where was it held?

8. What is the difference between a Bosnian and a Bosniak?

9. What is the capital of modern day Bosnia-Herzegovina?

10. Describe the structure of leadership within the Bosnian-Herzegovinian government.

11. What is Republika Srpska?

Discussion Questions - Break Up of the Three Countries

1. How and why did the region break up into three separate nations?

2. What sort of conflicts prompted this division?

3. Which groups were involved in the decision as to how to divide up the country?

4. Do you think the outcome was fair to all of the groups involved? Why or why not?

5. Are the three new countries succeeding at peaceful governance? Why or why not?

Chapter V:
Bosnian Culture: Art, Architecture and Education

"Bosnia is under my skin. It's the place you cannot leave behind. I was obsessed by the nightmare of it all: there was this sense of guilt, and an anger that has become something much deeper over these last years."

Paddy Ashdown, Former U.N. High Representative, Bosnia-Herzegovina
November 1, 2005

Bosnian Cultural Profile

From Institute for Anthropological Research
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CULTURE

The culture dentity of any ethnic group including Bosniaks or Bosnian Croats should be viewed through the context of specific historical changes, events and influences. The common Bosnian and Croatian cultural features in Croatia grow out from the common historical development and experience which is based on the Slavic ethnic heritage and the influence of the Germanic cultural circle.

The house in Travnik in which the Nobel Prize Winner, Ivo Andric was born.

However, the crucial influence on the Bosnian culture was exerted by the oriental culture of the Ottoman Empire which left its mark throughout several centuries of Islamization (many people converted to Islam) and also had an indirect influence on the development of art, culture and language.

Considering that Bosnians have been present in Croatia for several generations, it is very interesting that the Bosnian identity remains strong and resilient with Bosnian Catholics and Muslims alike. The war and immigration of numerous refugees contributed to this, but even in times of peace, the identity stays strong as a result of geographic closeness to B&H and family connections.

The cultural heritage of Bosnia, cultural convictions and social practices are based on a pluralistic, multiconfessional but **integrated cultural tradition** in which various religions and ethnicities are culturally interdependent. Tone Bringa, author of *Being Muslim the Bosnian Way,* writes, "Neither Bosniak, nor Croat, nor Serb identities can be fully understood with reference only to Islam or Christianity respectively but have to be considered in a specific Bosnian context that has resulted in a shared history and locality among Bosnians of Islamic as well as Christian backgrounds" (Bringa; 1995).

Peoples that inhabit today's territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina have a rich native culture and tradition which includes **folk and oral literature, music, dances, art, clothing, folk life**... Their different regional forms are a consequence of co-existence and intermingling of various cultural influences of the Slavic, Mediterranean, Balkan, Oriental and Middle-European cultural circles.

As patriarchal type of culture is traditional in B&H, all of the ethnic communities share its basic norms, filtered through the prism of religion. In this traditional culture, most likely because of the border position of Bosnia in the Ottoman Empire, a tradition of heroism and courage was nurtured as a desirable ideal and a role model for young people. *Gazija* (knight, hero) was a title given to people who stood out thanks to their extraordinary bravery in battles, conduct, and moral integrity, which included protection of the needy: women, children and old people. In epic folk poetry such an ideal was articulated through the janissary brothers Mujo and Halil Hrnjic. While Mujo is distinguished as the greatest warrior and army leader, while Halil is respected as protector of the weak.

As a military border with the Christian world Bosnia had a special place in the Ottoman Empire. Wars and poverty were constancy in Bosnian history. To use folk epics again, the character of a Bosniak is perhaps best depicted by the story of Budalina Tale (Tale the Fool) with his trusty horse Kulas, a warrior and border man who is always in rags, with poor battle equipment, but who is the bravest Bosniak hero, always on the front lines. Another ideal character in literature is a mythic hero Berzelez Alija.

Heroes are not specific only for Muslims. In Catholic and Serbian Orthodox folk epic tradition a character of an outlaw (*hajduk*) presented as a Bosnian "Robin Hood", a hero and a fighter against injustice and violence is popular. Such heroes include Ivo Karlovic, Viceroys Derencin and Zrinjanin, Mijat Tomic, Starina Novak, Marko Kraljevic, Janko Sibinjanin, and others.

Folk festival, Travnik 2006

Poverty can cause apathy, but the rough living conditions can also inspire ingenuity and intelligence. The Bosnian spirit of ingenuity and smartness in folk epics is best described by the character of *Nasrudin hodza,* as a poor but a witty and resourceful man who can, thanks to his traits, manage everyday and unusual situations. Although he originates from

the Arab and Turkish folk literature, Bosnians have assimilated him and use him as a native hero in folk tales.


Anterija - upper part of the urban dress.

Folk and traditional music and costumes of Bosnia and Herzegovina give evidence about the interrelationship of ethnicities living on these lands. Except for strictly religious contexts, all forms of this music (dancing, singing and playing music) coexist and share common traits in different ethnic groups living in the same geographic region.

In addition to folk songs about border heroes, there were also lyric songs which were sung to the accompaniment of the *Sargija* (a string instrument similar to the guitar). *Guslars* (fiddlers) were folk singers from the mountain chain of Dinara, who played the *gusle* (one-stringed folk fiddle) and sang about actual political and historical events. *Ganga* and *rera* are characteristic folk songs with a humoristic theme.

According to the main characteristics, **folk costumes** of the rural population can be divided into three regional groups: Dinara costumes (Western Bosnia and Herzegovina), Middle Bosnian costumes including Eastern Bosnia and the third type - costumes of Posavina (Northern Bosnia). The variants of these costumes in different ethnic groups living in the same region were expressed through small details, colors or the way they were worn, but they kept its basic type traits. In the lowlands the costumes were made from hemp and flax and in the Dinara region from wool, while the Muslim costume was made from all these fabrics, but also from silk. In the northern regions costumes have brighter and richer colors, especially red, and in the south they are mostly black and white, while those of Muslims are predominantly green and blue.


Mosque in the town of Počitelj built in 1463.

In addition to border-heroic culture, Bosnian towns were centers of **urban-mercantile culture**, which was under a strong oriental influence as manifested by values oriented toward enjoyment of life, as well as by music and other forms of art.

As opposed to rural costumes, the **urban dress** was the same on the entire territory of Bosnia, and its ethnic variants did not affect significantly its

basic style, as it emphasized more class or *esnaf* membership than religious or national affiliation. The costume of a high dignitary *Beg* was made of bright red, green or blue stout cloth, decorated with native silver. Merchants and craftsmen wore a suit made of dark stout cloth with black braid. Serbian Orthodox believers wore red belts, Catholics wore purple belts, while those of Muslims, called *trabolose* and *mukadem,* were made of multicolored silk. Members of different ethnicities could be also differentiated by the color of their caps *(fes).* Croatian and Serbian women wore mostly black satin or atlas *dimije* (Turkish wide trousers), while Bosniak women wore dimije of light pastel colors, and the wives of Begs had expensive silk dimije decorated with gold (Pasalic, 2005).

Sevdalinke, sad love songs of oriental atmosphere, were widespread in the cities, and they kept their popularity up to the present day. The analyses have shown that sevdalinka (tur. *sevda,* love) is not a copy of the Turkish love song, but a very different special sort of art tradition, incorporating both Western and Eastern elements, resulting from Slavic and Oriental emotional mixture. The song in all likelihood came from the Sephardic Jews that settled in Bosnia after being exiled from Spain in 1492.

Folklore Society Sevdah (USA).

The cities develop characteristic filigree, goldsmith and brass-working tradition which made B&H internationally recognized. In Bosnia and Herzegovina and in other countries there are many cultural clubs and folklore societies that nurture traditional Bosnian cultural heritage.

Ibrik (jar). National Museum B&H.

RELIGION, BELIEFS & VALUES

The biggest religious community in BIH is the Muslim community, next is Serbian Orthodox, then Roman Catholic and the smallest is Jew ish community. The immigrants in Croatia from BIH are predominantly Catholics, including a significant number of Muslims, while the number of those of Serbian

Orthodox faith and Jews is rather low.


Catholic cathedral in Sarajevo, built in 1889 (Photo Courtesy of Ruchan Ziya).

In comparison to other world religions, the differences between Judaism, Christianity and Islam look insignificant, while similarities prevail. These three religions share historic and geographic aspects, and are theologically related.

Ethnographically, compared to the host population in Croatia, Muslims from Bosnia and Herzegovina are characterized by specificities in religion, language, dialect, nutrition and other aspects of everyday life. Religion as a very recognizable cultural aspect is the most conspicuous and the most important cultural difference. Bosnian Croats are Catholics same as Croats in Croatia, and although some cultural differences do exist compared to majority population in Croatia, they are rather insignificant compared to those between that religious group and Muslims in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Both Christianity and Islam are revealed religions, which are characterized by a range of similarities manifested mostly through an attentive care to spiritual life and growth by living a conscientious and irreproachable life, regular prayer, fasting, pilgrimage, and asking for forgiveness of sins. Besides, active participation in the community life, care for others, voluntary financial assistance of the community and the poor are present in both religions.

One of the main commandments to both groups of believers refers to love, respect and obedience to parents and the parental duty to monitor and direct their children to the right path in life. There is still a whole array of similar principles referring to other spheres of life, which may however be presented and realized differently in everyday life of the two communities. Christianity, for instance, stresses inner growth thus leaving full-fledged freedom to believers in how they will deal concretely with everyday activities, while in Islam such activities are proscribed by the Qur'an and the Hadith to minutest details both on the level of physical and spiritual (e.g. obligatory body movements during ceremonial washing, the use of certain part of the body in performing certain actions, behavior while yawning and sneezing, and many others). However, within the present context it is important to emphasize only some of these differences, particularly those that potentially


Orthodox church in Banja Luka.

influence an individual's physical and mental health and refer to relationships in family and community.Lewis (1998:120) says that since its beginnings Islam has acknowledged other religions as evidenced by legal and theological texts. Pluralism is a part of the holy law of Islam which unlike Christianity and Judaism confronted the problem of religious tolerance early on in the Islamic history. The tolerance of other religions is not the matter of opinion or choice, interpretation or judgment depending on the circumstances, but it is based on dogmatic and religious texts and for Muslims it is a part of the written holy law.

The Muslims in B&H practice orthodox Sunni branch of Islam of hanefiz mezheba (legal school). The Islamic community in B&H is of traditional type and it was founded in 1463 at the time of the Turkish conquest. The Bosnian Islam is of ethnic character in a sense that it is mononational. Thanks to the intense communication with the center of sunni Islam, developed theological schools, network of religious institutions and education of Bosniaks in the Islamic education centers of the world, the Bosnian Muslims are synchronized with the modern flows of Islam.

Islam is the youngest of the Abraham religions. The year of revelation is 610 when the prophet Mohammad received the first passages of the Qur'an from a messenger of God, angel Gabriel. The credo: "There is only one God. Mohammad is a messenger from God" manifests absolute monotheism in Islam and belief in one and only God. Mohammad's task is to restore faith in the only true God and he is believed to be the last prophet before the Judgment day.

- Islam *(ar.* = peace, submission) was **revealed** over 1400 years ago in Mecca, Arabia.
- Muslims believe that there is **only One God**.
- **Allah** is the Arabic word for God. (Allah = to whom prayers^are directed).
- According to Muslims, God sent a number of prophets to mankind to teach them **how to live** according to His law.
- **Isa** (Jesus), **Musa** (Moses) and **Abraham** are respected as prophets of God.
- According to Muslims, the final Prophet was **Muhammad.**
- Muslims believe that Islam has always existed, but for practical purposes, date their religion from the time of the migration of Muhammad.
- Muslims base their laws on their holy book the **Qur'an**, and the **Sunnah** which is the practical example of Prophet Muhammad how to practice faith.

Five basic Pillars of Islam:

1. **Declaration of faith**
2. **Salat** - performing ritual prayers in the proper way five times a day
3. **Zekat** - paying charity tax to benefit the poor and the needy
4. **Sawm**-fasting during the month of Ramadan
5. **Hajj -** once in a lifetime pilgrimage to Mecca.

Like in Albania, the Dervish order as the most common form of folk Islam is also present in B&H, but it did not play such an important role in the expansion of Islam as the orthodox *ulema* did.

In B&H many local customs affirm the influence of preislamic cultural customs, mostly deriving from the Bosnian Church of the Middle Age, on Bosnian Islam.

Franciscan monastery Plehan.

They include outdoor places for prayers (dovista), the most famous of which is Ajvatovica (Little Mecca). They are mostly in the open near the graves of holy people or in other specially selected places. Prayers in the open were practiced by the Bosnian Christians before Islam, and they should not to be confused with mass Muslim prayers held in the open which are a result of the modern era.

Sarajevo synagogue built by the end of 16th century.

Islam is more than a religion, it is a way of life which is regulated by the Sharia (tur.law) law that is compilation of religious, penal and family laws, based on the Qur'an, as opposed to Adet (tur. custom) that is based on unwritten law. The Sharia regulates all human actions and puts them into five categories: obligatory, recommended, permitted, disliked or forbidden. It also sets out rules for conduct of men and women, lawsrelating to personal acts of worship, laws relating to commercial dealings, laws relating to marriage and divorce, and penal laws.

It is considered that the majority of members of the Serbian Orthodox religion came into Bosnia in greater numbers after the Ottoman conquest. They were mostly nomads with developed cattle breeding and inhabited mountain areas of B&H. However, as the center of the Serbian Orthodox Church (Pec Patriarchy) was in the Ottoman Empire, it had somewhat more favorable position, than the Catholic Church, the center of which was outside its borders.

In the ninetieth and twentieth century, the **Serbian Orthodox Church** in B&H shared the destiny of its people which suffered tremendous casualties during the Second World War, but it played a more ambivalent role during the Serbian aggression on B&H.

The **Roman Catholic Church** has the longest tradition in B&H, since the times of the medieval Bosnian state. The official Roman Curia represented by Dominicans did not succeed in imposing Roman Catholicism as the official religion in B&H, and after the expulsion of the Dominicans the medieval Bosnian Church (which was considered heretic by the Roman Catholic Church) dominated between 12 and 14 century until the Turkish invasion.

In the fifteenth century the Roman Curia, which would probably be the number one religion in Bosnia if it were not for the Ottoman Empire, gradually returns to B&H. After that time the most prominent role was played by the missionary Franciscans who through the Franciscan province of Bosna Srebrena kept Catholicism alive until the Austro-Hungarian occupation in 1878. After the occupation, the Catholic Church in Bosnia becomes a part of the Roman Catholic Church. B&H has a cardinal who is the supreme catholic priest on its territory.

The specificity of B&H is the folk Catholicism. The Franciscan order has been present there for the long time and the catholic population developed a special relationship with it, so that Franciscans are frequently called "uncles". The cult of Holy Mary is very developed in Bosnia and its most famous manifestation is Medugorje, the place where Mary appeared, which attracts millions of believers every year, although it has not been acknowledged by the official Catholic Church.

The Jewish community in B&H descends from the immigration of Sephardic Jews from Spain after the fall of Granada in 1492. In spite of being numerically small and of urban character, it left many traces in Bosnian culture and history. The most significant exhibit of the National Museum in Sarajevo is *Hagada,* holy scripture brought by the Jews upon their exile from Spain.

Some language differences	
Bosnian	Croatian
kahva/kafa/kava	kava
tacka	tocka
minut	minuta
planet	planeta
Sta je rekao?	Sto je rekao?
Ko ide?	Tko ide?
Ivanu treba novac.	Ivan treba novac
Treba da radim.	Trebam raditi.
hiljada	tisuca
januar/sijecanj	sijecanj
sto/hastal	stol
hefta/sedmica	tjedan
nogomet/fudbal	nogomet
voz	vlak
tanjir	tanjur

LANGUAGE AND COMMUNICATION

There are three official languages in B&H: Bosnian, Croatian and Serbian which are all used in official communication. There are two official alphabets: Cyrillic and Latin script, which dominates in everyday use.

The Bosnian language today exists as a standard language based like Croatian on the Stokavian - ijekavian variety which is very similar to the Croatian language, but with certain phonetic, lexical and stylistic particularities. As compared to Croatian, the Bosnian language is rather linguistically homogenous and not divided into so many dialects (kajkavian, stokavian, cakavian, dialect) between which differences are greater than between the two standard languages.

The spoken Bosnian language differs from spoken Croatian mostly in accentuation and some specific lexical items including many orientalisms. As opposed to Croatian, the Bosnian language keeps a clear distinction between rising and falling accents. A distinct characteristic of Bosnian dialects is also a stress shift to enclitics (e.g. phrase *u Bosni (in Bosnia)* will be pronounced /ubosni/ instead of /ubosni/ as in the Croatian stokavian dialects). Bosnian also often keeps the sounds h and f in some positions, which are missing in the same words of the Croatian language (lahko/lako, mehko/meko). The Bosnian language is open and multicultural and has a large and increasing number of loans from other languages, particularly Arabic, Turkish, and Persian. As it is more open to loan words it frequently allows both varieties characteristic for Croatian and Serbian language respectively.

The spoken language and a way of speaking disclose "a man from Bosnia", regardless of his/her nationality. Sometimes, members of Serbian and Croatian communities in B&H tend to use Serbian and Croatian languages, respectively, as a form of distinguishing themselves apart from each other, but their accent reveals their Bosnian affiliation.

In **nonverbal communication** handshake represents the introductory part. Men shake hands at the beginning and the end of each encounter. In Muslim families handshaking is permitted amongst men, but a woman cannot have any physical contact with a man that is not her husband. if the woman offers her hand first it is permitted to accept it, but a man must not offer it first. This social rule derives from *vahabism,* which is an Islamic reform movement from the eighteenth century that interprets Islam in a puritan fashion. *Neovahabism* reappeared in the seventies of the twentieth century.

In verbal communication participants in a conversation often do not look each other, but they look aside. In that way instead of a dialog they have what we might call a "double monologue". Because in the standard European communication direct looking in the eyes during conversation is the norm it may appear that the Bosnian is trying to hide something, but it is actually a way of verbal communication that enables him to concentrate better at the theme at hand ("talking under the eyelids").

When meeting someone for the first time, after the initial restrain, a Bosnian very quickly passes to a more informal way of communication using more intimate form of you "ti". This transition can be quite confusing if the person you are talking to is unknown to you. Equally confusing for a Bosnian can be the usual Croatian usage of polite form "vi" (you/plural out of respect) when somebody talks to him/her and then he/she often replies also with plural "mi" (we) - for example, when somebody asks "How are you (polite plural)?" and he/she responds "Thank you we are fine", instead of the usual Croatian "Thank you, I am fine".

Although there are many lexical differences between Bosnian and Croatian, the Croatian language also has a large number of orientalisms which are used in every day speech like the examples below, while for some of them there is no other word with the same meaning in the standard Croatian language:

Standard Croatian:

carapa, cizma, duhan, dzep, cevap, jastuk , karavan, kat, kava, kavez, lepeza, sanduk, sandala, pamuk, papuca, zenit, kajgana

Used more frequently than alternative forms:

cekic, fitilj, kalup, kat, marama, mana, pekmez, jarak, ducan, sat, secer, tava, tavan

In verbal communication Bosnians often use words from the Turkish language which can be very confusing for the people that do not know their meaning. For instance, when entering a Bosnian house the person that greets the newcomers says: "bujrum", which is a hello that means welcome. When somebody comes into a house unexpected he says: "Is there a bujrum?" which means: "Am I welcome?"

One can often hear terms inshalah (if God permits) and mashalah (Excelent! Great! God giveth.). The word mustuluk means "great news". When somebody says mustuluk, it means he/she brings some good news. As a gift is owed to any bringer of good news, the custom is to treat that person with food and drinks. Ceif or Cef (will or mood) is very often used with the meaning of "being in a mood to do something".

"If a man does something and somebody asks him why he did it he'll reply: "It was my *ceif*". (Hangi, 1906). In the same way, if you ask him why he did not do something he will reply: "It was not my ceif". In a narrower sense ceif represents a meditative mood accompanied by a total calmness of spirit and body. "Ceif is when you ascend into a careless empire, not knowing even that you are breathing, drinking coffee or chewing tobacco (Hangi, 1906.).

In addition to standard **greetings** that are also common in Croatia, Muslims say hello to each other with **merhaba** (welcome, I greet you as a friend) and **selam-alejkum** (peace be with you). Hangi (1906) describes the Muslim greeting like this: "Our Muslim greeting is very nice. When two friends meet in the street, they say hello by touching his or her chest, mouth and forehead with their right hand. With this they want to say: "I greet you

from my heart, I say it with my mouth and I honor you with my mind.””.

Hangi says that Muslims greet also members of other religions in this way and that they reply in the same manner. He also says that Bosnians regardless of their religion always ask after a greeting: "How are you?” or "How are you, sir?” and the customary answer is: ”To thank God, very well. And you?”

Traditionally, and even today in some rural parts, life in Bosnia was based on the extended family with more then ten members which were all close relatives either by birth or marriage. Every one of them had to be recognized and named as a particular family member, so that an elaborate system of **kinship terms** was in use. In spite of the changes in the form of family, they are still very much in use in all ethnic groups in Bosnia, while in Croatia these kinship terms are no longer common.

Bosnian kinship terms

The wife of a son or brother is nevjesta, nevista, neva or snaja. Sister's husbands are - badze, and husband's brothers are - djeverovi. The bride's brothers are to her husband - surjaci (sura, surjak), and rarely they will be called sogor. Their children are surjakovici. Wife of the djever is to the bride - jetrva, and amongst themselves they call each other- seka, sekica, sekana... Djever is usually called brat, brato, bajo, baja... Husband's sister is - zaova (zava) and the bride usually calls her - seka. Wife's sister is to the husband - svast (svaja, svastika), and he to her is svak. Brother's children are sinovci, necaci (netjaci), and among them they are called bratici, sestrici or prvi rodaci. To all old relatives from the wife's side the husband is- zet. Father's brother is cica, cikan, and rarely somebody will call him- stric. Cica's wife is - strina, and their children are stricevici. Mother's brother is - ujak, and his wife is -ujna. Their children are - ujakovici (first cousins). Father's and mother's sister are- tetke. Their husbands are called- tetak. Their children are - tecici. (http://www.bosanska-posavina.com/).

Muslim names in Bosnia appeared with the Ottoman Empire, which inherited Islam from Arabs and Persians, so that most of their names come from Arab, then Persian and the least from the Turkish language. Bosniaks have adapted these names to their language, often not knowing their real meanings, so they made modifications, shortened the names or using diminutives thus creating unique Bosniak names. All Muslim names have a meaning (Hasan means "beautiful man", Muradif signifies "friend", Alija means "exalted one", Tarik bears the meaning "North star”, Meliha "beautiful girl”... Most Muslim last names in B&H are patronymics which end with the Slavic suffix -ic or -ovic. Some Bosniak last names contain father's name and/or a name of a profession or a title (Izetbegovic - son of beg Izet; Hadzihafizbegovic - son of beg who was a hadzija and a hafiz- he knows the whole Koran by heart; Osmanovic - son of Osman; Imamovic - son of Imam; Kujundzic - son of a craftsman). With secular Bosniaks Slavic names are also popular (Zlatan, Tvrtko, Jasna...).

POPULAR CULTURE



Popular culture in B&H is tied to tradition and reflects the diversity of its influences. Bosnia and Herzegovina has been a center of popular culture that has marked the twentieth century in the Yugoslavian context, and some of its most successful representatives have achieved international success in literature, music or film. The Bosnian oral narrative tradition has found its voice in literature and other art forms.

In addition to other renowned writers, such as Alija Nametak, Aleksa Santic, Antun Branko Simic, Isak Samokovlija, Skender Kulenovic, Branko Copic the most famous Bosnian writer of the twentieth century is Ivo Andric whose novel "A Bridge on Drina" was rewarded with the Nobel Prize for literature in 1961. The youngest group of writers like Miljenko Jergovic and Semezdin Mehmedinovic has been marked by the trauma of the last Bosnian war which is a common theme in their literature.

Bosnia is one of the first countries of alternative and urban culture in the region. It has had a number of successful pop and rock bands, popular throughout ex- Yugoslavia, like "Indexi", "Bijelo dugme", "Ambasadori", "Teska industrija", "Vatreni poljubac ", "Plavi orkestar", "Crvena jabuka", "Zabranjeno pusenje", "Merlin", "Hari Mata Hari". The leaders od the Bosnian alternative movement are: the band SCH and an acclaimed hip-hop singer Edin Osmic also known as Edo Majka. There is alsos an annual music festival at which the best actual music achievements of pop and rock production are awarded.

Folk and traditional music, colored with various Balkan and oriental motives makes the Bosnian music scene as diversified as unique.

The stars of the Bosnian new folk movement, like Halid Beslic, Haris Dzinovic, Hanka Paldum, and others are very popular throughout the Balkan region.

Bosnian Muslims call their father babo, grandfather is did, dido or dedo, and grandmother nena, nana ili majka (old mother). Mother's brother is daidza, his wife daidzinica , their son daidzic, and daughter daidzicna. Father's brother is amidza, his wife is amidzinica, his son is amidzic, and daughter amidzicna. Amidza and dedo are a common forms when addressing any older man.

The same applies to famous singers of old lyric songs sevdalinke

A special part of the cultural production of Bosnia and Herzegovina belongs to film industry. Movies from the first two decades after the Second World War portrayed themes

from the national revolution, the Second World Wa and famous partisan battles (Films "Kozara" and "Battle on Neretva" by Veljko Bulajic, "Valter defends Sarajevo" and "Bridge" by Hajrudin Siba Krvavac).

The first real success came in the late seventies and the eighties. The most famous ones are "Do *you remember Doli Bet'* and *"Father on a business trip"* by Emir Kusturica that were scripted by Abdulah Sidran. Other film author is Ademir Kenovic whose film "Kuduz", written by Abdulah Sidran, vividly depicts the little man in conflict with injustice of the powerful.

After the war, during which no or very little movies were made, Denis Tanovic wins an Oscar for the movie *"No man's land'* in the category for best foreign picture.In short picture category one must mention "10 minutes" by Ahmed Imamovic, which won the "Prize for best European short film" in 2002.

COMMUNITY, SOCIAL LIFE AND CUSTOM

When it was included in the Ottoman Empire, the Bosnian state was organized politically as other parts of the Empire. The system of religious communities (millets) that had a very large autonomy (including the judicial system) formed the foundation on which today's Bosnian nationalities developed. They can be viewed primarily as religious nationalities because of their ethnic and linguistic relatedness. As they share the same language (with some dialectal differences) the largest ethnic groups in Bosnia are distinguished by religion which is the main marker of group distinctiveness, and for most of them the significance of religious adherence as a symbol of ethnicity outweighs the importance of religious belief and dogma. Since the middle of the nineteenth century national mass movements found their roots in binding together national and religious affiliation. Nationalities today are a reality for B&H and they form the foundation of Bosnian diversity. However, in spite of their connections to their respective "homelands", both Serbs and Croats share with Bosniaks a strong feeling of belonging to the local identity.

In B&H there is a well developed institution of *komsiluk* (neighborhood) through which neighbors help and protect each other, sharing both good and bad things throughout their life. For instance, it is customary to go to neighbors houses to mourn or to celebrate events. Despite different religions, it is common for Muslims to visit Christians for Christmas as for Christian neighbors to visit Muslims for Bajram.

Rough living conditions (both natural and social) have contributed to the feeling of solidarity amongst Bosnians, regardless of ethnicity, greatly affected the development of the local community.

Bosnians are known as sociable and hospitable people. They enjoy in entertaining guests

and visiting friends. It is a custom to bring a small gift when visiting someone (e.g. coffee, candy...) and hosts always serve coffee, sweets and drinks. Usually they offer three coffees. The first one is called *docekusa* (greeting coffee), the second one is *razgovorusa or brbljavusa* (talking coffee), and after the third coffee which is known as *kandzija* (tur. whip), or *sikterusa* (tur. Go away! Go home!) the guests are expected to leave.

A coffe-house in Travnik.

A part of the social tradition are *sijelo* and *aksamluk* (tur. aksam =evening) which are evening social events including light conversations and singing along with *meze* (tur. snacks) and *rakija* (homemade brandy). Especially popular are outdoor picnics that are called *teferici* when a group of friends takes coffee pots, coffee and some food (pies or a Bosnian pot) and goes to a popular resort by a stream, river or pond. Bosnians are known for their sense of humor, so these outings always include a lot of *sega* (tur. joke) as an obligatory element.

Bosnian coffee. Bujrum (welcome).
http://djed.blog.ba

In the cities, especially in the evening, it is the time for the **korzo**, or walking up and down the main street, and socializing with peers in numerous coffee shops. The term **raja** (tur. poor people) today bears a meaning of group of friends, crowd or bunch, and is a vital part of the Bosnian life and worldview.

A picnic (teferič)

For Bosnian emigrants in other countries, like Croatia, this need for socializing is often limited and less intense due to a different way of life, work and family priorities, which is often very hard for some

of them to bear.

CELEBRATIONS, FAMILY GATHERINGS

Significant events and dates from the family, national or religious past are often used as an excuse for family gatherings. When holidays are concerned Muslims orient themselves by the Islamic calendar and for them the bajrams (**Ramadan bajram and Kurban Hadji bajram**) are the most important holiday. Ramazan bajram comes at the end of Ramadan, a month of fasting and personal sacrifice. The celebration lasts for three days. It is customary to give presents for Ramadan bajram and to have festive lunches and dinners. Bajram-namaz (prayer) is preformed in all the mosques on the first day of Bajram, and the families go to the *mezar* (cemeteries), welcome guests after at their house, and in the next few days they visit their family and friends. The children who come to visit get *bajramluk,* a gift in money according to the possibilities of the giver. It is believed that this given money will return tenfold to the one who gives it. The Ramadan dinner during fasting is called *iftar,* and *sofra* (table) includes various traditional meals like baklava.

THE SARAJEVO IFTAR

The order in which the meals are served is special: after a hot meal comes a cold one and vice versa, after a sweet dish comes a salty one. The introduction to the iftar is ice sherbet (juice from honey and red rose with ice).

1. Entree: Various *recelji* (sweets from cherries, oranges, and roses), cheese from Travnik, *bosman* and almond cakes.

MEALS:

2. Corba (soup)
3. Cimbur (warm salty dish - egg meal)
4. Bunlari (cold sweet dish)
5. Bamja (okra)
6. Nice cevab with quince (sweet cold dish)
7. Zeljanica (warm salty dish - spinach pie)
8. Kadayf (cold sweet dish)
9. Sarena dolma (salty warm dish - stuffed vegetables)
10. Krti rutavci (cold sweet dish)
11. Studena jelandzi dolma (cold salty dish)
12. Baklava (sweet pie dish with walnuts)
13. Bijeli pilav (warm salty dish - rice with chicken meat)
14. Rumeni hosaf (stewed sour cherries with ice)
15. Kahva (Coffee)

http://www.cyberbulevar.com/kuhar/

The Kurban Haji bajram comes two months after the Ramadan bajram. It is a time for performing *hajj* (pilgrimage) as a basic religious duty. The Muslim that performs hadjj becomes the hadjia and earns respect in the community.

Kurban (sacrifice) is the traditional slaughter of the kurban (usually sheep). The festival remembers the prophet Ibrahim's willingness to sacrifice his son when God ordered him to. Kurban bajram is a holiday of the community as the meat and tof the sheep is distributed among family, neighbors and friends.

Catholics celebrate Christmas and Easter with the traditional marking of the important days of saints and martyrs. The main parts of the church year are Lent and Advent. Lent is the period of forty days which comes before Easter, traditionally a time of fasting and reflection, and its main characteristics are: personal sacrifice, caring for others and

questioning one's own faith. Other important holy days are Pentecost, All Saints' Day, and those dedicated to Virgin Mary, like Feast of the Assumption and Feast of the Immaculate Conception.

Eastern Orthodox Christians also celebrate Christmas and Easter, but their Christmas is celebrated by the Julian calendar so it falls on the seventh of January. The eastern orthodox New Year is on the fourteenth of January. They also celebrate numerous *slavas,* days of the family patron saints. The presence at the liturgies is not as mandatory as with Catholics.

The Jewish community celebrates their holy days according to Torah. They include sacred days, such as Yom Kippur (The Day Of Atonement), Rosh Hashanah (New Year), Hanukah (Festival of Lights) and other holy days that commemorate important events from Jewish history (Purim, Sukkoth, Passover, Shavuot). They are celebrated according to Jewish calendar (Christian year 2006 is Jewish year 5767).

In Bosnia, particularly in the cities where mixed marriages are more common, many families celebrate Eastern Orthodox, Catholic and Muslim holy days.

CLOTHING AND DRESSING CODES

There are no specific costumes defined by ethnicity or religion in Bosnia. Adolescents, as well as other age groups

Gabrijel Jurkić: Christmas evening in Bosnia.

Tatooed Catholic woman in Bosnia.

follow modern fashion trends dictated by the industry. Older Bosniak women distinguish themselves by wearing slippers and wider, more comfortable clothes. During feasts and celebrations Bosniak women tend to wear a lot of jewelry, probably so they can show off their fortune.

It is interesting that in some parts of Bosnia Croat women still tattoo their hands and other visible parts of their body with Christian symbols. This very old tradition had a special meaning during the time of the Turkish rule as remembrance of the last Christian queen Jelena, and a sign of resistance against islamization.

Head covering with a head scarf is practiced by women of all religious affiliations in rural areas. Traditionally veils are worn by older, moral, god fearing and respect worthy women, and serve as a kind of their additional protection.

The vahabist fashion that some younger Muslim women practice to express their identity represents a modern trend which is present in B&H since the war.

In Bosnian families it is customary to take off your shoes upon entering the house, where one walks with slippers or barefoot.

SEXUALITY

In all Bosnian communities, regardless of ethnicity or religion, the desirable sexual conduct is heterosexual and monogamous.

Islam, as opposed to the Catholic dogma, does not treat sex as a sin to be practiced only for reproduction. For Muslims sex is *ibadet* (a gift from god). Therefore heterosexual sexual practice is even encouraged, but exclusively for married couples. This attitude has contributed to the concept of marrying at a young age as a way to channel sexuality into socially acceptable forms. On the other hand, adultery is considered to be one of the most serious offences. We may assume that the main reason for this is that it destabilizes the community, the survival of which is of the utmost importance in Islam and that is why it should be protected by harsh punishments for the offenders.

Foto: Narayan Mahon

Traditionally, in accordance with social norms, most Bosnian girls and boys, especially Muslim, did not have a lot of opportunities to socialize with the opposite sex before marriage, while sexual activity was forbidden before marriage. In that sense they were protected from premature sexual relations, inappropriate relationships and possible tragic consequences. They married quite young, girls as soon as they turned 16.

Foto: Francine Aubry

The war and the era of socialism have most definitely weakened the traditional social norms related to sexuality, especially in the cities. People enter into a marriage later, and prenuptial sex has become common, as well as birth control, despite the religious prohibitions.

But public display of one's sexuality is still viewed upon as something tasteless and unacceptable. Different sexualities and their manifestations like *Gay pride* would not come across fertile ground with the local population. This doesn't say that this kind of sexuality does not exist; it is just not very public. There are records about different sexual conduct throughout Bosnian history, and the term *lutija* (levat) depicts a homosexual. During the Ottoman period homosexuality was tolerated, but certainly not encouraged. Homosexuality is contrary to religion and harmful to community because homosexuals do not have children. Due to a widespread ideal of *macho* men, accusing someone for being homosexual is a great insult, and it is very important to Bosnians, "not to be gay". Interestingly, some deviant male social roles (murderer, criminal) the community seems to accept more easily than homosexuality (he can be anything but gay). Therefore, homosexuals tend to migrate mostly toward big cities like Zagreb, Ljubljana, Belgrade, Istanbul, and other cities of Western Europe.

VIOLENCE

Violence does not represent a desirable form of social conduct in the Bosnian community. Although Bosnia was exposed to various acts of violence (wars, occupations, riots, risings...) in peaceful periods individual violence is not frequent. When it happens, Bosnians have a tendency to use a knife *(cakija)* in resolving the conflicts. Usually it starts as a consequence of overuse of alcohol and singing in local pubs.

As a result of the recent war, the Bosnian population came into possession of all kinds of weapons so the *cakija* is often replaced with firearms and explosives which are used in political and criminal conflicts. As in most patriarchal societies, strength and physical fitness are highly appreciated among the Bosnians.



Muslim cemetery in Sarajevo.
Foto: Lena Friess

DEATH AND FUNERAL ACTIVITIES

Death is an integral part of life. A quick and painless death is greatly appreciated (He/she did not suffer). Funerals are usually performed according to religious rules, but atheist (secular) funerals are also common. Cremation is very rare.

What distinguishes Muslims from other denominations is the way the funeral rites are performed. The body of the deceased is ritually washed (gusul). Then it is wrapped up in a cloth (cefini) and put in a shallow coffin (tabut). The *tabut* is used to carry the body to the grave (mezar). The body in the grave is covered by boards aligned in an angle of 45° on which the earth is thrown. The burial ceremony (dzenaza - namaz) has two parts. The first one is performed in front of the mosque and afterwards the body of the deceased is carried to the cemetery. If the cemetery is near the mosque, tabut is carried by family members and friends and if it is far away, motorized transport is used.

Traditionally, only Muslim men attend funerals, while women stay at home. Today even women go to funerals, but they do not participate, only observe it on the side. After the deceased has been lowered into the grave, the Muslims bury him. Each participant throws a couple of shovels of dirt and afterwards lets the shovel fall to the ground so that the next one can pick it up. When the casket is buried everybody prays for the soul of the deceased.

Most activities around the funeral happen in the house of the deceased. Neighbors, relatives, friends and acquaintances bring coffee, food and beverages for the guests so that the family can mourn in peace.

FAMILY STRUCTURE

The family is the base of a Bosnian community. The average size of a Bosnian family exceeds the nuclear family with two children. Although the average birth-rate is decreasing the desirable norm is three or more children in a nuclear family.

Muslims have three types of godfathers: circumcision, marriage and shearing (*strizeni*) godfather.

"Shearing" godfather is considered in some parts of Bosnia as the most important one. Both Muslims and Christians could be godfathers:

"The godfather takes the *makaze* (scissors) and cuts of a piece of hair hanging over the forehead of the child and becomes his/her *strizeni* godfather. It is believed that a child who has this godfather will heal if it is ill or die peacefully and quickly if it is dying..." (Hangi, 1906).

The people that eat at the same table make a household. The social network of the extended family is still very much present and elaborated, but nowadays two or more nuclear families rarely share one kitchen, and each married woman should have her own kitchen. This trend is primarily present in the cities, but it is becoming popular in rural parts as well. The census from 2001 shows that the percentage of urban population in B&H is 43% and the percentage of rural population is 57%. Similarly, in Croatia urban population amounts to 58%, as opposed to 42% of rural population. The wider nuclear family includes older members, often also those who lost their spouse or never married.

The Bosnian war (1992 - 1995) encouraged social solidarity within ethnic communities and slowed down the process of fragmentation of extended families, but the trend continued after the war. It is difficult to assess its intensity because of the lack of statistical data, but with considerable certainty it can be said that the extended nuclear family is still the prevailing family form in B&H.

Organizationally, the family has a "head of the household". Due to the patriarchal social structure it is customary that this role is played by a man. In Islamic culture the man represents the family outside the house, in the public space and the woman cares for the private sphere -the house and family.

It is not uncommon, however, that the wife is the real "ruler of the house". In the families that live in the area between the Bosnian krajina and Sandzak, women run the household businesses while men are only formally "heads of the household".

MARRIAGE, BIRTH AND CHILD CARE

Christianity and Islam put special emphasis on the need to be married as the best model for living together and the family is viewed upon as the basic structure which contributes

As soon as a child is born it has to be protected from **uroci** (spells,evil curses) and witches. Curses come from the eyes and there is nothing in this world *(dunjaluk),* that is protected from the curse. Not only children die from curses but adults as well, and it is often said that half the world died from curses. So, when you see a small child say: "*Mashallah",* or "Thou shall not be cursed" (Hangi, 1906).

to social bliss. In Christian law, marriage is a sacred institution. The Catholic Church has strict guidelines on divorce. The Church considers the bond of marriage to be a sacred bond, one that is based on lifelong love, fidelity and family. Marriage is both a legal bond on earth and spiritual bond which God has witnessed. The latter cannot be broken using temporal laws (although some Christian denominations tolerate divorce). Islam tolerates divorce, but considers it to be "the most disliked of the things permitted by God" (Hamidullah, 1993). As opposed to Catholicism in Islam marriage is not a holy sacrament and a gift of God, but a contract which brings rights and obligations to both parties, and can only be successful when these are mutually respected and cherished.

Most Bosnians today are in fact highly secularized, and about a third of all urban marriages in Bosnia in recent decades have been between partners from different religious/ethnic backgrounds.

While in earlier times arranged marriages were a social norm, today, marriage is a result of romantic love of two people who marry by their own free feel. But even earlier this old tradition was not obligatory as in other regions of the world, e.g. the Indian subcontinent.

Another custom that was still practiced in the first half of the 20th century was the abduction of the bride, usually with the consent of both families involved, to free a family with a large number of female children from paying the dowry. The custom of *asikovanje* (courting) has been practiced in Bosnia for ages. Girls would stand at the window and young men would court them.

Pregnancy and the birth of a child are sacred events in the Bosnian family. It enables the continuity of the species and the lineage and is extremely important for the preservation of the community. The woman takes on the role of the mother after birth. She gets social reputation and the respect of male and older members of the family and the community. The pregnancy of a woman is a proof of the biological abilities (to reproduce) of the man, so his social reputation grows too.

A family with more children is considered to be both happier and richer. That is why a higher-birth rate was encouraged and was high for centuries in B&H in all communities, regardless of religion. The fertility of a woman is an appreciated quality, while a family with no children is a great sorrow. The unwed woman is called *usidjelica* (spinster), and the one without children *inoca* and *bezditka* (barren woman). A

mistress is called *prileznica.*

Newborn babies receive all necessary care provided by the family members. After a period of 40 days *(babinje)* the mother and the newborn receive visitors.

The primary socialization (raising and caring for the child) in the preschool age is the task of the family, primarily of the parents and then of the wider family. The school takes over the role of secondary socialization, and there children acquire both religious and secular knowledge.

The **circumcision** (*sunecenje)* of male children is a Muslim custom that introduces children to the world of Islam. It is usually performed during the preschool age and represents a significant event for the family. Traditionally, this procedure was performed by barbers, but today it is done in medical institutions. The circumcision is a sacred event in the life of the boy and his family. The boy receives presents from relatives and is initiated into the world of men.

Circumcision is not obligatory, but it is recommended not only as a religious rite, but also for hygienic reasons, as a preventive measure against infections and illnesses.

The arrival of a female child does not trigger special joy in the family, because men are considered to be the carriers of the family name. Traditionally, boys had more freedom, while girls were raised strictly, getting used early to work and obedience. In front of their grandfather, father, uncle and even older brothers they had to keep quiet and be docile. By the age of ten girls did house works and learned how to saw and knit. (http://www.bosanska- posavina.com/). Most of them got married between 16 and 19 years.

Puberty and adolescence are viewed upon as a transition period between childhood and adulthood and as an entry into the world of adults. While adolescence period tends to become longer in the West, where a large number of "big children" (following the syndrome of Peter Pan) refuse to grow up even when they reach 40, in B&H young people mature early and begin to take over adult roles and responsibilities.

Young couple, Srebrenica 1970.
Foto: Kulenović family

There are big differences in the education of children between rural and urban areas. There are considerable differences, particularly in primary socialization process. In rural areas, the patrilocal extended household is still the basic social unit and the most significant means of social support, while the traditional socialization process of children involves the

authoritarian and strict parenting style with early emphasis on different gender roles. In urban areas emphasis nowadays is on the nuclear family, with both parents working and spending less time with their children, and the more permissive parenting style, while the younger generation has a lifestyle and aspirations similar to their western European counterparts.

DIVORCE

Even divorce represents a part of life. Although divorce is allowed, the ideal is to settle down with a life-partner, and of all the things God does permit, divorce is said to be the thing He likes least. Islam is more realistic, and aware that many marriages go wrong and break down for all sorts of reasons, so It is not assumed that a couple will remain together 'till death them part'. If and when a marriage is broken, either party is entitled to seek divorce and a share of the properties. However, most marriages commence with the best of intentions, and the state of marriage is regarded as the ideal way for Muslims to live, while celibacy is not desirable because it can lead to various psychological and physical problems.

In Roman Catholicism, traditional religious dogma of sacredness and inviolability of marriage makes divorce more difficult. Sexual intimacy outside marriage is forbidden by both religions.

INTERGENERATIONAL RELATIONS

Bosnians as other traditional societies, respect their elders because age brings authority, knowledge and faith in their right judgment. In the modern society full of changes, this authority is shaken, as older people "have problems understanding new things", but this type of intergenerational conflict or generation gap is present in all generations and populations.

Library of the islamic Center in Zagreb.

Because of the great losses of the older population, the war and the post-war period brought the young generation to the social scene and gave them great social power.

Also many families lost their fathers in the war, mothers had to take over the role of the head of the family.

Caring for one another has traditionally been a part of the Bosnian society. With the Christian and Islam base alike that prescribe care for parents, elders and the sick, there is also an economic motive. Often older people retain their right to properties which gives them additional power over the younger members of the family.

Graduation ceremony at Medresa in Zagreb

EDUCATION & EMPLOYMENT

A decade after the end of the war in Bosnia (1992 - 1995), over 40% of the population in B&H is still unemployed and living at the edge of existence. In such circumstances, when "every paying job is a good job it is difficult to talk about employment attitudes. Still, the ideal is a steady job with a regular paycheck. Permanent employment and decent living accommodation are considered as a sign of competence and prosperity.

Usually, Bosnians find work at a very young age, after finishing their apprenticeship or high school. Children help around the house and learn work habits. In working class families it is expected of the children to find work after high school, and if they go on to college they are perceived as slackers ("When are you going to finish school so you can start working? He is studying so that he doesn't have to work."). In families with a tradition of higher education, college represents an investment in the future and the potential of university education is fully appreciated.

A research of Bosnian adolescents in Croatia has shown that they aspire towards higher education, but they are aware that their economical situation can prevent them to achieve that.

There is no institutional obstacle for women to attain the same level of education as men, yet it is common for men to have a higher education than women.

Today in B&H, a developed structure of educational institutions exists, from preschool education to college institutions. However, education is not unified on the whole territory of B&H, but there are different national programs of the main nationalities that insist on national interpretation of history and the learning of the particular language as a national language.

During the 29/30 days of Ramadan all adult Muslims must give up the following things during the hours of daylight:

- Food or drink of any sort
- Smoking, including passive smoking
- Sexual activity

Muslims who are physically or mentally unwell may be excused some of these, as may those who are under twelve years old, the very old, those who are pregnant, breast-feeding, menstruating, or travelling.

The Zagreb Islamic school, "Dr. Ahmed Smajlovic" was founded in 1992 at the Islamic center. **Medresa** (ar. school) is the name for a traditional type of school, which through long Islamic tradition signified a place where all relevant sciences were taught (religion, applied geometry, rhetoric and literature).

In 2000, Medresa was included in the Croatian high school system as a private school with public rights. There students are taught for the service in the Islamic community, but its curriculum enables them to continue their education in colleges and universities in Croatia and abroad. The education goal is To enable full integration of students in all field of social life in Croatia.

HEALTH

In Islam health is considered the greatest of God's blessings and therefore it should be taken good care of. The Qu'ran and the Hadith contain instructions how to take care of the body. Special consideration is made about hygiene and everyday cleaning of ears, eyes, nose, hair and sexual organs, while the basic principle is to wash one's hands before eating. In addition to spiritual reasons, the Ramadan fast works as a cleaning mechanism of the organism. The concept of health in Islam unifies mental, physical and social health, and is an integral part of religion and commitment to God. A weak and sick person cannot perform their duties towards God, family and community, as a healthy and strong person can. This holistic approach towards health is related to the right diet that enables the equilibrium of the organism, preventive methods and avoidance of harmful substances and behavior.

The usage of natural drugs and plants has a long tradition in Bosnia, even today when colds and a sore throat are concerned. Hangi (1906) says: "Our Muslims wash at least five times a day with fresh water from the stream, they take bath frequently and live a simple and moderate life, and if they get ill they first use a cold compress, then mint, plantain, marsh, nettle and other plants... Besides that, they make various balms (mehlem) that are used to cure wounds and various internal illnesses". Even today the base for alternative medicine in Bosnia is herbal medicine, and herbalists who work as healers and therapists by collecting and distributing plants. Their products serve as sedatives and healing potions. In some areas, there are also *kostolomci* (bone-breakers) who set broken bones.

The use of *rakija* (brandy) as a cure for injuries, fractures, swellings, high temperature, and bone aches is widespread. The universal use of rakija in both positive and negative forms is well illustrated by the saying: *"Rakija,* mother and stepmother". In addition to rakija, apple vinegar and especially honey are considered to have healing properties for many problems. Popular cures for the respiratory organs include pine juice, which is made from pine shoots in the spring, and for the kidneys brine juice that is made from

spruce.

Magic rituals are also a part of the alternative medicine and they are applied as a supplement to herbal treatment or as an independent healing procedure. The most famous one is called *"hodzin zapis"*. It is an amulet which contains a quotation from the Qu'ran or a prayer *(dova)* inscribed on it. The hodza (Muslim priest) gives it to people on demand. Magic rituals are present in all three religions and it is common to use rituals from different religions.

Among common magic rituals, there is also *salijevanje strave,* when melted lead is poured into a canister with water in order to scare the illness away.

Mental health. The relationship toward mental health is complex. Mental patients do not carry such a stigma as in western countries. The curing of mental illnesses follows the general trend of disease treatment. More and more mental patients are treated in medical institutions or under the supervision of a doctor. As they do not carry a large stigma it is possible to see them in the social environment, particularly in villages, working, and being a part of the family and community.

As a consequence of the recent war, mental health problems related to war experiences, are quite common, including risk for post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), combat stress disorder (CSR), depression, or alcoholism, despite Islamic prohibitions against alcohol.

Considering the attitudes toward contraception, Islam allows it only in marriage, as sex outside marriage is forbidden. In practice most Muslim authorities permit contraception to preserve the health of the mother or the well-being of the family.Contraception with the aim of having a permanently child-free marriage is not accepted. So sterilisation is wrong - partly because it prevents children permanently and partly because of a text forbidding men to castrate themselves.


Česma u Travniku.

All religions disapprove of **abortion.** Islam, however, allows abortion to save the life of the mother because it sees this as the 'lesser of two evils', and there is a general principle in Sharia (Muslim law) of choosing the lesser of two evils. Abortion within the first 120 days would be permitted if a child would be born with such physical and mental deformity as would deprive the child of a normal life.

The Catholic Church considers contraception unacceptable no matter what the consequences are, and allows only natural birth control methods (abstinence). The Roman Catholic Church says that deliberately causing an abortion is a grave moral wrong.

Herbal Fair, Sarajevo, 2006.

Christianity and Islam have similar attitudes about **euthanasia** and **suicide**. Life is sacred and only God determines how long will somebody live and people should not interfere.

Of course, in practice there exists a gradation of individual attitudes about these questions, especially when secular believers, Muslims or Catholics are concerned.

FOOD

In general, Muslims are allowed to consume all foods (e.g. grains, vegetables, fish and meat), except those that are explicitly prohibited *(haram)* in Islam. Prohibited foods are very few but include:

» Alcoholic drinks such as beer and wine.

» Pig meat (eg. ham, pork, bacon) and by-products of the pig such as pig fat.

» Meat of an animal that has died of natural causes, or as a result of strangling or beating.

» Blood that is in liquid ('drinkable') form

The Bosnian diet is clearly colored by the Ottoman heritage and Islam. However, the fact is that many dishes in Bosnia that have an oriental origin differ from the original meals in other eastern countries, because they have a special seal characteristic for Bosnia (Lakisic, 1988). The Bosnian cuisine represents an amalgam of the culinary traditions of all the nations of B&H, built on the integrated Bosnian and Herzegovinian culture in which east meets west, and where meals originating even from neighboring countries have been so modified that they can be called **Bosnian dishes**.

Bosnian dishes are mostly light, because they are cooked or sauteed with little water, usually with a soup stock, so that they have natural flavor which has no browned flour in it.

Oriental spices are added in small

quantities, and are mostly standard (pepper, paprika, aleva) so that they do not diminish the taste of the meat or change the experience of the meal completely (Lakisic, 1988). Bosnian cuisine is consistent with modern demands of medicine and healthy food because it is very natural with a lot of vegetables, fruit, milk and dairy products. Meat is eaten either cooked or roasted, mostly lamb, veal and chicken.

Cevapcici (grilled, sausage-like meat on thick bread with onion).

Foto: Branislav Praljak, *Mladina*

Typical regional specialties are dolma, (paprikas and other vegetables stuffed with meat), kalja (cooked meat and cabbage) and bosanski lonac (a Bosnian hotpot stew, a slow-cooked- mixture of layers of meat and vegetables. Pitas (pies) are the most famous dishes of Bosnian cuisine, just like pizzas in Italy. Dough is transformed into thin layers (jufke) that are filled with cheese (sirnica), meat (burek), spinach (zeljanica), potatoes (krompirusa, kumpirusa), pumpkin (misiraca, misirac-pita), eggs (jajusa), walnuts and honey (baklava) etc. It is interesting that the meat pie (burek) is considered to be a male pie,

while all the other variants are female.

In the new surroundings, Bosnian immigrants preserve their old eating habits, and prepare pies and other Bosnian dishes frquently. A lot of Bosnian dishes have become standard in Croatia, like *sarma, sataras, filled paprika, musaka, burek, ajvar, duvec, cevapcici, baklava, kajgana, kajmak...*

BEG'S SOUP (BEGOVA CORBA)

Ingredients:

1/2 kg chicken meat 20 dg carrots

roots of celery and parsley 50 g bamia 20 g rice

2 ***dl pavlaka (cream)***
3 ***egg jokes lemon juice salt***

Put the meat and vegetables in water, salt and cook. When it is done filter the soup from meat and vegetables. Cut them into cubes and put them back into the soup. Return the soup on the fire and add cooked rice and bamia. Add lemon, cream and egg iokes before serving.

The daily routine includes breakfast as a light morning meal, lunch that is the main daily meal and dinner. Everyday lunch contains stews and meals that are eaten with a spoon. It is distinguished from the festive lunch, which is a chance for a hostess to show off culinary abilities and includes multiple courses. It starts usually with cold meats and cheese, the pies follow, and then roasted meat and dolmas, with sweets served at the end.

The festive lunch is a social event which gives an opportunity to the hostess to acquire

social reputation in the family and community. For a festive Muslim meal, zijafet, the exchange of sweet, salty, hot and cold dishes is characteristic. At the end, kahva (coffee) is served and it is not cooked but roasted in a pot called dzezva and is served in fildzans (small cups) with sugar cubes aside. "Kahva can be consumed on any occasion as it cools in the summer, warms in the winter, refreshes in the morning and strengthens in the evening (Hangi, 1906).

ALCOHOL

The most popular Bosnian alcoholic drink is rakija, a homemade plum brandy. It can be served on any occasion by members of all ethni/religious groups. As to Bosniaks, their relationship toward alcohol is ambivalent. Although alcohol is strictly forbidden by Islam Bosniaks still consume it. There are also chronic alcoholics (treated or untreated) among them. However, as opposed to Croatians who view alcohol consumption as part of everyday diet (mainly beer and wine), in the Bosniak family alcohol is mostly consumed by men during meals or on special occasions. It is unknown how much do Bosnian immigrant adolescents in Croatia copy the custom of collective youth drinking or binge drinking practiced by their Croatian peers, but it is propably present to a lesser extent. In Bosnian culture, particularly with Muslims, children are taught very early to reject alcohol, so that adolescent drinking represents a form of rebellion against the family norms, thanthe continuation of a habit learned within the family.

Culture of Bosnia-Herzegovina

From Europe-Cities.com

Located on the Balkan Peninsula, Bosnia and Herzegovina boasts centuries of artistic culture adopted from Balkan, Asian and European influences. Despite the country's small size, Bosnian artists, scientists and musicians have achieved worldwide acclaim, including Vladimir Prelog, who won the 1975 Nobel Prize in Chemistry, and the renown filmmaker Emir Kusturica.

Bosnia and Herzegovina is known for its regional folk costumes and dances, showcased at various folklore festivals. Dances are performed in separate groups of women, men and children, or in other various groups. Usually dancers hold hands or are linked together by handkerchiefs, small towels or strings of beads, as well as grip each others' belts or shoulders. Men's dances are usually more vigorous, while women's are a bit more graceful. Dances are accompanied by such traditional instruments as drums, flutes, lyres and violins. Some dances are performed without music, originally intended to express people's independence from the Turkish regime, which once banned Slavic music.

The art and architecture of Bosnia and Herzegovina were strongly influenced by various religions. The more than 60,000 stecak, medieval tombstones of the Bosnian Kingdom, are the most complete expression of medieval art in the country, located at some 2,600 sites. Other medieval art attractions include the religious icons of saints and biblical subjects on wooden panels, as well as early church paintings associated with Orthodox and Catholic churches, mosques and synagogues. Most of the country's religious buildings are centuries old. The largest Islamic monument and landmark in the country is the famous Bey's Mosque in Sarajevo.

Our Lady of Međugorje has become a pilgramage site for Catholics everywhere after six local children claimed they had seen visions of the Virgin Mary.

The origins of Bosnian literature can be traced back to the ancient monasteries and churches. Modern Bosnian writers reflect on subjects connected with their country's struggles. Zlata Filipovic, a Bosnian teenager, wrote Zlatas Diary, which is a contemporary version of Anne Frank's Diary of the Second World War. Ivo Andric is a famous Bosnian novelist who won the Nobel Prize in Literature in 1961. His most important works include the Travink Chronicle

and Bridge on the Drina, which explore the interacting histories of the Orthodox churches and Muslim mosques in Bosnian towns.

Bosnia and Herzegovina has also produced many distinguished films. A peak in Bosnian cinema included the production of the film No Man's Land, by the Bosnian director Denis Tanovic, which won an Academy Award in 2002. Director Emir Kusturica has won international acclaim with many of his films as well.

Bosnia and Herzegovina has suffered a turbulent past with frequent foreign invasions and occupations, reflected in Bosnian music, which is a mixture of ethnic Bosnian, Serb, Croat, Roma, Greek, Hungarian, Macedonian and Turkish influences. When the country was part of the former Yugoslavia, cultural artistic societies existed, which played mainly Bosnian music. The national music of Bosnia, 'sevdalinka' (from the Turkish word for love), can also be seen in Bosnia and Herzegovina. These folk songs are a mixture of Bosnian and Turkish music, traditionally performed with a 'saz', a popular Turkish string instrument, and a single vocalist accompanied by an accordion, guitars, clarinets, or violins. Kadir Kurtagic, Hasim Muharemovic, Emina Ahmedhodzic and Muhamed Mesanovic-Hamic are popular sevdalinka singers, whose recordings are available today in Bosnian music stores.

Modern folk music in the country is an important and popular genre today. Not only does it combine the sevdalinka influence, but also other music of Turkey, Serbia and the Republic of Macedonia, incorporating elements of Pop music. In the former Yugoslavia, this genre developed both in Bosnia and Serbia, and performers enjoyed popularity beyond the two borders. Hip Hop music is new to Bosnia and Herzegovina and won popularity in the urban areas with the famous rapper Edo Maajka, who is also popular in other countries of the former Yugoslavia.

The Sebilj Fountain is a well-known meeting spot in Sarajevo; its architecture was influenced by the Ottomans.

The architecture of Bosnia and Herzegovina is greatly influenced by the four major periods in its history. The social and political changes of the country influenced the creation of the architectural heritage of the country. The Middle Ages lasted until the invasion of the Ottoman Turks, when the social organisation of Bosnia developed into the Zadruga system, where families with common interests lived together in housing clusters. With the invasion of the Ottoman Empire in the 15th Century, the need to develop cities and urban areas was addressed and cities began to emerge in the basic form and organisation distinctive today. People used the river as

a main element of urban life, which led to the construction of the Stari Most (bridge) in 1566, in Mostar, but was later destroyed.

The Austro-Hungarian invasion had a profound influence on Bosnian architecture. Urban planning and architecture were developed with new aspects, including new building code regulations. At the end of World War II, to overcome the conflict between anti-historicism and modern architecture, a design strategy was introduced for the majority of architectural projects. Today, the cultural preservation process in Bosnia and Herzegovina is seen throughout the country, exemplified in the reconstruction of Stari Most in Mostar. Many other structures with historical and cultural significance destroyed in the Bosnian war were restored as well.

An important centre of the country's cultural life is Sarajevo, which is home to the Ars Aevi Sarajevo museum. The musuem houses some 130 works on display by such major artists as Jannis Kounellis, Michelangelo Pistoletto, Braco Dimitrijevic and Joseph Kosuth. A new museum building, built by architect Renzo Piano, will be open in 2009. The National Museum of Bosnia and Herzegovina in Sarajevo owns the Sarajevo Haggadah, which is the world's oldest Sephardic Haggadah, written around 1350 by Jews as they fled from the Spanish inquisition. Numerous cultural festivals take place annually in Sarajevo, including the Sarajevo Winter Festival, Bascarsija Nights, Sarajevo Jazz Festival and the Sarajevo Film Festival. The capital also hosts many theatres, including the most popular National Theatre of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In 2003, the first Bosnian opera was held in Sarajevo.

Azra Aksamija on Art and Architecture in Bosnia

By Seila Rizvic
From Balkanist.net
January 31, 2014

Bosnia is not particularly well-known for its booming arts scene. But for architectural historian, artist and MIT professor Azra Aksamija, the people and places found in Bosnia, and the stories they tell, are a ripe source of artistic inspiration. Aksamija's work focuses on the spatial aspect of cultural identity, physically constructed through architecture and symbolically constructed through culture. More simply put, Aksamija's work looks at how the places we build come to represent how we see ourselves.

The mosques and churches that dot the hills of villages all across Bosnia mark the existence of a long history of religious pluralism in the region. During the war, when a variety of ethnic, territorial and nationalistic ideologies were used to justify the killing and displacement of hundreds of thousands of people, this symbolic visual landscape was drastically altered.

Wearable Mosques by Azra Aksamija (*Source: MIT*).

Aksamija describes how "in the case of Bosnia, you have 70 percent of Islamic religious architecture being systematically destroyed [in the war]… buildings were destroyed to such an extent that they were completely bulldozed, foundation stones were partly dug out and carried to unknown locations so that you cannot rebuild from the original." Destruction of buildings is an often unavoidable consequence of war, but Aksamija delves deeper, exploring how these methodical demolitions were actually a part of a broader campaign of identity erasure. As she puts it, "any type of architectural structure marks a spot where a certain community has been living, it's a material evidence of that specific groups existence in a certain region. In our war, they were targeted because they marked the history of a certain group to a certain area and their historic claim to a specific land and as such they stood in the way of nationalists and genociders."

As a way to understand the post-war identities and tensions still existing in Bosnia today, Aksamija gives a closer look at how and why mosques become identity markers for Bosnian Muslims and how they fit into broader questions of history and art. Through clothing, architecture and other cultural-religious symbols, she uses a "cultural pedagogy" approach to unearth the truths of how art comes to construct who we are. Her "Wearable Mosques" project looks at how architecture tends to transcend simply the

buildings we build, but also the way that those places tend to incubate, reinforce and represent our identities.



Wearable Mosques by Azra Aksamija (*Source: MIT*).

The project is meant to "deconstruct prejudices but also to be critical in many different directions towards different ways of constructing Islamic identity in the world." The idea is to show Islamic identity as "local, individual" rather than monolithic. Architecture, in this way, becomes a process of not only construction, but also deconstruction, where community and individual identities are built and rebuilt following conflict.

In addition to her work on mosques, Aksamija has studied the ways that cultural institutions, the buildings themselves as well as their contents, help us remember our identities. Over the past year, she has headed the "Museum Solidarity" campaign in response to the shutdown of the National Museum of Bosnia and Herzegovina. After 124 years of existence, the museum was closed, and along with it, access to valuable items related to Bosnian cultural heritage. Working with a variety of international collaborators, scholars, artists, museolgists and librarians, Aksamija co-founded cultureshutdown.net. This website is used as a platform to coordinate with museums around the world and protest the political impasses that can often limit access to items of artistic and historical importance, and perhaps even more importantly, the collective memories of peace and cooperation that these items represent.

As a part of the project, museums were asked to cross-out one work of art in their collection using yellow barricade tape with the words "culture shutdown" emblazoned across. More than 225 cultural institutions have since taken part. Aksamija frames this project with the idea of "restorative memory" which posits that "museums house memories of co-existence, the history of Bosnia as a place where many cultures have met and lived together. And so restorative memory means to basically try and restore some of those memories of collective life."

Nomadic Mosque by Azra Aksamija (*Source: MIT*).

As memories of the war grow further and further away, the work of artists like Aksamija becomes all the more necessary as a means of remembering the past. While the contemporary implications of religion and identity and the physical spaces they inhabit continue to raise difficult questions in the region even today, Aksamija's work is making great strides in helping untangle this difficult history.

Resisting Reconstruction on Post-war Sarajevo

By Patrick Sykes
From Failed Architecture
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The Jajce Barracks on the hill behind Sarajevo's National Library.

From almost any point along the road that connects the old and new poles of Sarajevo's historic and commercial centres, the Jajce Barracks can be seen up among the north-eastern hills. From a distance, the national monument's domed towers and intricate molding are reminders of the city's fin de siècle boom years under the Austro-Hungarian empire. But as you approach, the grandeur of the relatively well-preserved front façade gives way to the sight of the caved roof and toppled walls, abandoned since they were damaged during the 1992-95 Bosnian War. The vantage point that invested the building with strategic importance when it was built in 1914 now ensures that it's a conspicuous blot on a skyline that otherwise seems to have recovered well from its wounds. The 17-year restoration of the neo-moorish National Library, which became a symbol of the conflict after 90 per cent of its two million volumes were lost to Serb incendiary shells, is approaching completion, and new skyscrapers have sprung up around the business district of Marin Dvor. But the barracks have meanwhile lain empty for almost twenty years, the entire right wing collapsed, the left barely holding. Only from an aerial perspective does the architectural ambition of the original building appear intact, its 'E' shape – supposedly designed to honour the Habsburg Prince Eugene of Savoy, who routed the Ottomans from (and destroyed) the city at the Battle of Zenta in 1697 – still discernable.

Walking towards the barracks from Pigeon Square in the centre of the Old Town, five minutes are all it takes to forget that we're in a European capital. The streets quickly steepen, the roads deteriorate, and we realise just how thinly spread the city is, rarely straying far from the Miljacka river. Once we leave the centre's apparently comfortable blend of brazenly tourist-oriented souvenir shops and seemingly authentic local cafés, there is little to distinguish the dense residential sprawl, until the houses open up onto the Islamic Kovači cemetery, one of the many clearings of pure white column-shaped headstones that punctuate the pace of the skyline in every direction. These resting places' elevated perspective over the city is a dark reminder of the dominance the Serbs claimed while they besieged Sarajevo for almost four years.

The Jajce Barracks with Sarajevo in the background.

As we approach, the extent of the damage quickly becomes clear. The steps to the door and the courtyard flagstones are uneven, and weeds are growing through the cracks that have formed. Plants have taken hold in the spaces left by broken windows, and have even climbed the main clocktower, slowly advancing on the extremity of the bare flagpole. The peeling magnolia paint has turned a sickly grey, and an ornate border is all that remains of the coat of arms above the main entrance. Inside, the only traces of human activity are those of boredom – on the part of military occupants and civilian intruders alike. In one room, a flecktarn of interlocking grey and black shapes has been painted on a wall, camouflage that no aggressor would ever have seen; just outside, green and blue graffiti blooms along the wall of a corridor otherwise lined only with rubble and glass.

Closed to the public, stray dogs and army soldiers alternately patrol the nearby streets. Though no longer a useable military site, the army will maintain a presence until the building's ownership is transferred from the Ministry of Defence to the local municipality, who are keen to sell it off for development – most likely under plans proposed by Prince Alwaleed of Saudi Arabia for a €50 million luxury hotel. Forty per cent of the national army of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) is involved in similar phantom guard duties, and the ruins of the Jajce Barracks are becoming something of an icon for frustrations over the protracted process of property transfer and the broader bureaucracy of peace, as overseen by the Office of the High Representative (OHR) since the Dayton Agreement of 1995. Among the diplomatic cables that Wikileaks began publishing in 2010 is a dispatch from the American Ambassador, Charles English, who writes that "failure to resolve defense property is one reason that Bosnia's armed forces do not look or act like a real army".

The site was exempted in 2012 from a ban on the sale of state-owned land (which comprised 53 per cent of the entire country), introduced by the OHR 'to protect BiH's assets' from abuse by the authorities in either of the two entities into which the country was split under the peace agreement. The semi-autonomous entities, the Republika Srpska and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which to some simply represent the rubber-stamped partition of what was once a multi-ethnic republic, have been mutually suspicious of the sincerity of one another's submissions to the higher single national authority, and as a result slow to act.

As unemployment hangs stubbornly around 44 per cent and the dream of EU accession progresses only slowly, much of Bosnia is caught in an economic stalemate. The barracks are an inconveniently visible example in the once-thriving capital, with no progress made despite the promise of decentralised ownership and the presence of interested investors. Meanwhile, the guards outside the gates can only look on as their charge crumbles behind them.

The interior (*Source: Ka Wing Chang)*.

6 Kinds of Bosnian Food You Must Try!

From The Fluffy Mojito Blog
July 30, 2014

For such an obscure and un-commercialized country like Bosnia & Herzegovina, you must be wondering "how is the food like?" Exactly the same question that popped into my head the first time I seated myself in a restaurant in Mostar.

Gastronomy in this country is a balanced fusion of Eastern and Western influences, a true reflection of their cultures and history. Because of its geographical position and history, Bosnian cuisine is similar to the cuisines of Turkey, Greece and other Mediterranean countries, and at the same time, the influence of European cuisines is strongly felt.

Having traveled Europe extensively over a various number of trips, I am intrigued by the food offered up by this country. Their dishes are definitely unique and unlike most European cuisines I've tasted.

1. PITA BREAD

Like most other countries, bread is usually served up as a starter dish before you even started ordering from the menu. The difference in Bosnia & Herzegovina is, you will always expect pita bread to be served as part of the bread basket, aside from the usual suspects such as baguettes, sourdoughs etc.

Most Bosnian dishes come in stew-forms or with a variety of sauces. Paprika, pepper, parsley, bay leaf, celery, milk cream and sour cream are some of the most common ingredients used in these dishes. Hence, these sauces serve as the perfect dipping complement to the pita bread.

2. PEARL BARLEY SOUP

Some of Bosnian cuisines are influenced by the Central and Eastern European countries – the pearl barley soup is one of those. I first had this soup in Slovenia (read: Gastronomy of Bled and Ljubljana) and immediately fell in love with it, though the cold biting weather outside might have made this warm homely soup taste better than it actually is.

Like the one I had in Slovenia, this pearl barley soup from Bosnia didn't fail to impress me. The barley soup which was served to us was piping hot, perfect for the cold wintery weather outside. It was savory with a tinge of home-cooked familiarity, and tasted like a thick tomato-based broth of meat and barley.

3. BOSNIAN BUREK

Bosnian Burek, or also called Bosanski Burek, is hands-down the best Bosnian dish I had. Burek is basically a ground beef meat pie, with savory meat fillings stuffed in thin pastry dough and rolled up into a snail-like form.

I had Burek several times as I traveled through Mostar and Sarajevo at different bakeries and restaurants, and they all tasted amazing. The dough is dense and elastic within tinge of olive oil, and the fillings stuffed in the dough are tasty tender chunks of meat with crunchy bites of onions. I love everything about Burek, but especially the texture of the dough.

If you buy Burek directly from bakeries, you will usually get them in the original rolled-up snail-like form. If you ordered Burek in a restaurant, they will slice it up into pie sizes like the above for easy consumption.

Regardless, it will definitely leave a lingering delectable taste in your platter every time you finish devouring one. Lip-smackingly good!

4. CEVAPI

Considered by many to be the national dish, cevapi is to Bosnia what the hamburger is to America. Cevapi are little rolled beef sausages classically served with bread, diced onion and kajmak (Bosnian cheese).

The cevapi I had was served with fries and a side salad, possibly an attempt to insert some modern touches into the otherwise traditional Balkan dish. The cevapi are very dense and extremely meaty with a strong smell. If not cooked well, they can either end up tasting too dry or too oily. Not a personal favorite, but if you are a carnivore at heart, then you will gobble these little beef sausages up in no time.

5. CUFTE

Cufte is basically a Bosnian specialty of meatballs made from seasoned minced lamb or beef, bound with egg and flour, and baked in the oven. The cuftes are usually served with an egg and yoghurt sauce, or more often than not would act as a side dish to a bowl of rice, and that makes a complete main course for one.

We stumbled upon a restaurant in Mostar called Nacionalni, which served authentic traditional Bosnian food. One of the main dishes they have on menu is to choose side dishes to go with your rice. We took stewed meat, broccoli and of course cufte, and it went perfectly well. Sort of like a home-cooked Chinese meal you can have back at home.

6. DJUVEC

This is one of my favorite dishes to have, especially on colder days in Bosnia & Herzegovina. It is one of those warm comfort food which just reminds you of home.

We had what i would call a mini version of djuvec. Djuvec is the Bosnian version of oven-baked meat and vegetable stew similar to ratatouille. It is typically made with meat, olives, tomatoes, mushrooms, onions, herbs and spices, and is usually served with either rice or mixed salad. A traditional djuvec will come served in a duvec (an earthernware casserole) which is where the dish gets its name from.

I love piping hot stews of all kinds, so this goes down as one of my favorite Bosnian dishes, a close second to burek!

Sarajevo 1984, Yugoslavia's Olympic Games

By Azra Nuhefendić
From Balcani e Caucaso
January 31, 2014

Thirty years ago, from February 8th to 19th, the fourteenth edition of the Olympic Winter Games was held in Sarajevo. A few years after the Olympic facilities, a symbol of common history and life, were targeted by the bombings.

(Foto ToNy, Flickr)

A metre of snow and twenty degrees below zero would faze no one in Bosnia. You would clean the main roads, dig a path through the snow from the door to the street, and life would go on as usual.

Sometimes it would be snowing even at the beginning of October. We would go to a restaurant for dinner and when leaving, in the small hours, the first snow would be meeting us. Tap-tap, on the tips of the light, elegant shoes, you would try to cross the whitened street without slipping or falling. The snow remained until April, sometimes even longer. It could be snowing even in the summer on the mountains around Sarajevo. Local newspapers carried the news, but no one was surprised.

In the spring, one could be in the woods on the Bjelašnica mountain, south-west of Sarajevo, in a normal climate, everything quiet, and ten minutes later in the middle of a snowstorm. Even those who knew the mountain were sometimes in danger of being lost or remain under the snow, like the eleven talented young skiers who, in the sixties, lost their lives during an unpredictable storm on Mount Bjelašnica.

IS IT SNOWING YET?

In short, snow was never a problem for us. We always had it in abundance. But at the beginning of February 1984, its inexplicable absence tormented us. About four million citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina were scanning the sky waiting for the snow. We woke up in the night to check. The first question in the morning upon awakening was, "Is

it snowing yet?". We blamed meteorologists for miscalculating and believers would pray for the snow. All in vain. In any event, cannons to make artificial snow were also ready, but this seemed like an excess of precaution. In the hundred years preceding the XIV Olympic Games, there would always be snow in Sarajevo and the surrounding areas in February.

The day before the Games in Sarajevo, on February 7th, 1984, the weather was spring-ish. Not one snowflake in sight.

I felt like crying, it felt like a real injustice. Many others felt the same.

Everything was ready a year before the Games began. The new Olympic village had been built. New hotels were opened and old ones refurbished. The Baščaršija, the old and ruined Ottoman city, in danger of being destroyed in order to build a "more beautiful and more ancient" one, had been recovered. The main streets of the city had been rebuilt and enlarged, the *façades* of the buildings painted, the electric tram rails changed, the central station restored. All the structures needed for the winter Olympics were built on the mountains around Sarajevo – Jahorina, Bjelašnica, Igman, and Trebević.



Vučko – the Olympic mascot of the '84 Sarajevo games (*Source: XabelFerreiro, Flickr*).

THIS IS HOW SARAJEVO PEOPLE LOOK LIKE

Every day, several thousand young people from all over Bosnia rehearsed the choreography for the Olympics opening and closing ceremony. The main Japanese newspaper "Yomiuri Shimbun" asked, with a headline all over the front page, "Where did they find all those beautiful girls and tall guys?", and then countered with the subtitle: "This is how Sarajevo people look like". To avoid flu-induced absence, everyone got immunised with powerful vaccines – "those for the horses", jokes Vanya. She and Svjetlana, two

Bosnians who moved to Trieste, had participated in the Games. Today, thirty years later, still beautiful and tall, they reminisce with nostalgia the times of the Olympics.

In the preparation phase, most of us worried about the fog rather than the snow. Fog too was always present in Sarajevo and its surroundings. For the local airport to operate in thick fog, our engineers had prepared the chemicals which could get rid of the fog – just like in an old Bosnian song, *"duni vjetre, malo sa Neretve, pa rastjeraj maglu po Mostaru"*. Everything was ready, perfect. Thousands of athletes, journalists, and tens of thousands of guests were already in town. The only thing missing was the snow.

I wanted to participate in some way in the event, to be helpful... I would have been happy to shovel the snow, hold a pole, point the way to the toilet, whatever. I applied as a volunteer for various committees, but not one accepted me. There were already thirty thousand people working, half of them were volunteers from all over the former Yugoslavia. Young volunteers organised into work brigades (*radne brigade*) tended to the Olympics constructions on the mountains. During the Games, four hundred waiters from all over Yugoslavia were in Sarajevo to serve guests.

THE CENTRE OF THE WORLD

The evening before the start of the Games, I thought, I could not stay at home while history was reaching my city. Sarajevo was shining. The streets were crowded. Shops, restaurants and bars were open all night, full of people. Thousands of people strolled, spoke aloud. Those who could not communicate in a foreign language did it in friendly gestures, photos. We laughed for no reason, just because we, the people of Sarajevo, were gathered there, together with the guests, for a big, beautiful, important event. We felt like the centre of the world.

In such an atmosphere it began to snow. I still remember exactly where I was: on Vase Miskina, today Ferhadija street, where the old part of the city, the Baščaršija, begins. There were people jumping with joy. Others held hands and danced, someone screamed. I was laughing uncontrollably, holding my arms open, turning around with my head up. I wanted to feel the snowflakes on my face.

I believe that on that evening many Communist leaders, necessarily atheists, thanked God.

It kept snowing in earnest, all night. The snow was beautiful, dry, the kind that does not dissolve immediately, but stays. The snowflakes were big, stylish as butterflies. At first

the snow was falling shyly, then more and more dense. It seemed that someone up there had opened up a bag, and was no longer able to control the speed at which it emptied.

Before, we had been worried because there was no snow. Now, the situation had reversed. In a few hours there was more than a metre of snow. Slopes urgently needed to be levelled. Marc Hodler, President of the International Federation for skiing, worriedly asked Branko Mikulić, presiding officer of the Bosnian Olympic Committee, how he planned to solve the problem.

"You need a thousand people to pave the runways, how can you find them at this hour of night?"

According to witnesses, Branko Mikulić replied: "What do you think, will 5,000 be enough?"

A FAIRY TALE

By radio, citizens were invited to come to the rescue. Thousands responded and worked throughout the night, including the soldiers of the Yugoslav People's Army. The next morning, the slopes were perfect, the whole town clean and tidy. "We were so excited, we would catch snowflakes even before they fell to the ground", recalls thirty years after Meho S., a taxi driver in Sarajevo.

Those were magical moments, like living in a fairy tale. In fact, the XIV Winter Olympic Games in Sarajevo, in 1984, could in many ways be considered a miracle.

In 1977, someone had been laughed at for proposing Sarajevo as host to the Winter Olympics. No one believed it could happen. The Olympic Games were organised by the rich countries of the West. It was, and still is, a very prestigious, expensive event, a showcase and a business card to the international scene. To win, Sarajevo had first to convince skeptics at home. The application had to be approved by the Communist Party and the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and approved and supported by the Federal government.

Other republics of Yugoslavia considered Bosnia and Herzegovina a "*tamni vilajet*" (a dark, retrograde world), a sort of poor cousin who deserved sympathy and help, but nothing more. As a result, the first reaction of the other republics was strong disbelief. Finally, approval was obtained at home. At the international level, Sarajevo found itself competing with Sapporo, Japan, and with the joint application of two Swedish cities, Falun and Göteborg.

After making his last visit to Sarajevo to test its ability to host an international event of this magnitude, Marc Hodler had reported to the Olympic Committee: "Bosnia and Herzegovina is a country that is developing rapidly, people live free and are happy".

Before the vote, British journalist Pet Bedford wrote: "If you choose Sapporo, the Japanese will arrange a plane to visit Tokyo, and if you opt for Falun and Göteborg, Swedes will show you the fjords and icebergs. But if your choice falls on Yugoslavia and Sarajevo, you will find friendly people, a great heart, and beautiful mountains".

THE COMMUNIST OLYMPICS

The XIV Olympic Winter Games were held in Sarajevo from February 8th to 19th, 1984. It was an event with several unprecedented records. It was the first Winter Olympics to be held in a communist country. It was a record for the number of participants from forty-nine countries, with 1,272 athletes (274 women, 998 men) who competed in thirty-nine disciplines, followed by 7,393 journalists and seen by two billion viewers. The organisers had sold 250,000 tickets and earned a total of $ 47 million. Thanks to the Games, 9,500 new jobs were created.

For the first time, as a demonstration sport, at the Winter Olympics athletes with disabilities competed in the giant slalom, and for the first time in the Olympic history, the pair of figure skaters on ice Jayne Torvill and Christopher Dean, England, received the maximum score.

The Winter Olympics in Sarajevo also launched one of the greatest sports icons of the late twentieth century, East German (at the time, East Germany existed as an independent country) figure skater Katarina Witt, who won the gold medal.

For the first time, Yugoslavia won a medal in the Winter Olympics. Slovenian skier Jure Franko won indeed the silver in the giant slalom, leading the entire nation into ecstasy. During the award ceremony, in front of the sports and cultural centre "Skenderija", tens of thousands people shouted: "*volimo Jureka, više od bureka*" ("We like Jurek more than the burek", the favourite national dish).

"Those were different times, and the values were different. We were promised a VCR in case we won. And I thought: if I run well in the second round, I'll bring home a VCR", recalls Jure Franko.

Juan Antonio Samaranch stepped in at the Olympics in Sarajevo for the first time as President of the International Olympic Committee. In his speech at the closing of the Games, he said that "the Olympic movement has been enriched. For the first time the

Olympic Games were organized by an entire people". That time a friendship was born between the city and the dignitary, one that lasted for twenty years, until Samaranch's death.

The bobsled ramp of the Sarajevo games (Source: *inthesitymad, Flickr*).

THE END OF THE STORY

In the early months of the war, in 1992, many Olympic buildings were destroyed, targeted on purpose, like everything that documented the common history and life of Bosnian and Herzegovinian citizens. The Zetra sports centre, with the magnificent hall of ice, which had been the stage of the closing ceremony of the Olympic Games, was bombed and set on fire, destroyed to its foundations. The Skenderija centre, the Olympic Museum, the hotels in the mountains... All destroyed.

Already in April 1992, on Jahorina mountain, the Serbs were stationed with Kalashnikovs at the start of the ski lift, to charge for the ticket. Mount Trebević, so close we considered it the mountain of our backyard, was no longer the same for the people of Sarajevo. After the war, many never returned there. The bob-sleigh slopes were mined during the war. Today they are abandoned, only a few brave venture there to collect old bullets and sell them to the craftsmen for making souvenirs.

The Olympic Villages, Mojmilo and Dobrinja, were designed to become the new districts of the city. It is a wide, beautiful area, close to the airport, where, after the games, 2,750 modern apartments were distributed to those who did not have one.

At the beginning of the war, in April 1992, the district of Dobrinja was heavily bombed. The Serbs tried to occupy it, in vain. It remained under siege for the duration of the war, isolated from the rest of Sarajevo, a sort of siege in the siege. The struggle of the inhabitants, mixed people of all ethnicities and religions, is a story of exemplary courage and strength. Today, Dobrinja is crossed by the invisible line of divided Sarajevo.

In 1994, the XVII Winter Games were held in Lillehammer, Norway. Samaranch interrupted his stay there and returned to Sarajevo, to show his solidarity with the city and

its citizens. With his arrival in besieged Sarajevo, Samaranch showed the courage and determination that many politicians lacked at the time.

"With an air of defiance, as if there were no danger from the hills, but visibly shaken, Samaranch was standing on the ruins of the sports centre Zetra where, ten years before, he had declared the Winter Olympics closed. For us it was the sign that we were not dead, that we had not been abandoned or forgotten. We were so grateful... People came to see him, to touch him", recalls Edo Numankadić, director of the Olympic Museum in Sarajevo.

Samaranch promised that he would do everything possible to reconstruct the Olympic Centre Zetra. He kept his promise and, in 1999, the centre was rebuilt and opened.

THIRTY YEARS LATER

These days, Sarajevo is preparing the celebrations for the thirty anniversary of the Winter Olympics (1984-2014). The celebrations are organised also in other countries in the world, where over a million Bosnians spread after the war. In Melbourne, Australia, organisers invite fellow country-people "to relive the Winter Games, to be together and revive, for a moment, the flame within us".

Thirty years later, the symbols of the Olympics are still present in Sarajevo. The mascot "Vučko" (the pet wolf) is now the biggest selling souvenir for tourists, and its faded image can still be seen on the *façades* of several buildings. Road signs point to "the Olympic mountain", people like to talk about it and many, sighing, remember the times when "we were happy and united".

But today the Serbs ski on mount Jahorina, the Bosnians on Bjelašnica.

Chapter V: Bosnian Culture: Art, Architecture and Education Study Questions

Created by Student Interns, The Echo Foundation

1. How have the arts had an influence on Bosnia?
2. Would you consider Bosnia to be a culturally diverse region?
3. Describe the cultural diversity of Bosnia.
4. What cultural influences can be attributed to the various empires which controlled the region throughout history?
5. How does Bosnian culture compare to /differ from your culture? What similarities and differences exist?
6. Describe how the geography and landscape affect Bosnian culture.
7. Was it surprising that the 1984 Olympic Games were held in Bosnia? Why or Why not?
8. What symbolism can you draw from the 1984 Olympic Games site in Sarajevo at the time of the games in 1984 and post-war?
9. How does education in Bosnia compare to the type of education you are familiar with?
10. What are some of the challenges that face Bosnia?
11. What are some distinct features of Bosnian architecture?
12. How does Bosnian architecture now compare to the Bosnian architecture in 1900's?
13. What is popular genre of music Bosnia-Herzegovina?
14. Describe the economy of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
15. How did the war impact Bosnian art and culture?
16. How could art be used to heal and rebuild the country?

Chapter VI:
Ideology, Conflict & Hope: What We Can Learn

"For people who are displaced, you can reconstruct the story of your life from the objects you have access to, but if you don't have the objects then there are holes in your life. This is why people in Bosnia – if anyone was running back into a burning house, it was to salvage photos."

Aleksandar Hemon, Author, *The Lazarus Project*
February 23, 2013

20 Years Later, This Is What Bosnians Think About The Dayton Peace Accords

By Edward Morgan-Jones, Neophytos Loizides and Djordje Stefanovic
From The Washington Post
December 14, 2015

Alija Izetbegovic, president of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina shakes hands with Slobodan Milosevic, president of the Federal Yugoslavia in Dayton, Ohio.(*Source: John Ruthroff/AFP/Getty Images)*

If they had a chance to vote today, would Bosnia's citizens support the controversial Dayton Peace Agreement? We asked. Many will be surprised by the answers.

A VERY BRIEF HISTORY OF THE BOSNIAN WAR AND THE DAYTON PEACE

After the breakup of the former Yugoslavia, The war in Bosnia from 1992 to 1995 was terrifyingly violent. That's the war that gave us the term "ethnic cleansing," as militaries representing three ethnic groups — the mainly Orthodox Bosnian Serbs, the mainly Catholic Bosnian Croats and the primarily Muslim Bosniacs — sought to purge areas of the "other" ethnicities. This violently forced displacement at times involved mass killings of civilians and prisoners of war. As the slaughter and bloodletting continued, the Bosnian Serb Army, Muslim-dominated Bosnian Army and Bosnian Croat Army were

reinforced by military and paramilitary forces from Serbia and Croatia and volunteers mainly from Muslim countries. In 1995, NATO forces stepped in to try to end the war.

All parties committed horrendous war crimes. However, a post-war analysis by the Research and Documentation Center in Sarajevo found that about 82 percent of civilian victims were ethnic Bosniacs. Most notably, in July 1995, Bosnian Serb forces slaughtered more than 8,000 Bosniac (Bosnian Muslim) men and boys in Srebrenica. And in August 1995, Croatian forces expelled hundreds of thousands of Serb civilians from territories they suddenly captured in Bosnia and Croatia.

Finally, between August and September 1995, U.S. diplomats forced Croatia to stop its offensive. NATO forces bombarded Bosnian Serb positions, forcing their leadership to accept binding peace negotiations. Those negotiations produced the Dayton Peace Agreement signed in Paris on Dec. 14, 1995.

THE DAYTON PEACE AGREEMENT WAS A COMPLEX COMPROMISE

The agreement represented a compromise between the aspirations of different warring parties. Against the wishes of Serb and Croat ultra-nationalists, it reestablished Bosnia as a unified state and granted the right of return for victims of ethnic cleansing. Against the wishes of Bosniac ultra-nationalists, it adopted ethnic federal structures recognizing Republika Srpska ("Serb Republic") as a political entity with self-governing rights within Bosnia. It also established a complex system of power-sharing and minority rights for the country's three major ethnic groups ("constitutive peoples"), thereby preventing the Bosniac majority from out-voting the minorities on their issues of vital political concern.

Academic opinion is starkly divided on the Dayton agreement. Was it a brilliant breakthrough, whose framework should be used in other contemporary conflicts, especially in the Middle East? Or was it a useful but deeply flawed instrument, whose problems include minimal cooperation between its entities and an excessively devolved system of government partly responsible for undermining the rule of law?

The agreement aimed to end the country's de facto partition. To do so it created a unified federal state in Bosnian and Herzegovina – not just to secure the end of violence but also to protect human rights and cooperation. But ethnic divisions and fragmentation prevented these goals. Two decades on, the Bosnian Serb leadership is seen as undermining Bosnia's legitimacy at every turn, incessantly pushing for partition.

WE MEASURED BOSNIAN OPINION OF THE DAYTON AGREEMENT, 20 YEARS ON

Today, some in the international media use the Dayton accords as a synonym for inertia, neglect and despair. For these reasons, most experts would assume that Bosnians today would oppose the agreement.

It's not so.

Using a 2013 Bosnian representative sample with 1,007 respondents, we tested the conflicting claims of scholars and policy-makers by asking the following question: "If there had been a referendum today on the Dayton Peace Agreement, how would you vote?"

In every one of Bosnia's three main ethnic groups — the Bosniacs, the Croats and the Serbs — more people would vote for Dayton than against it.

Bosnian Serbs originally opposed Dayton's constitutional structures — but even they have come around to supporting it today. Across all ethnic groups a minority — only 28 percent — say they would have definitely or probably voted against Dayton in 2013. Bosnian Serbs are seven times more likely to say they would vote for the agreement than would oppose it.

This is surprising, considering the history. In post-WWII Yugoslavia, Serbs increasingly felt marginalized and deprived of their national rights. This sense of victimization contributed to the violent collapse of the former Yugoslavia. In March 1992, Bosniacs and Croats overwhelming approved independence in a referendum boycotted by the Serbs. War followed. Out of the pre-war population of 4.37 million, about 110,000 former Yugoslavs were killed and another 2.2 million driven from their homes, often explicitly in the name of "ethnic cleansing." During the war, Bosnian Serb leadership strongly opposed any peace agreement, preferring to secede entirely.

Interestingly, on Aug. 27-28, 1994, another Serb-only referendum asked Serbs to endorse or reject an international peace plan that would give their community 49 percent of Bosnia-Herzegovina. A federation of Muslims and Croats would control the remaining 51 percent of the territory. Encouraged by Radovan Karadzic, the Bosnian Serb leader who rejected compromise, about 90 percent of voters opposed the plan, according to the official results.

That referendum gave advance warning about their strong reaction against the international peace plan that their leaders signed six months later.

In the years after Dayton, fighting broke out in once again in Kosovo. In 1999, NATO intervened to end violence between ethnic Albanians and Serbs. Kosovo's governance was transferred from Serbia to the United Nations. Ten years later, Kosovo declared independence from Serbia, despite bitter opposition from Belgrade.

Kosovo's gradual recognition by the international community could have encouraged Bosnian Serbs in Republika Srpska to turn against Dayton and follow a similar path to independence.

But that's not what happened. As the table below shows, Bosnia's Serbs tacitly endorse the Dayton accords: 42 percent of them would definitely vote for Dayton, and only 9 percent would vote against it.

Croatian respondents are less enthusiastic, but only 22 percent would either probably or definitely vote against the treaty. Members of this language group are most likely to say they are not sure if they support the treaty; 37 percent of Croat speakers give this response. A clear plurality of Bosnian speakers are in favor of the treaty, with 39 percent saying they would either definitely or probably vote for it. But even here we see some polarization: 26 percent would definitely or probably vote against it, and 25 percent are unsure.

Donald Horowitz, one of the leading experts in ethnic conflict studies, points out that it's often true that the majority population is more discontented with ethnic power-sharing schemes than are minorities, at least in in Northern Ireland, Belgium and Bosnia. Not surprisingly, minorities appreciate the guarantees against majority rule formally enshrined in Dayton-style agreements.

Despite the strong historical legacies of Serbian nationalism, minority Serbs have come to see Dayton as guaranteeing their territorial autonomy. In other words, they associate Dayton with the continued existence of Republika Srpska.

Croats are less happy. Unlike the Serbs, they did not receive explicit ethno-territorial autonomy after the war. Instead, their war-time territory was merged with the Bosniac-controlled areas to form the Federation. Croat politicians complain of "majoritization" or being frequently out-voted by the Federation's more numerous Bosniacs.

The guarantees offered by ethnic federalism might be a necessary precondition for getting minorities to endorse peace settlements. Contrary to many experts, Bosnia suggests that support for these compromises can emerge no matter how opposed are the original players.

REASONS TO BE WORRIED

Bosnian Serbs don't endorse Dayton unreservedly, however. About two out of three Serb respondents would support Republika Srpska's full independence.

What's more, the Bosnian Muslim community is polarized about whether or not Dayton's broader compromise was and is a good thing. And Croats are relatively to the other two groups less supportive of the system. All that adds up to worry. If Serbs actually did try to take Republika Srpska into independence, that would violate the Dayton agreement — and would probably return Bosnia to violent conflict.

But the majority of Bosnian Serbs seem to realize that they will not secede anytime soon. About 61 percent of the Bosnian Serbs say that it is unlikely that their republic will become independent in the following 10 years.

Despite the caveats, however, Bosnia's citizens appear to have accepted Dayton as the best compromise available. And despite the common narrative of "ancient ethnic hatreds," perhaps Bosnia stands for the possibility that post-conflict societies needn't always be hostages to their past.

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Bosnia's Unending War

By Nidzara Ahmetasevic
From The New Yorker
November 4, 2015

One of the largest massacres in Europe in the second half of the twentieth century took place in the small city of Prijedor, in northern Bosnia. In April, 1992, as the Bosnian war was beginning, the Bosnian Serb regime announced on the radio that it was taking over the town and the surrounding areas. On May 31st, Serb nationalists ordered all non-Serbs to mark their houses with white flags or sheets, and to wear a white armband if they left their homes. Over the next few months, they initiated mass expulsions of an estimated fifty thousand Bosniaks (Bosnian Muslims) and Bosnian Croats. An estimated twenty-five thousand people, including some women, children, and elderly people, were taken to concentration camps outside the town, where, according to the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (I.C.T.Y.), many were tortured or raped, and more than three thousand were killed. Massacres like this one were occurring across Bosnia, but, until Srebrenica, in 1995, none was larger than Prijedor.

A woman lays flowers among names of killed citizens in the Bosnian city of Prijedor, on May 31, 2013, to commemorate "White Banner Day."

Former residents began to come back to Prijedor in 1998, three years after the end of the war, but by 2007 less than a third had returned. In May, 2012, Emir Hodžić, a Bosniak who was expelled when he was fourteen, came back to his hometown for the first time. It was the twentieth anniversary of the crimes committed there, and he wanted to pay homage to those who had been tortured and killed. In 1992, his father and older brother were taken to the Omarska concentration camp, on the site of a mining complex outside Prijedor. They were held there for three months and tortured, and then transferred to another detention center. They were only released after the camps were discovered by a group of British and American journalists, who broadcast the images around the world. The camps were shut down, in November, 1992, but instead of remaining at home, Hodžić and his family were put on a convoy by the Bosnian Serbs and transported to the Croatian border, where they were handed off to the United Nations. They eventually settled in New Zealand.

When Hodžić returned to his hometown, in 2012, he put a strip of white cloth around his left arm and tried to enter Omarska, which is once again an active mine. Security guards stopped him at the entrance and threatened to call the police if he didn't leave. Full of disbelief, he went back into Prijedor. "I was so, so angry," Hodžić told me. Local organizations had planned a memorial ceremony, in which they had intended to lay out two hundred and sixty-six body bags, for the number of women and children who were killed in Prijedor, but the local government banned the event. Hodžić decided to see it through alone. He bought more white fabric that he laid out like a body bag and stood in the square by himself, for twenty minutes, in silence, hoping someone would approach and ask him what he was doing. Nobody came. "It was a very weird feeling, an overwhelming feeling of dehumanization, the same one I remembered from 1992. I was once again marked as 'the other' in the city where I was born," Hodžić said. "Victims in Prijedor aren't seen, and I wanted to show them, 'You can't erase me.' "

Hodžić had asked someone to take a picture of him, and he posted it on Facebook, on a page he had set up with a group of friends called Stop Genocide Denial. They had planned to start a campaign to make May 31st International White Armband Day, to honor all people who were killed because they were different, and the photo of Hodžić standing alone in the middle of the empty square went viral, rallying people to the cause.

Among Hodžić's friends was Edin Ramulić, who was imprisoned when he was twenty-two, and whose father and brother were tortured and killed. Since 1999, Ramulić, who came back to Prijedor with the first returnees, has been involved in survivors' groups and has tried to talk about what happened, but with little success. "It is like a story that belongs only to us, victims and survivors," Ramulić said. "And, as long as we do not try to involve anybody else in that story, it's O.K. But when we approach other people in Prijedor and try to engage them, it becomes a problem." Ramulić came out to the square with six others, some of whom were Serbs, on May 31, 2012. They all wore white armbands and stood together in silence.

Thirty-seven people have been convicted and sentenced for crimes committed in Prijedor in the nineteen-nineties; the I.C.T.Y. sentenced twelve of them, while the others were tried domestically, in a war-crimes court in Sarajevo. The Sarajevo court has so far issued five hundred indictments, but the Bosnian public knows little about them. Even the ongoing trial in The Hague of Ratko Mladić, the Bosnian Serb military chief, has not been broadcast on TV or radio channels. Part of the problem is that, in both courts, "the process is about international lawyers and political élites," Eric Gordy, a sociologist at University College London, whose work focusses on the former Yugoslavia, told me. "The tribunal and local courts never developed a clear idea of who their clientele was, never took enough of an interest in articulating or addressing the concerns of victims, or explaining to the local public what was being established and what it meant."

(The Bosnian war-crimes court said in a statement that claims about a lack of outreach probably come from people "who do not know much about work of this institution. We consider transparency and public relations to be very important." The court noted that most hearings are open to the public, and that it is involved in a series of public discussions, in coöperation with local organizations. It also argued that public interest in war-crimes proceedings is decreasing in Bosnia. "It is not possible to expect that twenty years after the war, people will have the same interest in war-crimes trials as they had ten or fifteen years ago," the statement said. "It is natural, therefore, for media coverage to decrease as well.")

A further challenge is posed by the Bosnian government, which has little interest in moving beyond the war's divisions. The Dayton Agreement, which brought the war to a halt, in 1995, also instituted a governance structure that recognizes all of the warring ethnic groups as active parties. Dayton, which many say effectively froze the conflict in place, created a vast and complicated system: two "administrative entities" (Republika Srpska and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina), three Presidents, and ten cantons, each with its own President, ministries, and parliament. There are more than a hundred and fifty government ministers at the various levels, in a country of less than four million people, and countless Bosnians are employed in the state apparatus. Dayton also made Bosnia what is often called a "semi-protectorate," a country where the international community has ultimate authority over local governance structures. But the international community has redirected its energy into other conflicts, leaving Bosnia to its corrupt local élites. According to Transparency International, Bosnia today is one of the most corrupt countries in the region. It is also one of the poorest, with more than sixty per cent youth unemployment. Because of economic hardships, people of all ethnicities are leaving. Prijedor and its surrounding villages are once again becoming empty.

Fikic Dervisa (right) points to a photo of her husband Zijad, who is one of hundreds of missing men from Prijedor, Bosnia since 1995 (*Source: Getty Images*).

On August 5, 2012, several dozen people wearing white armbands gathered again at the main square in Prijedor. Among them was Fikret Bačić, whose twelve-year-old son and six-year-old daughter were killed, in 1992. Bačić wanted a memorial to be created for the hundred and two children who were killed in Prijedor,

and this effort became a focus of future demonstrations. That day, people carried schoolbags, each one bearing the name of a child who was killed. Local authorities had forbidden the gathering, claiming that it could incite ethnic conflict, and that using the word "genocide" would give the town a bad name. The people who came ignored the government. I was among them, walking in a column that moved slowly down the main street, where cafés normally play loud music. On this day, the cafés were silent, and the patrons watched quietly, though they didn't join us. When we reached the square, we set the schoolbags down in a pattern that spelled out the word "genocide," to protest the government's opposition. Some of the activists were local Serbs who were in the process of forming an organization called Kvart Youth Centre, which promotes dialogue in Prijedor about the war. After the gathering, local police brought several of the participants to the station for questioning, but soon let them go.

Goran Zorić works for Kvart, and, like most of Kvart's members, he identifies as L.G.B.T. Zorić was eleven when the war started. At that time, all Serb men in the area were required to join the military apparatus, and Zorić's late father, who had been a high-school teacher, became a member of the local police force, but he never spoke about what was happening all around them in Prijedor. About ten years ago, Zorić became active in promoting L.G.B.T. rights. Then he came out, first to his friends and later to his family. He remembers that not all people in Prijedor reacted well. "Once, I was beaten up badly on the street. Though I'm not sure if it was a hate crime, or just a matter of being at the wrong place at the wrong time," he said. When Zorić joined the commemoration, in 2012, the mayor of Prijedor took the opportunity to label the event a "faggot parade." "In this small, conservative, and homophobic town, it was a clear message about us as a group, that we cannot be accepted by society," Zorić said. Nationalists threatened Zorić and the others, mostly through Facebook, though some people approached them on the streets or in cafés, insulting them and even, on one occasion, spitting in the face of one of Zorić's friends. "Somebody wrote graffiti on the wall with my name and the word 'faggot,' with a swastika underneath it," Zorić said. He has kept a picture of the graffiti.

The demonstrators didn't let these threats deter them. In 2013 and 2014, even more people came to the May 31st demonstration in Prijedor. They carried a hundred and two white roses, each with the name of one of the murdered children. They laid the roses in a circle and read the names aloud. This past May, more than a thousand people came. Again, roses were laid in a circle. This time, a young Prijedor artist came with giant Legos and began building a monument in the middle of the square. Kids joined her, putting one piece on top of the other in silence. The only sound was the name of each murdered child coming through loudspeakers. I was standing close by when a woman carrying red and yellow flowers approached the demonstrators. At first, she said nothing. Then she asked if she could put the flowers from her garden beside the white roses. She thanked the activists for what they were doing. Then she opened her purse and took out a

small, yellowed picture of a boy in a school uniform. “This is my son. He was killed, in 1992,” she said. There was silence. One of the activists, who had come from Belgrade, embraced her.

On that day, a Bosnian Serb named Zoran Vučkovac was at the head of the column of marchers, along with his wife, Danijela, and young son Vuk. When he arrived in the square, he began to speak. “I am from Omarska,” Vučkovac said. “One hundred and two children were killed in this city. They are the litmus test of our humaneness. Children are not nationalists, nor creators of ideologies. And they should not be left in the hands of those who are. I ask the authorities to memorialize the children who were killed here. I demand that it be done now.” His words sounded almost revolutionary: perhaps they could trigger a collective reckoning that would force the people who were involved in or witness to crimes at least to acknowledge that they had taken place. But the few articles that were published about the event were attack pieces. The city of Prijedor has several memorials to the Bosnian Serb Army, but the government ignored the pleas for a memorial for the children who were killed.

Beds in Omarska concentration camp in Prijedor (*Source: Genocide in Bosnia*).

Vučkovac, who grew up next to the Omarska camp, was five years old when the war started. He does not remember much of it, though he recalls seeing the destroyed village of Kozarac, which his family would drive by in order to get to the city. One day his sister came home from school and said that her teacher had “disappeared,” and no one had been concerned enough to find out what had happened to her. Vučkovac’s father was a quartermaster in the Yugoslav People’s Army, but he never really spoke of the war at home. Vučkovac learned about it from the media and in class. “For a while, in my high school, I was also affected by the nationalist propaganda that persists here,” Vučkovac said. “Some of these ideas were coming from my family, some from the people around me; some are just the product of the official narratives in the part of Bosnia where I live.” His ideas started changing in high school, slowly, he said, as he began to read more on his own, and he discovered new ideas in books and online, outside the school curriculum. He also took part in a reading group as he found that his personal understanding of the war was changing. Finally, around 2009, he joined a group of local

activists who were organizing debates and discussions about the war. “Since then, I have been struggling with many tough questions that are political, but also very personal for me,” Vučkovac said. “You have to understand the level of dehumanization that was established in the camps at a very personal level, and then start looking for human answers. Nationalists, they see only numbers, not people. And these numbers are just collateral damage for them.”

I went to Prijedor for the first time in 1999, to write a story about the people who had been imprisoned and expelled but had decided to come back after the war. I planned to visit the locations that had formerly been used as camps. My photographer and I got lost at one point, and we began asking people for directions to Omarska. They turned their heads and even walked away from us, some saying that they had never heard of the place. We continued on by ourselves for a few minutes, only to discover that Omarska was just around the corner from where we had been. “The bottom line is that the war never stopped,” Zorić told me. “It just changed form.”

In Srebrenica, where more than eight thousand men and boys were killed, in July, 1995, there is almost no discussion between Bosnian Serbs and Bosniaks about the war. Victims groups organize the commemorations of July 11th, the day the Bosnian Serb Army took over the city, and hardly any Serbs participate. This year, I visited Srebrenica a few days before the twentieth-anniversary commemoration and tried to speak to local Serbs about the war. Some told me that it has nothing to do with them, and that the politicians are to be blamed. Feelings like these are common in the towns where the most atrocious war crimes were committed. In Prijedor, Ramulić spent years trying to organize commemorations, protests, and petitions, with mostly one-sided results. “Until 2012, most of the dialogue was from victims and survivors to victims and survivors,” he said. “It did not influence public discourse.”

Eric Gordy thinks the May 31st commemoration in Prijedor has succeeded where others have not partly because of its young leaders, “who are conscious that the community has no future living in compulsory denial,” he told me. Ramulić also feels that coöperation with Bosnian Serbs is the only way forward. “I cannot project onto people I meet the picture that society expects me to project,” he said. “That is, not to forget or forgive, and to have a defensive attitude toward anybody who is different from me.” Zorić believes the atmosphere in Prijedor is beginning to change: people will say privately that perhaps terrible things did happen, even if they aren’t yet willing to speak of the details in public. “Maybe it’s because of what we do, or maybe it’s something else, but people are becoming more and more ready to at least acknowledge what happened during the war,” Zorić said. “And a few more local Serbs are walking down the street each year on May 31st, wearing white armbands.”

The Counterparty

By Elisabeth Zerofsky
From Harper's Magazine
December 2015

Early one morning in July, while hiking through the mountains of eastern Bosnia, I came upon a warehouse that was partially hidden by a clutch of beech trees. The long, flat concrete edifice was stippled with bullet holes, and across the front were a number of bluish posters, each with an airbrushed portrait of Vladimir Putin as well as a tagline in Cyrillic lettering: EASTERN ALTERNATIVE. I was walking with Ethan Putterman, an offbeat, white-haired professor who was born in Los Angeles and teaches Rousseau at the National University of Singapore. As we peered through a gate that hung in front of the entrance, Putterman said to me, "Do you know what this is?"

A warehouse in Kravica, Bosnia and Herzegovina, where, in 1995, 1,300 Bosniak men and boys were executed, July 10, 2015 (*Copyright Matej Divizna/Getty Images*).

I had met Putterman only a few hours earlier, on the trail of the annual peace march that retraces, in reverse, the route taken by thousands of Bosnians who fled the town of Srebrenica during the Bosnian War. That morning, the third of the march, we had set out from the village of Pobudje with several thousand people. When we reached Krainovici, a scattering of homes that was too small to register on a map, Putterman and I had followed the path down a thicketed descent and ended up in the yard of a pale stucco house. The family who lived there served us coffee in plastic cups. After we rejoined the trail, picking a course through the blue-green hills, whose gentle, sinuous lines had gone bleary in the midsummer heat, we found that we'd lost sight of the march.

A wrong turn had delivered us to Kravica, and to the warehouse — where, Putterman told me, more than a thousand Bosniak (Muslim) men had been murdered in the summer of 1995. When Bosnia and Herzegovina declared independence from Yugoslavia, in 1992, an amorphous three-fronted war broke out among the new country's Bosniaks, Serbs, and Croats. Starting in the spring of that year, as many as 50,000 Bosniaks sought refuge in and around Srebrenica, an alpine town of placid houses and boxlike socialist buildings

that the United Nations established as a safe area in 1993. Despite the U.N.'s presence, the armed forces of the Bosnian Serbs, which were supported from Belgrade by Slobodan Miloševic, laid siege to Srebrenica for three years. They overtook the starved, suffocated town on July 11, 1995, and two days later transported some 1,300 captured Bosniaks to the warehouse in Kravica. Once the warehouse was full, the Serbs opened fire, including with rocket-propelled grenades, and executed the men throughout the night.

The posters we saw on the front of the warehouse were a plea to Putin to block a proposed U.N. resolution that would formally acknowledge that the mass killings at Kravica and around Srebrenica had constituted genocide. Evidently the appeal had been successful; two days earlier, Russia had vetoed the resolution. While Putterman and I were taking pictures of the structure — he with his iPad, I with my phone — a police officer in a navy-blue uniform appeared through the trees. He shouted at us, pointed unhappily at Putterman's iPad, and waved us off in the direction we'd been heading before. After a few minutes of walking more quickly than we tried to let on, Putterman said, "Don't turn around, but he's following us."

It wasn't long before a police cruiser drove up from behind us and cut off our path. The officer checked our passports and asked to see the iPad. Though Putterman swiped carefully away from the photos and video he'd just taken, the policeman opened the back door of his car and indicated that we should get in. He drove us to a crossroads, left us in his airless car while he had a long conversation with his chief, and finally dropped us off at the bottom of a hill. When another car sped toward us, Putterman and I ducked into a cornfield; we decided it was best to take a taxi to Potocari, a hamlet a few miles away. The peace march was due to arrive there later that afternoon.

On July 11, 1995, the day that Srebrenica fell, some 25,000 Bosniaks fled to Potocari, where a detachment of U.N. troops from the Netherlands was stationed in an old battery factory. The mission of the Dutch battalion was to protect the civilians in the Srebrenica enclave, but the peacekeepers denied entry to many of the refugees who arrived at the compound. Those who were allowed inside were soon turned over to the Serbs. Ratko Mladic, the Serb military chief, entered Srebrenica virtually unopposed, and over the next seven days his forces murdered more than 8,000 Bosniaks, nearly all of them men and boys, in the Kravica warehouse and in fields and farms around the region. (Mladic was arrested in 2011 and extradited to The Hague, where he is on trial for genocide and crimes against humanity.)

Eight thousand is an ungraspable number, but the boundless plane of tombstones — white marble obelisks inscribed with Arabic epitaphs — that today curves up the hillside of Potocari gives some sense of the magnitude of the crime. This year, 136 fresh graves were dug for victims whose bodies had been discovered since the 2014 commemoration. (In many instances, the Serbs exhumed and reburied their victims to hide evidence of the

killings.) One of them was for a man named Becir Velic, from the town of Cerska, just outside Srebrenica. His grave was marked 1939–1995. On the morning after the peace march arrived in Potocari, twenty years to the day after the fall of Srebrenica, I watched the men of his family kneel around a hole in the earth and lower the casket. They folded themselves over in prayer, while the women, their heads covered with white scarves, stood behind the men and cried.

At the battery factory, Land Rovers pulled up and disgorged the designated VIPs for the day's commemoration ceremony: the French ambassador and the Dutch foreign minister, the deputy secretary-general of the United Nations, and, finally, Madeleine Albright and Bill Clinton. When the prime minister of Serbia, Aleksandar Vucic, arrived from Belgrade, the press shoved cameras in his face. Vucic and Clinton shook hands. The dignitaries gave speeches that followed a predictable pattern — expressions of sympathy and regret followed by exhortations to future togetherness — and made a brief cavalcade through the cemetery, where they laid flowers at a monument, pausing for the pack of cameras that tailed them. As Vucic passed among the gravestones, protesters threw rocks and plastic bottles at him, which some Serbs would later describe, somewhat cynically, as an assassination attempt.

One person who was not in Potocari for the ceremony was Pedja Kojovic, the president of one of the country's newest political parties, Naša Stranka ("Our Party"). A former journalist and a sometime poet, Kojovic, who is fifty, has shoulder-length brown hair that he parts down the middle. He speaks with a slight, thoughtful reticence. On non-parliamentary days, he wears a tight black T-shirt and jeans, a holdover from the years he worked as a cameraman for Reuters. A week before the peace march, I met him in one of Sarajevo's ubiquitous cafés. We sat at a counter that looked out onto the brutalist structures and neo-Renaissance buildings in faded greens and pinks that alternate along Marshal Tito, a boulevard that runs through the city center. Kojovic had plans later that month to visit the village of Doljani, where he'd come across the aftermath of a massacre in 1993, and he had loudly condemned Russia's veto of the U.N. genocide resolution. But he expressed a wariness about the ways in which various groups had appropriated the annual Srebrenica ceremony for their own purposes. "I don't want to turn it into a marketing campaign," he said. In the decades since the war, commemorations in Bosnia have become a new battleground, where feuds over narrative — who was guilty, who was victimized — are played out in grotesque pantomime. Srebrenica lies deep inside a part of the country that is now governed by the Bosnian Serbs, and, as I discovered, the authorities there have been known to make trouble for visitors who come to pay tribute to those who died in the genocide. "When we are able to recognize that all victims were our victims," Kojovic said, "that will be the first step in reconciliation."

Kojovic spent the first half of the 1990s reporting on the wars of independence that accompanied the disintegration of Yugoslavia: he followed them first to Slovenia, then to Croatia, and finally back home to Bosnia. Aleksandar Hemon, the novelist, who was his roommate at the time, described for me recently the tense months leading up to the Bosnian War, which had brought an almost frantic pursuit of pleasure. According to Hemon, Kojovic had fallen in love with a woman from Istria, in Croatia, and "he would lie back, with his eyes closed, and repeat these Istrian words that he found strange. And the word that he would say was something like '*mruljice.*' And I'd say, 'What the fuck is *mruljice*?' He told me it was a dustpan. The least romantic object in the world. But he would just be on his back repeating the Istrian word for 'dustpan.' "

Map by Dolly Holmes.

Reality quickly upended their late-twenties oblivion: when Kojovic was dispatched to Croatia, in 1991, he was detained and tortured by the Croatian army. "He was all beaten up," Hemon told me. "He would spend an hour in the bathtub soaking his bruises. He was so destroyed he couldn't sleep." Kojovic's father, a Serb, was an eye surgeon who worked at the hospital in Bosniak-controlled Sarajevo throughout the war; near the end of the conflict, he was arrested by the Serbs and put in a concentration camp for aiding the enemy. After he was released, four months later, he and his family, including Pedja, left for the United States.

Kojovic had been working for Reuters in Washington, D.C., for twelve years when, in 2007, he returned to Bosnia to promote a book of poems he had written. In Sarajevo he had coffee with Danis Tanovic, a filmmaker who won an Academy Award at thirty-three for his first feature, an absurdist reverie on the Bosnian War, and Dino Mustafic, a popular theater director. Over the course of a long conversation, they found that they were all troubled by the paralysis and corruption of the country's postwar political system. Kojovic moved back to Sarajevo the following year with plans to read and write poetry, but he ended up joining Tanovic, Mustafic, and a multiethnic group of artists and intellectuals who were disappointed with the Bosnian left and had decided to run in local elections as Naša Stranka. Tanovic lent the party the considerable heft of his name — "It

was like Danis was opening a nightclub, and ten thousand people showed up the opening night," Kojovic said — and Mustafic brought the political connections.

The founding members of Naša Stranka spent the summer and fall of 2008 visiting sixty towns around Bosnia. "We had zero cash, so we used our friendships and authority to provide some sort of campaign," Kojovic told me. They incurred a hundred thousand dollars of debt. "I would go and say to a friend who runs the printer's shop, 'Hey, can you print us fifty thousand posters of this? I'll pay you sometime.' " But they all felt that reform could only happen from within the system. "It couldn't be done by writing open letters or civil society, that kind of stuff," Kojovic said. Given the party's limited time and resources, the members of Naša Stranka counted it a considerable victory when they won nearly 15 percent of the vote in Sarajevo that fall.

The horrors of Srebrenica helped to expedite a peace agreement that was finalized in November 1995, in Dayton, Ohio. The Dayton Accords were a welcome and necessary accomplishment, but in the twenty years since, it has become clear that the major powers that conspired to extract peace — the United States, the United Kingdom, and France, along with the U.N. — were not caught entirely unaware by what had happened in Srebrenica. Indeed, U.S. intelligence agents had seen, nearly in real time, satellite images of the slaughter. According to some critics, Srebrenica was sacrificed by the leaders of the Western powers for the sake of a peace deal.

Sarjaevo (*Copyright Christopher Anderson/Magnum Photos*).

The Dayton Accords stopped the Bosnian War, but because the deal was hammered out before there was a clear military victor, it relied on a complicated patchwork of ethnically organized governments that satisfied everyone and no one. Most saliently, it divided the country of Bosnia and Herzegovina into two quasi-autonomous "entities," which coexist in a turbulent union. The Serbs were permitted to maintain much of the territory that they controlled at the end of the war — 49 percent of the country — in an entity that they called Republika Srpska. Meanwhile, the Bosniaks and the Croats were given control of the other entity, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, known colloquially as the Federation. Together

the entities form a sort of bicameral nation, which is governed by a three-member presidency that consists of one Bosniak, one Serb, and one Croat. (The Brcko District, in northeastern Bosnia, formally belongs to both entities but governs itself.)

Throughout the conflict, Serb and Croat leaders had lobbied to divide Bosnia along ethnic lines, but Richard Holbrooke, the American diplomat who was the chief architect of the Dayton Accords, felt that such a solution would legitimize the ferocious Serb nationalism that had incited the war. Even so, he would later look back with a measure of regret on some aspects of the partition: "We underestimated the value to [the Serbs] of retaining their blood-soaked name," he wrote in his memoir. The country that Holbrooke and his team ultimately fashioned is extraordinarily complex: today there are fourteen separate governments, each with its own ministries and parliament, for a country of 3.8 million people.

Many Bosnians blame Dayton for their country's present situation, but the principles that underlie the agreement can be traced to the fall of Communism. When the country declared independence, it was the most ethnically diverse of the former Yugoslav republics: Bosniaks made up 44 percent of the population, Serbs 31 percent, and Croats 17 percent. Leaders of the new nation thought that each of the three so-called constituent peoples of the country should be represented by a single political party, a system that remains, for the most part, in effect today. As Kojovic told me, the leaders believed that "there would be no division within ethnic groups; all Muslims will vote for the Muslim party, and all Croats for the Croat party. For them, that was the multiparty system."

Some of the faults of the system are revealed in its idiosyncrasies. In postwar Bosnia, a citizen can claim full rights only by declaring himself a member of one of the three constituent peoples. Though Kojovic is unofficially as multiethnic as his party, and indeed his country — his mother is Croat-Bosniak — he is, as far as the government is concerned, a Serb like his father. What's more, he explained, each member of the presidency must be a resident in the part of the country that "belongs" to his ethnicity. "I cannot be a president of Bosnia, because I'm a Serb who lives in the Federation," he said. "I would have to move to Republika Srpska. Imagine if there was a law in America that says, if you're Hispanic and live in Texas, you can be the president of the United States. But if you're Hispanic and live in Washington, D.C., then you can't. Everyone would think the whole country's a joke."

Much of what was settled at Dayton wasn't designed to be permanent, but the agreement created so many checks and balances that change has been extremely difficult to come by. "When you propose an ethnic solution, you create new problems," Jasmin Mujanovic, a political scientist at York University, in Toronto, told me. "Twenty years down the line, you have a generation born into that system that believes it's the only possibility."

Naša Stranka was founded with an eye toward breaking the logic of Dayton. The party's founders were convinced that the stranglehold of ethnicity in postwar Bosnia had made the country's corruption intractable. Albin Zuhric, the party's general secretary, suggested that even Sarajevo's water restrictions could be blamed on ethnic politics: "For twenty years, it wasn't the most competent people that we employed in the companies that supply water to most parts of the city. It was the people that the three ethnic parties put there because they were loyal." As Kojovic put it, Naša Stranka "wanted to introduce a political option that's based on the political options that democracies are based on — on ideology, not ethnic or religious background."

Though Naša Stranka's results in the 2008 election were respectable, the party encountered trouble in the national elections two years later, when it formed a controversial coalition with a party based in Republika Srpska. Tanovic won a seat in the regional parliament, but Naša Stranka was severely punished by voters, and it nearly disbanded. (These days, Tanovic and Mustafic have mostly returned to their art; according to Kojovic, "the gravity of their work turned out to be stronger" than the pull of politics.)

In its most recent national election, in October of last year, Naša Stranka had its best showing yet, and this summer the party provided a crucial vote for a significant labor-reform law. Even so, Kojovic acknowledged Naša Stranka's limited presence within government bodies. He insisted that some of the party's most important accomplishments have happened outside institutions. It supported an unpopular decision to permit a commemoration for a massacre of Serbs in Sarajevo, and has defended LGBT interests — two controversial positions, for which its members have suffered in the voting booth. "Naša Stranka is like a MacBook Air with no USB port; they're technologically two steps ahead of reality," Florian Bieber, a professor at the University of Graz, told me. Kojovic looked at it differently. "There are writers for the public, and there are writers for other writers," he said. "And we are in part a party for other parties."

Many photographers and filmmakers who covered the war in Bosnia found that the most effective way to communicate the suffering of Sarajevo was to capture it in the winter. In images of the besieged city, snow lining the concrete modernist apartment blocks of downtown sapped all color from the frame. Sarajevans who'd had the windows blasted out of their homes by mortar shells endured four Januaries with sheets of plastic over the gaps in the walls. There was no heat, or electricity, and people slept in ski gear. Hardly a tree was left intact.

These days, Sarajevo is best encountered in the summer. At sundown, a dusky haze settles into the skyline, and then darkness descends on the town center, which runs along the Miljacka River at the base of a green valley, before the surrounding mountain homes light up the metropolis from above. During Ramadan, the city performs a ritual each

evening: a cannon sounds to signal the end of the day's fast, and the sidewalk tables in Bašc aršija, the Ottoman-era old town, fill with Sarajevans for the *iftar* meal — flat *somun* bread, Bey's soup, *burek* pastries with meat, dolmas, and baklava served with Bosnian coffee or tea. Afterward, people stroll through the neighborhood's narrow alleys and into the Ozymandian lanes of the adjacent Austro-Hungarian quarter. The smell of sweet tobacco hangs over the cobblestones, and covered women pause to snap iPhone photos of girls in harrowingly tight dresses.

Rebecca West, who compulsively chronicled the Balkans in the 1930s, was enraptured by the "air of immense luxury" she found in Sarajevo, and its "unwavering dedication to pleasure." But West also noted that this atmosphere was, "strictly speaking, a deception, since Sarajevo is stuffed with poverty of a most denuded kind." A war, a socialist regime, and another war later, Sarajevo's festive airs are buoyant as ever; yet the paradox that West identified endures. When the Dayton Accords were signed, many analysts projected that Bosnia's economy would recuperate in five years if the new nation did everything correctly. Twenty years on, the country's inflation-adjusted GDP is still below prewar levels. Unemployment stands at around 40 percent, with youth levels just above 60 percent, and the country is by some calculations the poorest in Europe.

The situation poses a dilemma for young Bosnians especially, many of whom want to help revive their country but don't want to waste their lives in a system that seems incapable of making progress. "There are so many creative people here," Dennis Gratz told me one afternoon at Naša Stranka's headquarters. Gratz is a former president of the party, and, like Kojovic, he now holds a seat in the parliament of the Federation. A thirty-seven-year-old lawyer and novelist, he wore New Balance sneakers and a crisp oxford shirt. "There are parts of Sarajevo where you feel like in Williamsburg. But this system drives you mad. It makes you hate — first yourself, and then the rest."

I caught up with Gratz again later, one evening after *iftar.* We sat on the patio of an Italian restaurant in a courtyard off Marshal Tito, across the street from his law practice. Sarajevo is a compact town, and if you were to spend enough time idling in a café — as many people do — "the whole city," Hemon has written, "would eventually circulate past you." At our first meeting, Gratz had talked spiritedly about the travails of Greece's Syriza, which was a few days away from a referendum on the terms of a proposed European bailout. Five years ago, the two parties occupied comparable roles within their respective political landscapes, though Naša Stranka's economic program is considerably more centrist. About an hour into that conversation, Gratz informed me that he was observing Ramadan, and hadn't had anything to eat or drink. Now, adequately nourished, he was even more sardonic. "It's so easy to solve the Greeks' problems," he said with a smile. "I would like to know how to solve our own."

Before joining Naša Stranka, Gratz had never voted. "I was one of these educated people who are disgusted by politics," he said. Dino Mustafic eventually persuaded him to get involved. In the early days of the party, Gratz told me, "it was very sort of intellectual, like, let's meet for coffee, let's get drunk and discuss politics. But we had no idea what we were getting into." After the first election, Gratz went to New York for a year. He returned to Sarajevo in 2010, just in time for the party's disastrous performance in the national elections; the opposition "cut us in pieces," he recalled. "But we could not just stand by and do nothing." Gratz was unsparing in his lament: "There is no democracy here. Politicians have access to money, they are deeply corrupt, and every aspect of public life is criminalized and morally so sold, so compromised, that it is almost impossible to understand how we get along with it. The only reason why we are not Somalia is our geostrategic importance. We are far too much in Europe, and we simply are a problem to be dealt with."

It is no small irony that the ethnic tensions the Bosnian political system was designed to stop have become a crucial mechanism in that system. Ethnic conflict, and the fear it elicits, serve as a potent distraction from Bosnia's all-consuming kleptocracy. Milorad Dodik, who is now the president of Republika Srpska, the Serb entity, was a moderate when he was prime minister in the late Nineties. "If more leaders like Dodik . . . emerged, and survived, Bosnia would survive as a single state," Richard Holbrooke wrote in 1998. Today, however, Dodik is one of the most belligerent Serb nationalists in the country; in June he railed against the proposed U.N. genocide resolution and declared Srebrenica "the greatest deception of the twentieth century." According to Jasmin Mujanovic, of York University, "He figured out what the system rewarded." Dodik has been threatening secession for years, and in July he proposed a referendum on whether Republika Srpska should continue to recognize the legitimacy of Bosnia's judiciary system. Many analysts suspect that one of Dodik's objections to the courts is that they would probably send him to jail if he fell out of power.

A week after the peace march, I took an early-morning bus to Banja Luka, the capital of Republika Srpska. I watched through the window as the pointed roofs of the houses in the countryside around Sarajevo gave way to the waved domes of the Serbo-Byzantine style. In Banja Luka I met Bojan Šolaja, a thirty-one-year-old who runs the city's International Press Center. He had a buzz cut and wore a turquoise polo shirt, and he looked at me skeptically for most of our conversation. Behind us stood the city's gold-crested Orthodox church, majestic but lonesome, in the middle of an empty square. Šolaja harbored a deep sense of victimization at the hands of the international community, and ran down a list of grievances that are shared by many in Republika Srpska: the Serbs had been blamed, wrongly, for starting the war; what happened in Srebrenica had been declared, falsely, a genocide; and now the Western powers were continuing to meddle, in typical imperial fashion, in affairs that no longer concerned them, as evidenced by the

proposed U.N. resolution. “Why Serbs, why Srebrenica, why now?” he complained. He insisted that Serb interests would always be distinct from those of the Bosniaks. “They see Bosnia and Herzegovina as one country in the future. And that’s a problem,” Šolaja told me. “You will never have a Bosnian nation.”

Milica Plavšic and Aleksandar Trifunovic, Serb journalists who occupy the other end of the political spectrum from Šolaja, were in low spirits when I met them at their office in Banja Luka that afternoon. “My mother is an educated woman and a pensioner, and she doesn’t live so well,” Plavšic told me. “She knows about the corruption, and she doesn’t really like Dodik. But she chooses to believe him. There is so much fear.” Trifunovic accused Dodik of shuffling away enough money to take care of several generations of Dodiks. He alluded to recent demographic estimates that put the proportion of Serbs in the entity at about 90 percent: “Now you have a situation where Republika Srpska is possibly becoming ethnically ‘clean,’ and at the same time, many people say our main problem is Bosniaks or Croats. This kind of fear is the result of manipulation.”

It is very easy to fall in love with Sarajevo. People sit all day at the cafés along Ferhadija, the pedestrian promenade that runs into the old town, and sip sweet espresso. The city is laid out like a stratigraphic soil sample, and it displays the stunning architectural articulations, refurbished since the war, of five centuries of ruling cultures — Ottoman, Hapsburg, socialist. The many ornate mosques, churches, and synagogues lend Sarajevo a seductive cosmopolitanism. It’s no surprise, then, that the city has already been anointed the next great tourist destination, even though one need push only lightly for its allure to give way. The National Museum, one of the country’s most important cultural institutions, was shuttered for three years; it finally reopened in September thanks to an activist campaign. When I tried to visit the bright-yellow Holiday Inn, a Sarajevo landmark — it was built for the 1984 Winter Olympics, and became the informal headquarters for reporters and diplomats during the war — I found it padlocked, caught in the midst of bankruptcy proceedings.

Still, Sarajevo is substantially better off than the rest of the country. “Central Sarajevo is beautiful, everything looks good,” Nidžara Ahmetaševic told me at her apartment behind the old town. A ceramic bust of Karl Marx that doubled as a piggy bank looked at us from across the room while we ate *ružice,* a syrupy walnut cake, and drank *rakija* from a tall plastic bottle. Ahmetaševic, a forty-one-year-old journalist with elegantly short hair, criticized Naša Stranka for failing to address the destitution in the rest of the country. “Njihova Stranka,” she called it — “Their Party.” “You can’t be a political party in this country if you stay in central Sarajevo,” she said. “Would Barack Obama win if he stayed in Manhattan?”

Ahmetaševic was deeply involved in a protest movement that erupted in February of last year, when the public’s rage at the economic situation and corruption broke through the

passive postcommunist political culture. Protesters were beaten by security forces, and demonstrators in Sarajevo and the northern industrial city of Tuzla set fire to government buildings. The burning gave way to plenums, public assemblies in which citizens put forward concrete demands and forced the resignations of several government officials — "a political theorist's wet dream," as Jasmin Mujanovic described them. "We need another wave of protests desperately," Ahmetaševic told me. "We need people to feel what democracy is, to feel power. Everything is ruled over by politicians — banking system, schools, private universities, even shops belong to politicians. Our lives, in a way, belong to them."

Just before I arrived in Bosnia, in late June, the Federation's three-month-old ruling coalition had collapsed. The supposed reason was a dispute over control of state-owned companies, though as with everything in Bosnian politics, there were several murky layers of subtext. With no government to speak of, the Federation's parliament lay empty for much of the summer, yet Naša Stranka still continued to draft new legislation. "Dennis is like the guy with the soccer ball on the field," Kojovic said of Gratz. "Like, 'Hey, where is everyone?' "

At the end of July, Kojovic and several members of Naša Stranka drove out of Sarajevo toward the rocky bluffs of southwestern Bosnia. For the first time in twenty-two years, he was returning to Doljani, the village where he'd discovered a massacre of Croats in 1993. At the time, he had been reporting for Reuters on a Bosniak military offensive in the region. "I came across it like in a Fellini movie," he said. "There was a priest running through a field. He was completely lost. He told me that civilians were trying to get away." The priest said that his parents were trapped in Doljani, and he begged Kojovic to drive him there. On the way, they came upon a field where there were several dozen lifeless bodies whose hands were tied behind their backs. The priest knew the victims, and he ran around the meadow, calling out their names. Kojovic took out his camera and began to film. The whole clearing erupted with a cry. Kojovic found the priest weeping next to the bodies of his mother and father.

Working as a war correspondent in other countries had been difficult enough, but it was even harder for Kojovic to rid himself of the trauma he had encountered at home. Now, two decades later, he walked around the clearing, to a place where a Croat couple had lain, and then to another, where he'd discovered two dead girls intertwined. The weather was the same as it had been in 1993, sunny and warm. He told me later that it was jarring to find the field without the bodies: "So strange to see this beautiful meadow on top of the mountains, whereas I remember it as an entrance to hell." A Catholic service, part of a commemoration of the massacre, was held beneath a tent flying a Croatian flag. Kojovic said that during the ceremony the Croats in attendance had looked at one of the younger members of Naša Stranka and whispered that she didn't know how to cross

herself correctly. Unlike Srebrenica, Doljani rarely received outsiders, and the people there hadn't imagined that non-Croats would come.

During the war, Kojovic often traveled back and forth across the front lines while following stories. "He knew people. He wasn't too afraid," Aleksandar Hemon said. "He would go farther than anyone else, to places that other people had no access to." When I asked Kojovic how his experiences twenty years ago affected his work today, he told me that he had made a habit during those years of attending funerals on all sides of the fighting. Sometimes he went to so many in a single day that he would get confused about whether the ceremony he was observing was for a Bosniak, a Croat, or a Serb. "Not many people had the opportunity to see that, okay, we're suffering here, but over there they are suffering, too," he said. "There were small differences in the rituals, but when you see the faces of the people being buried, they look exactly the same."

"Destroy Them to Save Us": Theories of Genocide and the Logics of Political Violence

By Scott Straus
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INTRODUCTION

Since the end of the Cold War, the study of genocide and other forms of mass violence against civilians has become more common and more sophisticated. The growth of research on genocide is not isolated, and indeed it closely resembles growing interest in the related areas of political violence and human rights. Before the 1990s, there existed few social scientific and historical analyses of genocide as such (beyond the specific case of the Holocaust). Today studies of genocide are found at most major university presses, in many flagship journals, and at high- profile academic conferences. The Oxford University Press even recently released a trademark *Handbook of Genocide Studies*.[1] Two scholarly associations on the study of genocide now exist, each with an associated peer-reviewed journal; several universities have created academic centers devoted to the study of genocide (or to Holocaust and genocide studies). There has been rapid growth in undergraduate academic courses taught on the subject, as well as growing interest in policymaking communities on the prevention and punishment of genocide and related atrocities.[2] In short, the end of the Cold War has produced significantly greater legitimacy and intellectual ferment around the study of genocide.

The Holocaust – a horrifying example of genocide.

The research gains are real. Overall, the area of research called ''genocide studies'' is more theoretical, more comparative, and more systematic than ever before. While the Holocaust still dominates by a huge margin the empirical material available on any single case of genocide, detailed, micro-level, theoretically-oriented studies now exist for a number of other important cases, ranging from East Timor,[3] to

Cambodia under the Khmer Rouge,[4] to the Armenian genocide,[5] to Rwanda.[6] Other promising theory-oriented studies, for example on Guatemala, are in the works.[7] Qualitative and quantitative comparative analyses have similarly soared in number, and, with that growth, theories of genocide have multiplied. The net impact is an increasingly vibrant area of scholarly inquiry.

However, all is not well in genocide studies. For theory-oriented scholarly studies of the phenomenon to continue to advance, taking stock of the gains while being attentive to lingering obstacles and unanswered questions remains crucial. Such is the main purpose of the article. In addition to surveying and synthesizing the existing literature with a focus on research during the past decade, the article explicates a series of related shortcomings with the existing state of research; the article also generates a series of theoretical propositions.

At least five major questions remain underdeveloped in theoretical studies of genocide. First, is the field moving kaleidoscopically toward disparate theorization or is it converging on key points of consensus? Second, what explains variation among countries at risk of genocide? Why do some situations that have the theoretical ingredients of genocide result in genocide while others do not? Third, what are the main causal mechanisms that link certain identified structural conditions to the outcome of genocide? Fourth, what is the causal ''logic'' of genocide? Why is genocide and not another outcome the strategic or policy choice of leaders? And finally, how is genocide related to other forms of political violence? There is a pervasive tension about whether to isolate a conceptual distinctiveness to genocide (or a related term such as ''murderous ethnic cleansing,''[8] ''mass killing,''[9] ''mass violence,''[10] or ''politicide.''[11] However, no matter how that question is resolved, genocide studies has been strangely and unproductively cloistered from the study of other forms of political violence. Addressing these five questions is essential for progressing theoretical studies of genocide.

The article is divided into three sections. First, the article summarizes the main research trajectories and findings that have appeared during the last decade and contrasts those with earlier sets of arguments. The main conclusion is that the intensive study of genocide has yielded two main clusters of findings and arguments, around war and ideology respectively, as well as several other important insights. I argue that the two main theoretical paradigms are compatible, rather than contradictory, and that each provides theoretical insight into different dimensions of genocide. Second, the article asks whether and how genocide is empirically and theoretically distinct from other forms of political violence. The analysis begins with a conceptual discussion, followed by a discussion of the causal logic of genocide. In both cases, the analysis draws out theoretical and observable implications concerning the nature of genocide, especially in comparison to other forms of political violence. Third, the article identifies three other areas for theoretical improvement that are largely missing from the existing literature: the

importance of examining variation and negative cases; the importance of examining the interaction between national and subnational actors; and the importance of studying over-time variation and periodization.

RECENT FINDINGS AND ARGUMENTS IN THE STUDY OF GENOCIDE

Ask a non-specialist about why genocide happens and the most likely answer would be some combination of hatred, totalitarianism, and scapegoating. These analytic themes tie quite closely to what might be called a ''first generation" of comparative research on genocide, a set of arguments for which the Holocaust served as an analytic center of gravity.[12] To explain the foundations of genocide, early theorists variously emphasized intergroup prejudice and divisions;[13] a concentration of power in authoritarian regimes;[14] and scapegoating via prejudice in periods of hardship.[15] The ''first generation" genocide studies literature is not limited to these arguments, and some scholars made conjunctural arguments. For example, in a seminal book, Robert Melson argued that a combination of revolution and war is the cauldron for genocide.[16] While Helen Fein emphasized dehumanization, her four-part argument also stressed state decline, ideologies of group domination, and war.[17] Both sets of arguments foreshadow later research on genocide, as I discuss below. Nonetheless, the themes of prejudice (as well as hatred and dehumanization), extremely repressive regimes, and displacing social stress are the most common emphases in the early literature on genocide.

During the past decade, a different set of theoretical emphases has emerged. I argue the most recent scholarship clusters into two main paradigms and several other less common but important theoretical insights.

STRATEGIC PARADIGMS AND THE IMPORTANCE OF WAR

The first main cluster is a strategic or rationalist approach to the study of genocide and related forms of violence, a perspective that is most well developed in the political science literature. The main insight is that strategies of mass violence are developed in response to real and perceived threats to the maintenance of political power. The main empirical finding that informs the strategic perspective is that genocide and other forms of mass violence generally occur in the context of armed conflict. Indeed, the empirical connection between genocide and war is arguably the most robust empirical finding in the most recent literature: genocides generally occur in wartime or in response to the threat of armed conflict; most major cases of genocide, such as the Herero genocide, the Armenian genocide, the Holocaust, Rwanda, and Bosnia, all take place in wartime.[18]

That said, there is less consensus on the causal mechanisms linking war to genocide. In a series of quantitative studies, Ben Valentino and co-authors argue that mass killing is effectively a counterinsurgency tactic to ''drain the sea'' of insurgents.[19] Writing in 2008, after an analysis that included dozens of variables in a statistical model, Valentino and

Jay Ulfelder conclude that, ‘‘Our analysis emphatically confirms that governments are most likely to perpetrate mass killing when they are fighting insurgencies or engaged in civil wars.’’[20] They also find that states with low infant mortality, states that have practiced past discrimination, and states that are not members of the GATT or WTO are more likely to commit mass killing. The main interpretation is that weak states lack professionalism and information to sort citizens from insurgents and that if they do not value such citizens even in peacetime they are even less likely to do so in wartime.[21]

An innocent child cries upon the body of their dead parent, who died during the Rwandan Genocide.

Scholars working in qualitative traditions similarly stress a theoretical connection between war and genocide, but they stress different causal mechanisms. Martin Shaw argues that genocide is a form of war and that the logic of genocide is closely associated with the logic of war.[22] In war, he argues that civilian groups are more likely to be constructed as ‘‘enemies’’; military means of destruction are more likely to be deployed; and military and political centers of power are more likely to be closely allied.[23] In slight contrast, Manus Midlarsky finds that wartime loss, in particular territorial loss, drives genocide. Like Valentino and to an extent Shaw, Midlarsky locates genocide theoretically as a response to threat. War creates conditions of state insecurity and vulnerability, he argues, and loss in war triggers disproportionate responses—what he calls ‘‘imprudent realpolitik’’ in which civilian populations are constructed as threatening enemies.[24] He departs from Valentino who conceptualizes mass killing in instrumentally rational terms, yet both argue that genocide and mass killing are responses to perceived threat. Melson argues that in war states link enemies of the revolution to external wartime enemies, thereby increasing the risk that the domestic ‘‘enemies’’ will be targeted for elimination. Similarly, Jacques Semelin argues that war contributes to defining some groups as internal enemies, and war increases uncertainty and vulnerability, which can lead to the use of violence.[25] In research on Rwanda, I also found war to be a central driver of genocide, arguing that war legitimized the use of violence against constructed enemies, created uncertainty and insecurity, thereby empowering hardliners over moderates and also triggering the use of violence, and led specialists in violence (soldiers, paramilitaries, and

militias) to enter the domestic political arena.[26]

To summarize, a cluster of authors writing recently on genocide emphasize a strong empirical and theoretical connection to war; in that literature, there are three consistently articulated causal mechanisms. First, war creates threat and insecurity, which in turn increase the probability that violence will be used to counter the threat. That is the core of the strategic perspective that most authors share. Second, war increases the probability that perceived opponents will be classified as ‘‘enemies,’’ whom in war one seeks to destroy. War thus changes the categorization of opponents and alters the range of tactics used against opponents, in particular increasing the probability that violence and destruction are the choice. Third, war instigates the use of militarized forms of power (militaries, weaponry, and so forth), which facilitate lethal violence against perceived enemies.

However, two key questions remain. First, why are civilian, non-combatant groups targeted, and, second, why is the strategic objective systematic destruction of civilian groups? Ulfelder and Valentino make two arguments. One is a function of capacity and tactics: in guerilla war, states with weak control, capacity, and limited information kill civilians en masse because such states cannot separate civilians from insurgents. The other is a function of preferences: where states do not value citizens, where they discriminate, they are inclined to target civilians. The latter begs the question of what explains preferences or what explains how states construct enemies. That question is essential, and as I discuss below paradigms that emphasize ideational constructs—in particular, how states construct social groups and legitimate political communities and how leaders define their objectives—provide at least partial answers to these questions. By contrast, Midlarsky employs prospect theory and psychology to argue that loss triggers disproportionate responses to threat, while Shaw locates civilian targeting in what he calls modern, “degenerate” warfare, which by definition targets civilians.

A strictly strategic perspective should address two additional and conflicting problems. First, if genocide is an optimal choice in wartime, why is that choice not more common than it is? Or, second, why would leaders expect the strategy to succeed, given that most high-profile past cases yield failure: whether in the late Ottoman empire, Nazi Germany, Cambodia, Rwanda, and even the former Yugoslavia genocide and mass killing was followed in short order by regime change.

IDEOLOGICAL PARADIGMS

With some degree of contrast, a second cluster of arguments has emerged in the past decade that emphasizes the ideological origins of genocide. The central insight in this literature is that one needs to understand the ideas in people’s minds, in particular those of leaders, in order to understand how and why genocide occurs. The most consistent focus in the literature is on ideological visions of and for the state, that is, on the ways in

which leaders imagine the purpose of their polity and the legitimate community of citizens that belong to the polity. Harff, for example, in her multivariate analysis finds "exclusionary ideologies" a key variable.[27] Several recurring ideological themes are the importance of utopia, purity, fantasy, and obsession—themes that in the main suggest quite different origins and dynamics from explanatory paradigms that emphasize the strategic origins of genocide. To be sure, as Ben Kiernan suggests in his sweeping history of genocide, the sheer vastness of a genocidal enterprise requires pragmatic skill, a combination of what he terms ''apocalyptic vision and prudent compromise.''[28] Yet the clear analytical emphasis is on ideology.



Political cartoon depicting the influence of nationalism.

A representative author is Eric Weitz, who emphasizes that leader-level visions of utopia based on their conceptions of race and nation.[29] He argues that leaders who commit genocide are revolutionary; they are animated by visions of utopia; they harness the state to implement their future; and they imagine a future with pure, homogenous populations.[30] Similarly, Semelin emphasizes that examining the ''imaginary'' is necessary to understand genocide. Ideology is the ''binding agent,'' he argues, that connects security fears, to identity, to quests for purity that involve destroying others to save one's own community.[31] Genocide is, as he describes, when actors ''destroy 'them' to save 'us'.''[32] In Kiernan's historical survey, ideology is also the key ingredient. He argues that idealized conceptions divorced from reality are common to genocides across time.[33] He identifies four specific ideological ''obsessions'' and ''preoccupations'' that animate genocidal violence: racism, territorial expansionism, agrarianism or ''cults of cultivation,'' and desire to restore purity and order based on imagined antiquity. And Michael Mann's work also strongly emphasizes ideology. He argues that the root of genocidal violence is imagining the nation as an organic whole, which in turn is based on an ethnic interpretation of democracy. In his famous phrase, the risk for genocide is greater when the ''demos'' is imagined as an ''ethnos.'' That said, Mann, like Semelin, Melson, and Weitz argue that genocidal violence is more likely when (respectively)

organic nationalist, purity-seeking, revolutionary, or utopian states are in acute crises, especially in war[34]—a point to which I return.

Ideological arguments solve two analytic problems that trouble strictly strategic arguments that emphasize the dynamics of war above all else. The first is to answer the question of why civilians are targeted in large numbers in the midst of a crisis; that is, ideological approaches solve the issue of civilian group selection. Ideology delimits legitimate in-groups and illegitimate out-groups. The central mechanism is exclusion, as Harff, Melson, and Fein argue, but the mechanism could be conceptualized as division, as Kuper suggests, or discrimination, as Ulfelder and Valentino claim. Ideology also creates specific goals and even obsessions that carry the seeds of extreme violence. The vision itself suggests violence—a purified national community or a return to an idealized past, for example. In addition the gap between a utopian, unrealistic commitment and the ability to attain the goal lends itself to a process of violence to cleanse or hasten the process of purification. The second analytic problem that ideological arguments help to solve is that they provide an answer as to why in some wars but not others states target civilians en masse. The answer is: the ideological vision of the leadership will shape how a state defines strategic enemies and strategic objectives, thus indicating which states are likely to respond to perceived threat with mass violence and which are not.

How are these two clusters of arguments different from earlier research? Clearly, the themes of war and elite ideology resonate with Fein's and Melson's earlier research. Yet the most recent paradigms are sharply different from strictly culturalist arguments that locate the origins of genocide in inherently hateful social relations.[35] The most recent literature emphasizes leaders' ideals and strategies, not widespread prejudice and inter-communal hatred in the population. Even if Mann and Semelin address questions of mobilization and micro-level perpetration, the model of genocide is top-down—a point to which I will return. The most recent scholarship also downplays autocracy.[36] Ulfelder and Valentino consistently find regime type not significant in various models, and Mann argues that the roots of genocide lie in democratic ideals not authoritarian practice. That said, most arguments are not inherently contradictory; the main insight of regime type arguments is that authoritarian states have fewer feedback mechanisms and checks on power. In crises or where elites have utopian visions, a smaller decision-making circle could fuel escalation and the use of extreme violence. Still, the theoretical reorientation in the most recent work is valid: authoritarianism as such is not a necessary condition for genocide, nor even its central wellspring. Finally, the recent scholarship deemphasizes scapegoating. Crises, in particular wars, trigger mass violence but the causal mechanisms are not about blaming others for one's own hardship.

An outstanding question concerns the theoretical compatibility of the two main paradigms. I would argue that the paradigms are and should be complementary. A strategic perspective that emphasizes the importance of armed conflict as the main macro

environment in which genocide takes place is empirically valid and theoretically crucial. Wars favor violence: they legitimize killing as a tactic; they increase fear and uncertainty; and they trigger militarized institutions that specialize in destruction, among other issues. But an ideological perspective that emphasizes the political imaginary (to paraphrase Semelin) seems critical for understanding patterns of civilian targeting: the political imaginary establishes social categories and political goals, which in turn helps to explain why certain civilian groups are targeted for destruction. In other words, the ideological vision of a political leadership will shape how leaders respond strategically to perceived threats. The compatibility is present in some scholarship, in particular Mann, Semelin, and Weitz, but I would argue for an explicit connection between the two clusters of arguments—each speaks to different dimensions of genocide.

OTHER THEORETICAL INSIGHTS IN RECENT GENOCIDE SCHOLARSHIP

Several other themes are evident in the recent scholarship on genocide. The first is an approach that normalizes genocide as inherent to regular processes of political development, in particular of state building, imperialism, and even democracy. A central connective insight is rather than conceptualize genocide as political violence that happens ''over there'' to others who are ideological extremists or trigger-happy counterinsurgents, scholars should recognize the more familiar origins of genocide. Mark Levene, for example, argues that genocide emerges from state building, state competition, and consolidation in the modern era.[37] As noted above, Mann argues that a wellspring of what he calls murderous ethnic cleansing is a perversion of democratic ideals. Shaw argues that genocide is connected to the history of warfare, arguing that genocide is a form of modern degenerate war.[38] And Dirk Moses argues that the idea of group destruction is tied to the logic of empire and colonization.[39] In each of these texts, the authors normalize genocide, showing how its origins are not alien to ''civilized'' society.

Remnants of lives lost during the Rwandan Genocide.

A second important theoretical insight in the recent literature is that genocide should be conceptualized as dynamic. Given the emphasis on intent in the legal definition of genocide, a

tendency in popular and scholarly commentary has been to emphasize pre-meditation, leading to static models of genocide. Such models imply leaders were committed to exterminatory violence and subsequently looked for opportunities to implement their plan. By contrast, a consistent finding in the most recent scholarship is how genocide is rarely the first choice of leaders, but rather that the choice emerges over time in response to past failures, events, contingencies, and the actions of one's opponents.[40] The implications are far-reaching, if underexplored. A dynamic model suggests a number of events, incentives, and constraints that could not only push elites towards escalation but also towards de-escalation, a point that I take up below.

A third important area of theoretical focus, but one with contradictory findings, concerns that of state capacity. Here the literature points in multiple directions. Ulfelder and Valentino find that weak states lack the information and professionalism to distinguish combatants from civilians in insurgency. By contrast, Midlarsky argues that states must feel vulnerable, but they must also have the capacity to access and murder targeted populations. Shaw argues that modern warfare technology facilitates killing, implying military capacity is a critical variable. Given the attention questions of capacity and control have received in the literature on civil war[41] the issue deserves further attention in the literature on genocide.

To conclude, the last decade has seen a major expansion of genocide studies. Two principal lines of causal argument have emerged, as have a series of other fruitful lines of analysis. If synthesized, the various arguments point to two foundational elements of a theory of genocide: a) the phenomenon tends to occur in highly acute crises, in particular war, in which political authorities deploy mass violence in response to the perceived threats that they face; and, b) the phenomenon tends to occur when political elites are committed to ideologies that either create utopian expectations or that define illegitimate members of a political community in categorical terms. Moreover, the process of genocide is a dynamic one—the choice of genocide emerges over time. Clearly, more precision is needed. Given that most armed conflicts do not result in genocide, is there a kind of war or a specific dynamic in war that triggers genocidal violence? Is there a more specific articulation of the kind of ideational vision that produces such genocidal violence? Or should we expect equifinality—that the causal patterns will not be identical and we should expect multiple causal pathways to lead to the same outcome? Is there nonetheless a common causal sequence or a critical common logic of genocide? And how does state capacity matter? All these questions are critical for further developing a theory of genocide.

GENOCIDE AND POLITICAL VIOLENCE

This section and the next take a step backwards to examine some gaps in the genocide studies literature. The focus is less on a variable-centric approach to studying the

phenomenon; the move is a step away from asking what are the typical conditions in which genocide occurs. Rather, the section seeks to make global observations about the political phenomenon of genocide. I should add that the focus is on studies of the phenomenon of genocide, not on the policy and normative question of how genocide could or should be prevented.

Genocide studies has developed largely in theoretical isolation from the broader study of political violence. To a degree, the different tracks are appropriate: many genocide scholars have sought to isolate a distinct phenomenon (genocide) and to develop explanations for it. However, as I have argued elsewhere, while still recognizing the specificity of genocide, study of the phenomenon should be embedded in a broader study of kin phenomena, in particular political violence.[42] The reasons are three-fold. First, to understand the specificity of the phenomenon and the logic of genocide, it should be clear what characteristics are unique to it and what characteristics are shared with other phenomena. The specification should lead to more precise and disaggregated theorizing and comparative research designs. Second, empirically and theoretically, the phenomenon of genocide has similarities with other forms of violence. If a common finding is that genocide is a form of violence that occurs in wartime, especially civil war, then a logical connection should exist to studies of violence in war, especially civil war. Explaining patterns of violence against noncombatants in war has been the focus of considerable research in recent years.[43] Similarly, if a common finding is that certain forms of utopian and exclusionary ideologies drive genocide, then a logical theoretical analog should exist to the study of terrorism, which entails violent targeting of civilians and where one finds similar attention to messianic ideologies at the leadership level. Yet, despite some recognition of similarities,[44] the two subjects rarely intersect. Third, as I shall discuss, because there is considerable disagreement about a social scientific definition of genocide, insisting on its distinctiveness *in isolation* of related phenomena is shortsighted.

This line of analysis prompts the perennial question in genocide studies: how to define the term, an issue many authors wish to sidestep but which usually requires discussion precisely because the term ‘‘genocide’’ is so contested. The definitional question plagues comparative research because there are inherent ambiguities and limitations in core elements of the legal United Nations Convention definition and because most scholars offer their own unique definition. Thus, a scholarly area of study has developed around a core but contested concept, which presents an inherent problem for comparative research.

In response to such problems, some scholars discard or downplay the term in favor of alternative conceptualizations. To wit, Valentino employs ‘‘mass killing’’ (a certain number of civilian deaths over a period of time); Mann employs ‘‘murderous ethnic cleansing’’; Rummel uses ‘‘democide’’; and Krain uses ‘‘state-sponsored mass murder.’’ Harff defines the outcome of interest as ‘‘genocide,’’ ‘‘politicide,’’ and

‘‘geno/politicide’’ (all of which have the same value in her statistical study). Others place genocide within a spectrum of kin violence: for example, Shaw focuses on genocide as his main outcome, but he places genocide within a spectrum of ‘‘genocidal action’’ (and defines genocide differently than others do).[45] Similarly, Semelin focuses on genocide but argues that the main unit of analysis should be ‘‘massacres.’’[46] Kristine Eck and Lisa Hultman employ the related concept of ‘‘one-sided mass violence,’’ of which genocide would be one extreme.[47] Christian Gerlach eschews genocide for the term ‘‘mass violence.’’[48] By contrast, of the authors previously cited, Kiernan, Midlarsky, and Weitz all write about genocide as the outcome in question, though Midlarsky’s conceptualization is more restrictive than that of Weitz and Kiernan (with resulting variation in their universe of cases).

How to resolve the issue? The first question is to ask if there is anything specific to the concept of genocide. If there is not, there is no reason to insist on the term; scholars should talk about political violence or killing. I shall argue that not only is ‘‘genocide’’ conceptually specific and empirically valid, but also that there exists more conceptual consensus than usually suggested in the literature.[49] I also insist that the specificity of genocide does not mean the phenomenon should be studied in isolation from other forms of violence; in fact, I argue to the contrary.

Raphael Lemkin coined and defined the term ‘‘genocide’’ as its name implies: ‘‘destruction of an ethnic or national group.’’ More specifically, he conceptualized genocide as ‘‘a coordinated plan of different actions aiming at the destruction of the essential foundations of the life of national groups, with the aim of annihilating the groups themselves.’’[50] (The U.N. Genocide Convention is worded differently, and problematically, as ‘‘intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial, or religious group, as such.’’ Nonetheless, the core conceptualization for both touchstone definitions is deliberate (intentional) group destruction, and that in turn is the core of most existing scholarly definitions, including many from the first-generation of genocide scholarship.[51] How one specifies the core elements, including

Protest can often lead to political violence.

''deliberate'' or ''intentional,'' what kind of groups (political, ethnic, racial, religious, gender, linguistic, constructed or real), what constitutes destruction, including what level, what time period, and across what territory, are all subject to different interpretation. But the core specificity of genocide is deliberate (organized, systematic, planned, intentional as opposed to accidental or coincidental) group (with the implication, as Shaw insists, of a focus on civilians) destruction.

Compared to other forms of political violence, genocide is thus distinctive for being group-selective (rather than individual/combatant-selective or simply indiscriminate) and for being group destructive (rather than group harmful or group repressive, for example). Group destruction also implies violence that is lethal, large-scale, systematic, coordinated, and sustained over time and across space. By consequence, of a violent event or period, scholars may ask: was the violence group selective (i.e., violence in the aggregate that targets a social category or collectivity, rather than individuals, combatants, or is not group-oriented) and was the violence aimed at the destruction of that group (i.e., violence that is consistently lethal, sustained, systematic, and reaches a high level). There should be variation on those two dimensions of different forms of political violence.

Similar to Shaw and Semelin, the conceptualization places genocide within a spectrum of violent action while still recognizing the specificity of genocide. The conceptualization differs from ''mass killing'' or ''indiscriminate'' violence, both of which imply large-scale violence but violence that is not group-selective or oriented toward group destruction. The distinction matters empirically but also theoretically, as I discuss below. The approach is generally consistent with Elisabeth Wood's framework of examining ''repertoires'' of violence committed by armed groups.[52] Genocide would thus be one aggregate form or repertoire of political violence, differing along the lines suggested above from sexual violence, massacre, torture, terrorist violence, electoral violence, selective violence, and so forth. Some of these repertoires of violence could be and usually are part of genocide, but in the aggregate genocide may be distinguished from them.

There are other empirical features of genocide that distinguish it empirically from other forms of political violence. Genocide is ''atrocity by policy,'' as Christopher Browning aptly argues.[53] The perpetrating organization requires capacity to inflict violence, to be group selective, and to coordinate agencies over time and across space. Genocide is, in reality, an aggregate of multiple instances of violence that are repeated in a consistent and systematic fashion. Genocide is also a form of asymmetric violence in which the perpetrator is, I would argue, the territorially dominant power. The organization committing genocide may have diminishing power, including losing in conflict, but for the violence to be committed on a large and systematic scale the perpetrator must exercise effective domination over the targeted population at the time of the violence. As

Shaw among others note, the state need not be the perpetrating agent as other ‘‘power organizations’’ could possess such capacity. In practice, however, the most likely actor to possess such capacity is the state, as the dominant power holder in a society. By implication, at the time of the violence targeted groups are highly vulnerable to the violence—they are subordinate.[54]

The line of analysis suggests several theoretical implications. First, if genocide is committed by the territorially dominant organization, usually the state, then the form of violence differs from other forms of violence against civilians. For example, terrorist violence in the general understanding of the term is a form of violence that directly targets civilians, but it is generally committed by non-state clandestine organizations that are the weaker party in an asymmetric conflict.[55] Counterinsurgency indiscriminate violence also would be distinct from genocide. In that case, actors commit indiscriminate violence because they lack territorial control and information to be selective.[56] By contrast, genocide is group-selective violence, generally requiring domination of territory where such violence exists. Second, we might expect patterns of recruitment to follow from the nature of domination. Thus, the demographic of average genocide perpetrators is consistently that of ‘‘ordinary men’’ that reflect patterns of recruitment for other official organizations, such as the military and police.[57] By contrast, we would expect the demographic for terrorist violence to vary systematically. Indeed, there is some evidence to suggest that terrorist recruitment attracts ideologically committed, marginalized, or revenge-oriented perpetrators.[58]

Srebrenica graveyard.

If genocide is to be embedded within but distinguished from a larger universe of forms of political violence, a question is: what is the degree of overlap between different forms of violence? As conceptualized here, genocide is an aggregate outcome, like civil war, composed of violence that is similarly patterned over time and territory. Thus, genocide is one level of abstraction greater than violence measured at hourly or daily intervals, such as rape, murder, arson, poisoning, torture, and even riots or massacres. Genocide encompasses (and therefore overlaps with) each of

those forms of violence. Empirically, as noted above, a consistent finding is that the policy of group destruction emerges over time and, as Mann and Valentino argue, is rarely the first choice of perpetrators. By implication, genocide is the product of a process or spiral of escalation in which alternative strategies of violence might have been previously tried or exercised. Examined over time then, genocide would be a period within a longer period of interaction between conflicting groups.[59]

There are several observable implications from this line of analysis. For example, a strategy of genocide should sequentially follow other related aggregate strategies of violence, such as targeted assassination, forced displacement, or even indiscriminate mass killing. By implication, many structural conditions and factors that drive violent displacement or mass killing should similarly be present when genocide occurs; there should be substantial theoretical overlap between related strategies of violence. At the same time, if genocide is distinct, then analysis should try to isolate the constellation of conditions in which genocide and not another form of violence tends to occur or analysis should seek to discern what, seen across a history of conflict, drives the escalation (or de-escalation) of violence.

A related concern is to examine the causal logic of genocide, especially in contrast to other types of political violence. In general, genocide studies has not engaged in the kind of analysis about the logic of violence that, for example, Stathis Kalyvas has done to the logic of violence in civil war.[60] Examining the logic of genocide is defensible in that, while genocide may not be the initial choice of perpetrators and while it may be self-defeating as a strategy, at some point in time it becomes a deliberate policy, a strategy, whose nominal purpose may be studied. If the objective in genocide is group destruction, that suggests an important contrast to the logics of other forms of violence.

For example, a significant number of scholars who study terrorist violence and violence against civilians in civil war argue that such violence has a ''communicative'' function.[61] ''Corpse messaging'' in the context of a drug war is a vivid illustration.[62] The violence is designed to deter and punish defection, to destabilize or weaken opponents, to goad opponents to engage in self-defeating strategies, and to attract attention (and recruits and money). By contrast, in genocide the violence is not generally communicative, but rather an end in itself. Communication is not the function of violence, but rather destruction is. In civil war, the general objective is to defeat, weaken, or compromise with an enemy as well as to control territory; violence is deployed to achieve those ends. In these scenarios, the ultimate vision of interaction is usually group submission, surrender, or negotiation—but there is a future of sharing territory. The logic of genocide differs. In genocide, negotiation, control, surrender, and submission are off the table. The perpetrating organization pursues group destruction as the best available strategy. Thus, a central question is when and why would alternative strategies, such as group submission, removal, or negotiation, be off the table? Why is group destruction the chosen option?

The question is rarely asked in genocide studies, but it seems essential for the theoretical development of the field.

An initial hypothesis is that genocide is a form of future-oriented violence in which an opposing group is perceived as inherently threatening and as likely to gain the power to act on their threat. That is, the representatives of a dominant organization must fear their domination is fleeting. If a group is perceived as inherently dangerous for whatever reason, but usually because of ideological constructs and armed threat, negotiation is off the table—no matter what assets or agreement is reached the group will always pose a dangerous threat. If the group is perceived as inherently dangerous, forcing the group into submission and removing the group will be logical only if the dominant organization can continue to remain dominant or otherwise contain the threat. By contrast, if representatives of a dominant organization perceive an inherently dangerous group and an imminent or even long-term future erosion of power, they could choose to flee or to destroy a group as a preemptive measure of self-protection.

Imagine a hypothetical situation where a leadership consistently perceives an inherent existential threat from another group. If that leadership controls an organization that is territorially dominant and believes it can retain that dominance, group submission, containment, control, and separation/expulsion would be the dominant strategy for handing the threatening group. However, if there is a real fear that the ability to dominate is eroding, then group destruction might become the short-term strategy to protect a group's long-term survival. As Semelin perceptively argues, that is why the logic of genocide is often, ''destroy them to save us.'' The above analysis suggests that in addition to emphasizing war and threat, on the one hand, and ideology and the construction of threats and goals, on the other, the question of domination over time is essential for explaining genocide.

FURTHER GAPS

In this final section, I address additional areas of theoretical and empirical weakness in the emerging literature on genocide with the aim of flagging topics that deserve greater attention.

First, a central methodological weakness in the existing literature on genocide and other forms of mass violence is a strong focus on comparing cases with similar outcomes. The modal comparative strategy in the existing literature is to examine cases that resulted in the same general level of violence. Kiernan's broad historical survey is a good example—a survey across some two thousand years of genocide cases across all continents. But with some exceptions—Midlarsky, Valentino, and Mann all have some discussion of negative cases—the main research agenda has been to find what disparate cases of genocide and mass killing have in common. Most contemporary comparative analyses thus focus on some mix of the major 20th century cases—the Armenian genocide, the

Holocaust, Cambodia under the Khmer Rouge, the former Yugoslavia, and Rwanda. For the development of theory in a generally theoretically weak field, the research design is justified. The main objective has been to see what different cases have in common as a way of generating plausible causal narratives. However, for the refinement and testing of theories, a research design that primarily selects cases with the same outcome on the dependent variable will be profoundly limited.

Going forward, a key question—and one that will help embed genocide studies in a broader study of political violence—is, what explains variation? Why in some cases is genocide the outcome or strategic choice while in others it is not? The main arguments in the existing literature tend to over-predict; the main arguments point to conditions and variables that are considerably more common than genocide and other forms of mass killing are. Most wars, for example, do not result in genocide; many states have embedded ethnic nationalist ideologies. Yet when viewed across time and across all states in the world, the outcome of genocide is relatively infrequent. Why is genocide the result in some cases but not others? That is an essential question to which the existing literature has paid insufficient attention.

In a 2006 book, Daniel Chirot and Clark McCauley pose precisely this set of questions. They isolate four main logics—what they call motives—of what they call mass political murder. These include convenience, revenge, fear, and what they call fear of pollution. ''Convenience'' is the notion that mass political murder can be a utilitarian or cheap solution to a particular problem. ''Revenge'' indicates that mass violence emerges out of anger and the desire to punish, in particular after honor has been violated. ''Fear'' signifies that mass violence happens when perpetrators fear for their own survival. Finally, ''fear of pollution'' highlights usually ideological efforts to purify societies. The authors in turn suggest several reasons why genocide does not happen more frequently. It is costly and can trigger revenge; conflicting groups can work out modes of exchange, such as exogamous marriage; conflicting groups can work out codes of honor and warfare, which in the modern world could include international humanitarian and human rights law; there can be material interests that create economic incentives to reduce conflict; and finally there can be the promotion of what they term enlightenment: ideas that promote individualism, modesty, and skepticism.[63]

The avenue of inquiry that Chirot and McCauley encourage is excellent; what is needed is greater attention to hypothesis testing and research design. A promising empirical strategy is to focus on ''negative'' cases—that is, to examine cases that from a theoretical viewpoint have a high probability of genocide, but that nonetheless have a different outcome.[64] Such is a research design that Wood emphasizes when examining sexual violence in civil war.[65] A related point is to focus theoretically not only on sources of violence but also on sources of restraint. Much of the existing literature highlights accelerators of mass violence. Instead of only asking the question, what drives genocide

and mass violence, researchers should also ask what restrains or decelerates genocide and mass violence? Answers to that question should help explain variation in outcomes among plausible cases of mass violence and genocide.[66]

Second, another area that deserves greater theoretical and empirical attention is the relationship between local and national actors in the formation and execution of genocidal campaigns. The existing theoretical literature on genocide bifurcates the unit of observation. On the one hand, most studies focus on macro-level, structural conditions and national leaders' decision-making rationales. The implied model of how genocide occurs is that of top-down, centralized implementation of a policy determined in the capital. On the other hand, the literature focuses on perpetrator- level, individual-level explanations seeking to answer the question of why individuals participate in genocide.[67] Missing from many studies of genocide is an account of the ways in which sub-national coalitions and interactions of actors matter for shaping the outcome of genocide. By sub-national, I refer to a mix of important actors— province- and town-level civilian administrators or security forces; influential professional, religious, or business actors who shape policy in rural areas; or ethnic groups that are located on the periphery. Are alliances between national and local actors necessary for genocide to occur? Are policies of genocidal mass violence accelerated or initiated at the local level? In short, in what ways do sub-national dynamics shape genocide? While some scholars pay attention to the question, by and large the question has not been squarely addressed in the existing literature.

There are several reasons why an examination of sub-national dynamics is critical for the development of genocide studies. First, the study of violence in civil war pioneered by Kalyvas has yielded major theoretical insight through disaggregating dynamics at the national and local levels.[68] One hypothesis is that the dynamics of genocide should similarly follow distinct logics and pathways at the national and at the local level. By contrast, an alternative hypothesis is that what distinguishes genocide from other forms of political violence is the dominance of national-level factors in the origins and execution of the violence. The point is that the question deserves attention, and that attention should help to further embed and distinguish the study of genocide in a broader study of political violence. Second, detailed studies of individual genocide cases consistently indicate that sub-national dynamics are critical to the ways in which genocide takes place and may be critical to why genocide takes place. Detailed studies of the Holocaust in Germany's World War II empire show how local and national initiative and innovation interacted with ideological objectives at the center.[69] Geoffrey Robinson's account of the dynamics of mass violence in East Timor details the importance of interaction between local and national actors; detailed accounts of Rwanda demonstrate critical patterns of interaction at the local level; and Christopher Sullivan's research on Guatemala puts local dynamics squarely at the center of the analysis explaining patterns of violence.[70] Again, the central

analytic issue is to understand the place and importance of sub-national (or in the case of Germany sub-imperial) actors and dynamics to understanding outcomes.

Third, if disaggregating national and sub-national dynamics is critical for the development of genocides studies, so too is disaggregating cases over time. As argued in the previous section, an important but theoretically underemphasized finding of much recent work is the way in which genocide is the outcome of a dynamic process of decision-making. That conclusion is evident, again, from detailed studies of specific cases, but also from macro-comparative studies such as those of Valentino and Mann, in particular.[71] A theoretical implication is that cases should vary over time, and scholars may yield insight into sources of escalation and de-escalation by examining periodization. The question is likely quite relevant to explaining variation among cases—at critical junctures or because of the presence of certain constraints, some situations move toward greater levels of violence while others move towards lesser levels of violence. Another question is to ask whether patterns and processes of genocidal violence change over time, such that an examination of the dynamics of perpetration in the early stages of genocide may be quite different from later stages.

Periodization is especially relevant to the study of genocide because as a type of political violence genocide is defined, in part, by its duration. As discussed earlier, genocide is an aggregate of similar acts of violence repeated and sustained across time and space. Genocide is most generally conceptualized as a continuous ‘‘campaign,’’ as a chain of violence. That conceptualization indicates an important element of time or periodization, which stands in contrast to, for example, a riot or massacre. The simple point is that examining periodization is potentially critical for developing and refining an overall theory of genocide.

CONCLUSION

Genocide is a real and important form of political violence. In the past decade, scholars have advanced a set of arguments about the origins of the phenomenon. In this article, I summarize the main arguments, which cluster around the importance of war and ideology, and argue that each speaks to different dimensions of genocide. Synthesizing and refining the paradigms is essential for continuing to develop a theory of genocide. I further argue that isolating how the phenomenon is similar and different in empirical and theoretical terms from other forms of political violence is crucial, as is the question of why in some situations genocide is the policy choice while in others another form of violence is. In addition to these questions, the article identifies three main avenues for future research: examining ‘‘negative cases,’’ interactions between national and sub-national actors, and periodization within cases. Each area of inquiry is underdeveloped in genocide studies and remains important for advancing theories of the phenomenon.

The Case Studies: Croatia 1990-97

By Sinisa Malesevic
Excerpt from Ideology, Legitimacy and the New State: Yugoslavia, Serbia and Croatia
Pages 250; 258-9

The main aim of operative ideology is to demonstrate that our current enemies were always our enemies. That is why operative ideology often relies on conspiracy theories trying to show how the Serbs had always planned to enslave the Croats. Thus, history books intentionally devote chapters and special sections to Serbian history in order to trace historically the causes of the most recent war in the former Yugoslavia. The idea of Great Serbia appears in the Ilija Garašanin programme, *Načertanije*, at the beginning of the nineteenth century, where the idea of the unification of all Serbs living in the Balkans was first proposed. However, the textbooks attempt to show that throughout history Serbs always had aggressive motives and were bent on conquest. Thus, we read that 'Serbia and Montenegro went to war with the Ottoman Empire in 1876 to conquer Bosnia and Herzegovina'; or that 'Serbia, Montenegro, Bulgaria and Greece had their expansionist goals…in the Balkan wars'; or that '[even] after achieving their independence, the advocates of Greater Serbia did not stop. In the domestic and international ress they have aspired to foreign territories. Oppressed with the spirit of *Načertanije*, they untruthfully and mythomanically glorify their history.'

We are also informed about the character of Serbs: ' in order to establish Greater Serbia, [the advocates of] Greater Serbia did not hesitate to use terror and were engaged in the establishment of terrorist organisations'; or 'on the territories they [the Serbs] conquered in the war of 1877-78, they tortured Albanians and committed genocide against them'. There are numerous descriptions of how Serbs insulted, tortured and killed their Croatian prisoners, all of which highlight the Croats as their victims: 'these killings of prisoners bitterly remained in the mind of every Croat'. There are detailed descriptions of Serbian misdeeds during monarchist rule in Yugoslavia, a special section on *Chetniks* in World War II that includes extensive descriptions of the killing of Croats and the burning of Catholic churches, and especially detailed descriptions of crimes committed by Serbs in the most recent war in Croatia. The terms Serb and *Chetnik* are used interchangeably; we read aobut 'Serbian masters of war', the 'terrorist clique from Pale' and '*Chetniks*'; the '*Chetnik* seige' or '*Chetniks* from the former Republic of Yugoslavia'; the '*Chetnik* brotherhood'; and the 'Serbia rebel (*Chetnik*) forces'…

In the case of ideology of Greater Serbia, the aim is to demonstrate the continuity of this idea from medieval times to the present in order to show that 'our present enemies' were 'always our enemies', and in this way justify 'our' behavior towards 'them'. Thus, in order historically to trace the roots of the ideology of Greater Serbia, the textbooks and

editorials had to differentiate it from communist ideology. Here we find that the ideology of Greater Serbian is a political project shaped in the nineteenth-century work, *Načertanije*, by Ilija Garašanin:

> With this programme, Serbia had to expand in the Balkans and unite all Serbs into a single state. To achieve this it was necessary to conquer other non-Serbian peoples. That was the first programmatic formulation of the Greater Serbia idea, the predecessor of today's Greater Serbian expansionism on the territories of the former Yugoslavia.

Although the ideology of Greater Serbia starts with Garašanin 's *Načertanije*, we are also instructed that

> Greater Serbianism and all-Serbian consciousness established in *Načertanije* have [deeper] roots. They go deep into Serbian history from the time of the medevial Serbian state when *Svetosavlje* wanted by force to unite heterogeneous ethnic elements in the Balkan peninsula which had been included into the Serbian state by conquest. *Svetosavlje*, *Načertanije*, and Vuk [Karadzic's] theory about Serbs of three religions are the roots of all-Serbian consciousness and Serbo-centrism that even today, as throughout history, endanagers the independence and freedom of the non-Serbian people in the Balkans.

Hence, the sources of today's Greater Serbianism are to be found in *Svetosavlje*, *Načertanije*, and Vuk Karadzic's theory of Serbs with three religions.

Further on we read how the idea of greater Serbia was gaining strength at the beginning of the twentiteth century with the creation of an independent Serbian state and the establishment of terrorist organizations such as 'Unification or Death' and 'Black Hand'. We read that 'supporting the idea of Greater Serbia, [this organization] will make an impact on all official factors in Serbia and outside of Serbia [and] will fight with all means againt the enemies of this idea'. The contemporary version of this idea is found in the Memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences, while textbooks and editorials constantly make this parallel: 'That Greater Serbian nationalism was supported by Serbian academics (with their Memorandum from 1986 which was inspired mainly by Dorbrica Cosic)'; or that 'Milosevic relied on war as an extension of *Načertanije*-politics'; or

> What kind [of policies does the EU offer to] neutralize Memorandums project…with what kind of surveillance programme does Europe plan to stop and eliminate future military battles when all they have done is prove themselves useful as a means for the realization of the *Načertanije* programme.

Bosnian Croat Leaders Convicted for Ethnic Cleansing in Yugoslavia Breakup

By Ian Traynor
From The Guardian
May 29, 2013

Bosnian Croat leaders at The Hague war crimes tribunal on 29 May before conviction. From left, standing, Jadranko Prlic, Bruno Stojic, Slobodan Praljak, Mlivoj Petkovic and Valentine Coric (*Copyright Jiri Buller/AP*).

Hague court hands out 10- to 20-year sentences for 1990s wartime chiefs' terror campaign to seize Muslim territory

Croatia's wartime leaders of 20 years ago have been found guilty of orchestrating a campaign of terror and atrocities to drive Bosnian Muslims away and to seize their territory.

On Wednesday, during a landmark trial at the Yugoslav war crimes tribunal in The Hague, six Bosnian Croat leaders received sentences of 10 to 25 years for leading the campaign to carve an ethnically pure Croatian mini-state out of Bosnia, through violence and terror, with plans for Croatia to annex the territory.

The trial, which has lasted seven years, amounted to the first close judicial examination of the Bosnia policies of Croatia's first president, Franjo Tudjman, an extreme nationalist.

The verdict was damning. The judges stated: "All six were found guilty for their participation in a joint criminal enterprise with the objective to remove the Muslim population from the territories on which the Bosnian Croat leadership, with the leadership of Croatia, wanted to establish Croat domination.

"These crimes were not committed in a random manner by a few undisciplined soldiers. On the contrary, they were the result of a plan put together by the JCE [joint criminal enterprise] members to remove the Muslim population."

The six guilty included the political, military, and police chiefs of the Croats in Bosnia. The judges also named Tudjman, his defence minister, Gojko Šušak, and his army chief of staff, all now dead, as co-plotters in the brutal land grab of 1993-94.

The land grab triggered a Muslim-Croat war-within-a-war in Bosnia, the main conflict being between Serbs and Muslims.

It was the first time the leadership in Zagreb had been found responsible in court for what, to many, including one of Tudjman's successors, the former president Stipe Mesić, was a disastrous policy.

The most spectacular and dramatic episode of the systematic campaign came in November 1993 when Croatian forces in Herzegovina shelled Mostar's 16th century Ottoman bridge spanning the Neretva river.

The destruction of the architectural masterpiece, known as the "stari most" or old bridge, was condemned globally as an act of cultural barbarism. The officer held responsible for directing the attack, Slobodan Praljak, a former assistant minister of defence, received a 20-year sentence on Wednesday.

The Croats forced Muslims out of their homes on the west bank of the city into the ancient Ottoman quarter on the east side, then shelled and besieged them for months.

The city remains ethnically divided until this day. The Croats erected a soaring Roman Catholic cross to dominate the skyline above the mainly Muslim eastern side.

Before the Croatian then Bosnian wars erupted in 1991-92, Tudjman met the late Serbian leader, Slobodan Milošević at a hunting lodge near the Serbia-Croatia border to plot dividing up Bosnia between them.

At that time, in January 1991, during a break one day from a tennis game in Zagreb, Tudjman told the Guardian the aim was to replicate the arrangement of 1939 when Belgrade and Zagreb split Bosnia between them to create Greater Serbia and Greater Croatia.

In a whirlwind of violence against civilians in the first months of the Bosnia war from April 1992, the Serbs seized more than half of Bosnia.

In early 1993 the Croats then moved on their land grab, encouraged by the efforts of Lord Owen whose territorial division awarded tracts of ethnically mixed central Bosnia to the Croats.

The Croats torched Muslim villages, massacred hundreds of elderly peasants, set up a string of camps where inmates were tortured, conducted night-time roundups in the towns to evict non-Croats, and prosecuted the siege of east Mostar.

The aim was to establish the mini-state called Herceg-Bosna in the south-west of the country bordering Croatia proper.

Croatian forces, the court found, "exercised extreme violence, Muslims were woken up in the middle of the night, beaten and forced to leave their apartments, often still in their pyjamas. Many women, including a girl of 16, were raped".

One of the three judges dissented from the verdicts.

The tribunal concluded: "The ultimate purpose was to create a Croat entity, to unify the Croatian people in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Later these areas were to be either joined with the Republic of Croatia, or remain in close association with it."

Chapter VI: Ideology, Conflict & Hope: What We Can Learn Study Questions

Created by Student Interns, The Echo Foundation

1. How do the different ethnic groups view the Dayton Peace Accords today?

2. Compare and contrast themes of the Bosnian Genocide to those of other genocides (i.e. Rwanda, Armenia, Cambodia, the Holocaust).

3. What is the current state of Bosnia with regards to politics, economics, and its people?

4. What is the "Counterparty" Elisabeth Zerofsky refers to in her article? Who is their leader? How did they come about? And what is their mission?

5. Brainstorm a new government structure for Bosnia and explain why you chose it.

6. What are your predictions for Bosnia's future? Do you see a future similar to any other country? If so, explain.

7. According to Scott Straus, what is the "blinding agent" for genocide? Give an example.

8. What did Ilija Garašanin's *Načertanije* propose? Why is this important?

9. What are the lessons of Bosnia that could be applied to current ethnic conflicts in other parts of the world?

Chapter VII:

Additional Resources

"I realize that what happened in Bosnia could happen anywhere in the world…It only takes bad leadership for a country to go up in flames, for people of different ethnicity, color, or religion to kill each other as if they had nothing in common whatsoever…It happened to us. It can happen to you."

Savo Heleta, Author of *Not My Turn to Die: Memoirs of a Broken Childhood in Bosnia*
2008

HUMAN RIGHTS

CURRENT EVENTS



VIDEOS - BOSNIAN WAR

President Clinton's Address on Bosnia

Bosnian War: The Death of Yugoslavia Documentary

Sarajevo My Love (Al Jazeera)



ABC News Coverage of War – April 19, 1992

War in Mostar Bosnia (BBC)

20 Years After the Dayton Peace Accords

VIDEOS – BOSNIAN CULTURE

30 for 30: Once Brothers

Bosnian Sevdah

Bosnian Dance at UNC Charlotte

Traditional Bosnian Dance

MOVIES - BOSNIA

A Perfect Day (2015)

Grbavica (2006)



In the Land of Blood and Honey (2011)



The Abandoned (2010)

No Man's Land (2001)



PHOTO GALLERIES

20 Years Since the Bosnian War Photo Collection

Sarajevo 1984 Olympics: Before and After



Life After Wartime: Bosnia and Herzegovina, 20 Years On

Bosnian and Herzegovinian Artists

INTERACTIVE TOOLS

Map: Understanding the Dayton Accords



Survivor Stories-Remembering Srebrenica

Timeline: Bosnian War



BOOKS

Wounded I Am More Awake
By Julia Lieblick and Esad Boseailo

Blood and Honey: A Balkan War Journal
By Ron Haviv



The Book of My Lives
By Aleksandar Hemon



Love Thy Neighbor
By Peter Maass



They Would Never Hurt a Fly: War Criminals on Trial in The Hague
By Slavenka Drakulic



Rape Warfare: The Hidden Genocide in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia
By Beverly Allen



BOSNIAN LANGUAGE TUTORIALS





Common Bosnian Phrases

From Omniglot

Hello/Good Day.

Dobar dan (DOH-bahr dahn)

Hello. (informal)

Zdravo. (ZDRAH-voh) or Merhaba (MEHR-hah bah)

How are you?

Kako ste? (formal), (KAH-koh steh) Kako si? (informal) (KAH-koh see)

Fine, thank you.

Dobro sam, hvala. (DOH-broh sahm, HVAH-lah)

What is your name?

Kako se zovete? (formal) (KAH-koh seh ZOH-veh-teh)

What is your name?

Kako se zoveš? (informal) (KAH-koh seh ZOH-vehsh)

My name is _____ .

Zovem se _____ . (ZOH-vehm seh____.)

I am _____.

Ja sam _____. (yah sahm)

Nice to meet you.

Drago mi je. (DRAH-goh mee yeh)

Please.

Molim. (MOH-leem)

Thank you.

Hvala. (HVAH-lah)

Thank you very much

Hvala lijepo (HVAH-lah LEE-yeh-poh)

You're welcome.

Nema na čemu. (NEH-mah nah CHEH-moo)

Yes ("formal")

Da (dah)

Yes ("informal")

Ja (yah)

No

Ne (neh)

Excuse me. (getting attention)

Oprostite. (oh-prohs-TEE-teh)

Excuse me. (begging pardon)

Izvinite. (EEZ-vee-nee-teh)

I'm sorry.

Oprostite. (oh-prohs-TEE-teh)

I'm sorry. ("expressing condolence")

Žao mi je. (zhao mee yeh)

Goodbye

Alahimanet (religious implication) or Zbogom.

Goodbye (informal)

do viđenja (doh vee-jeh-nyah) or ćao (chaoo) or Zdravo. (ZDRAH-voh

---

I can't speak Bosnian [well].

Ne govorim dobro bosanski. (neh goh-VOH-reem DOH-broh boh SAHN-skee)

Do you speak English?

Da li govorite engleski? (dah lee goh-VOH-ree-teh ehn-GLEHS-kee)

Is there someone here who speaks English?

Da li iko ovdje govori engleski? (dah lee EE-koh ohvd-yeh GOH-voh-ree ehn-GLEES-kee)

Help!

Upomoć! (OOPOH-mohtch)

Look out!

Pazite! (PAH-zee-teh)

Good morning.

Dobro jutro. (DOH-broh YOO-troh)

Good evening.

Dobro većer. (DOH-broh VEH-chehr)

Good night.

Laku noć. (LAH-koo nohtch)

Good night (to sleep)

Laku noć. (LAH-koo nohtch)

I don't understand.

Ne razumijem. (neh RAH-zoo-mee-yehn)

Interview with Dr. Mirsad Hadzikadic

By Drew Weinstock, Echo Student Intern
September 23, 2015

ABOUT DR. MIRSAD HADZIKADIC

Dr. Mirsad Hadzikadic
Professor, Department of Software and Information Systems
Executive Director, Data Science Initiative
Director, Complex Systems Institute
Director, Data Science and Business Analytics Professional Science Master's
College of Computing and Informatics / The Graduate School
UNC Charlotte

Mirsad has over thirty years of information technology experience combining business and academic environments. Dr. Hadzikadic joined the UNC Charlotte faculty in 1987 after receiving his Ph.D. in Computer Science from Soutehrn Metholdist University where he was a Fulbright Scholar. In addition to publishing his scholarship, he has made presentations at national and international conferences, leading information technology firms, and universities. His research/scholarship activities have been primarily focused on: data mining, cognitive science, medical informatics, and complex adaptive systems. From 1991 to 1997, Mirsad served as the Director of the Department of Medical Informatics and Department of Orthopedic Informatics of the Carolinas HealthCare System. In 1998, he joined Deloitte and Touche Consulting Group as Manager in the Health Systems Integration Service Line. He returned full time to the University in January 1999 to assume the chair position in Computer Science and serve as Associate Director of the School of Information Technology. Mirsad helped to shepherd the transition from a school in the College of Engineering into an independent College of Compting and Informatics, and served as its Founding Dean. Mirsad is currently serving as the director of the Comlex Systems Institute at UNC Charlotte and Executive Director of the Data Science Initiative.

Drew: Thank you for agreeing to speak with me, Professor Hadzikadic. I'd like to hear your story of coming to the United States from Bosnia, including the challenges you faced during that transition and your work today to promote understanding.

Professor Hadzikadic: I came here in 1984 at the age of 29. I was working at that time and already had my BS and Master's degrees in computer science. I came here on a Fulbright Scholarship to attend the PhD program at SMU in Dallas, Texas. My wife and two kids joined me 3 months after I arrived.

After three years I received my PhD and decided to come to UNC Charlotte. I had five job offers but Charlotte appealed to me because it reminded me of the Bosnian landscape,

which is also between the mountains and the ocean. It was the lowest paying position, but I'm glad I took it.

In 1989, we decided to return to Bosnia. We stayed there for 10 months; then the trouble started. At that time it was still part of Yugoslavia. It had a congress of the socialist communist party. But one of the Republics wanted out. There was turmoil. No one was concerned about the economy. Everyone was caught up in this nationalistic movement. We decided it was time to come back and leave.

My family returned to the United States in1991, just as a small war started in Slovenia. And then, full blown war erupted in Bosnia in 1992.The refugees started streaming out in 1993. We got our parents - my parents, then my wife's parents - out. Then my brother's family, wife and two kids - first the kids came then the wife then the brother. At one point we had 18 people living in our home. Helping our family members acclimate and find jobs was the beginning of our work with refugees.

We began working with Catholic Refugee Services and engaging the community in different ways to support the large number of people fleeing the atrocities of the war. There are now approximately 2,500 Bosnian refugees living in the greater Charlotte area.

For 10 years, I did not return to my homeland. Initially I was too disappointed to face what had happened there. I was disgusted with the fact that neighbors had killed neighbors. I knew the country I had always known and believed in was no longer there. It had disintegrated into pieces. And there was guilt; guilt that I was able to leave and others were not, that I survived, that I did nothing to stop what was happening there.

Gradually that guilt fueled resolve and I awakened to my responsibility to my country. I began to travel home annually to help the survivors. Now I use my position at the university to help develop competent, compassionate leaders in Bosnia. I established a relationship between UNC Charlotte and Sarajevo School of Science and Technology. Joint research, joint degrees and the opportunity to travel to Charlotte for a PhD are giving Bosnian students hope and skills for the future.

I also established an advisory council for Bosnia in Washington, D.C. The council works to educate the U.S. Congress on the region and to inform policy-making. And, I became a founding member of the Bosnian Herzegovinian-American Academy of Arts and Sciences. This organization has grown to 230 members working to build bridges between the U.S. and Bosnia to establish a more just and prosperous society there.

I now travel between the U.S. and Bosnia 3-4 times a year to continue facilitating relationships between the many good organizations refugees have organized here and those still there.

In trying to bridge the cultures, I have learned about identity. In life, we may lose some part of our identity, but we always gain new ones. At this point, I have lived more of my life in the U.S. than in Bosnia. In both places, I am asked where I am from. I am not of

one place or the other; I am a hyphen, a bridge between the two. And that is what I use to make contributions to this world for the benefit of all.

Drew: When you visit Bosnia do you always return to the same place?

Professor Hadzikadic: I visit the same place now, but it is not the place in which I was born. I am from Belruca, a city in northwest Bosnia that is now the capitol of the Republic of Srpska; this is Serbian territory belonging to Serbian separatists, as they prefer to be known. It is a different, unrecognizable city. I have no desire to go back there. I go to Sarajevo, the capitol of Bosnia.

Drew: Mrs. Ansaldo and I discussed the curriculum including sections on genocide, UN involvement in the conflict, the individual republics, geography, faith, the arts and culture. A possible chapter will also cover the relationships between members of the Charlotte community and Bosnia. What do you think of this outline?

Professor Hadzikadic: That's excellent. There is a danger when presenting history; everyone has their own version and timeline and none of them agree. Your outline is good because it puts the events in context of what is happening now and where we should go from here.

Drew: Yes, and as I have grappled with trying to understand the whole context of the situation it seemed I could never go far enough back to get a good understanding.

Professor Hadzikadic: This would be true for any country or event.

Drew: Thank you very much for you time, Professor.

Introducing Sarajevo School of Science and Technology (SSST)

From Sarjaevo School of Science and Technology
May 13, 2015

"What are now the buildings, classrooms, computer laboratories and offices of the University Sarajevo School of Science and Technology began as a vision of the future where young people are given both the tools and the opportunities to affect change in our society and form a new critical mass of capable and educated future decision-makers. With my many years as senior faculty and researcher at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, University of Illinois and University of Sarajevo, as well as through my work as part of the Bosnia and Herzegovina Presidency, I have become convinced that the only true long-term contribution that can be made to this country's and this region's future is the one made towards its youth. Young people are our greatest and as yet untapped resource. We came together to re-energize this resource through offering education of the highest standard, distinguished by innovation and modernity. That is how the story of SSST began."

Dr. Ejup Ganić, SSST Chancellor and Rector

The Sarajevo School of Science and Technology was opened in October 2004 in Sarajevo as the first private University in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Dedicated to providing high quality, internationally competitive education and up-to-date programs, SSST established collaboration with the University of Buckingham (United Kingdom), and is today the only private University in BiH offering its graduates a dual degree. Further, this collaboration makes SSST subject to meeting not only national but also University of Buckingham's and UK's academic guidelines and standards of teaching. Through this collaboration, SSST is the only University in the region of South-Eastern Europe monitored by the UK's Quality Assurance Agency, ensuring both transparency and the highest standards in teaching and examinations procedure.

To fulfill its mandate for excellence, SSST has put together an internationally educated and ambitious faculty, many of whose members come to us from the world's leading universities. The faculty is actively engaged in research projects within their fields, remaining at the

forefront of their profession's advances both in terms of research and innovative teaching methodology.

At SSST, we believe that a good degree, in any field, must also include a fluent knowledge of at least one foreign language. The University, just like most of the world today, has embraced English as a medium of communication with a full English language curriculum, but also provides additional courses in both English and German, mandatory for all students regardless of their academic field of study. In result, the quality of writing, speaking and presentation skills in English that students gain here is particularly high. German is a significant addition, given the importance this language holds in fields of politics, business,science and technology. Students are taught in smaller groups, and are given materials specific to their future professions. All courses involve the use of contemporary e-learning technologies and web resources.

Our University employs one professor for every four students – the highest ratio in the region and wider – while our system of academic advising ensures that professors and teaching assistants are available for daily consultations and are charged with individual monitoring of each student's academic progress.

"We are quite unashamed of our ambition. We wish to compete with the best and become the best, not only within the borders of a single country, but to offer the highest standards of education at a highly competitive cost to talented students from all corners of the world. Our graduates hold two diplomas, speak at least two languages, complete at least one specialized internship prior to graduation, and their degrees are comprised of two fields of study. This makes them such strong competitors that SSST claims the highest rate of employed graduates out of all BiH Universities: over 85% within the first year of the completion of their studies, and in their own fields."

Emina Ganić, Head of Academic Affairs

The SSST curriculum, taught entirely in English language, seeks not only to transfer technical skills and academic knowledge but also to build confident and globally-minded graduates, prepared for the challenging international environment. In addition to their main field of study (major), all SSST students also choose a minor, allowing specialization within their fields and greatly increasing their competitive edge following graduation.

SSST offers four-year academic programmes for all undergraduate studies (240 ETCS credits; European Credit Transfer System), with the exception of Sarajevo Medical School with a six-year academic programme (twelve semesters) and Sarajevo Film Academy which offers a Bologna certified three-year academic course (BA Degree Programme).

Chapter VIII:

Appendix

Ideology, Conflict & Hope: The Bosnia Project
Book Signing, Panel Discussion & Reception
April 26, 2016, 5:00-9:30 PM
Wells Fargo Auditorium & Bechtler Museum of Modern Art



ALEKSANDAR HEMON, Author and MacArthur Genius

Aleksandar Hemon is the author of *The Lazarus Project,* which was a finalist for the 2008 National Book Award and National Book Critics Circle Award, and three collections of short stories: *The Question of Bruno*; *Nowhere Man*, which was also a finalist for the National Book Critics Circle Award; and *Love and Obstacles*. Born in Sarajevo, Hemon visited Chicago in 1992, intending to stay for a matter of months. While he was there, Sarajevo came under siege, and he was unable to return home. Hemon wrote his first story in English in 1995. He was awarded a Guggenheim Fellowship in 2003 and a "genius grant" from the MacArthur Foundation in 2004. He lives in Chicago with his wife and daughter.

RON HAVIV, Award-Winning Photojournalist & Co-Founder of VII

Ron Haviv is an Emmy nominated, award-winning photojournalist and co-founder of the photo agency VII, dedicated to documenting conflict and raising awareness about human rights issues around the globe. Haviv has covered more than twenty-five conflicts and worked in over one hundred countries in a career that has spanned three decades. His work has been featured in numerous museums and galleries, including the Louvre, the United Nationals, and the Council on Foreign Relations. Haviv's work in the Balkans was used as evidence to indict and convict war criminals at the international tribunal in The Hague. Blood and Honey: A Balkan War Journal, his first photography book, is dedicated to this subject.

ELISABETH ZEROFSKY, Member, Editorial Staff, *The New Yorker*

Elisabeth Zerofsky is on the Editorial Staff for the *New Yorker* where she has written extensively on French affairs and more recently, Bosnia. Her writing has also appeared in *n+1*, the *New Republic*, and *Harper's*. She is a graduate of Brown University where she received her B.A. in Comparative Literature and M.A. in French Studies. Zerofsky was a Fulbright fellow in Paris from 2008 to 2009 and an adjunct lecturer at City College of New York from 2010-2012.

THE ECHO FOUNDATION

Inspired by Nobel Laureate Elie Wiesel's 1997 visit to Charlotte, The Echo Foundation, a 501c3, creates programs that infuse in young people a sense of personal responsibility and social justice through education. Our mission is "***...to inspire hope and promote justice through education, service, and the development of leadership for a more humane world***."

TICKET INFORMATION

Book Signing, Panel Discussion & Reception – General Admission Individual Tickets $85

Business Attire

For sponsorship opportunities please contact The Echo Foundation at 704-347-3844.

ABOUT THE ECHO FOUNDATION

The Echo Foundation promotes understanding and inspires hope through education, service, and the development of leadership for a more humane world. Our programs teach responsibility to young people in the context of social justice.

Echo was founded in 1997 following Wiesel's visit to Charlotte that year. As the community-wide project *Against Indifference* concluded, Wiesel challenged the community to act on its convictions of human dignity, justice, and moral courage. He also offered his assistance in developing programs to address critical issues facing humankind.

Through comprehensive educational programs, The Echo Foundation equips individuals with moral and intellectual tools necessary to create positive change in their local and global communities. Echo initiatives use the power of example to educate about human rights, social justice, and urgent matters of sustainability. Experiential learning opportunities, programs using the arts in service to humankind, and facilitated dialogue in the pursuit of innovative solutions are hallmarks of the organization.

The foundation has hosted 28 humanitarians, Nobel Laureates and world leaders and created curriculum about each; serving over 740,000 students, and forging partnerships to benefit students worldwide. Recent projects have focused on Dr. Paul Farmer & Partners In Health; Africa expert and activist, John Prendergast, Rwandan Bishop John Rucyahana; Science Nobel Laureates, Günter Blobel, Edmond Fischer, Christiane Nüsslein-Volhard, Douglas Osheroff, Robert Richardson; founder of Doctors without Borders, Bernard Kouchner; Earth Institute Director, Jeffrey Sachs; Nobel Laureate in Literature, Wole Soyinka; human rights advocate Kerry Kennedy; Chinese dissident Harry Wu; and others. For more information and printable copies of past curriculum, visit www.echofoundation.org



THE ECHO FOUNDATION

FIVE INITIATIVES

The Echo Foundation mission: *"...to promote justice and inspire hope through education, service and the development of leadership for a more humane world"* is realized through the implementation of five initiatives:

I. *Voices Against Indifference*: A curriculum-based educational program, VAI connects high school students with global humanitarians who exemplify the power of the individual to make a difference. Each year, VAI addresses critical issues facing humanity from the perspectives of our participating humanitarians with the underlying goals of shifting attitudes, fostering global awareness and promoting personal responsibility among youth. Simultaneously, VAI builds bridges across cultural divides by bringing students from all corners of the region together for dialogue. An extension of this initiative is Echo's Annual Award Dinner, at which the guest humanitarian is the keynote speaker and a local hero is honored with the Echo *Award Against Indifference*.

II. *Forum for Hope*: Designed to promote social responsibility among regional business, faith and education institutions from the top down, the *Forum for Hope* is an opportunity for community leaders to connect with global humanitarians. Participants explore effective means by which they can leverage their stature to create a culture of equality, dignity and mutual respect. Previous forums have included Nobel Peace Laureate Elie Wiesel, Partners In Health Founder Dr. Paul Farmer, Doctors Without Borders Founder Dr. Bernard Kouchner, and Columbia Earth Institute Director Jeffrey Sachs.

III. *Footsteps Global Initiative:* Travel and hands-on experiences have the capacity to transform students in a way that transcends classroom learning; only by "doing" can young people fully appreciate the challenges that face them as future leaders. This leadership initiative for regional high school students promotes awareness and global citizenship through travel and service. Competitively selected Ambassadors of the initiative participate in yearlong programming that combines intensive study, volunteerism and travel to locations of great humanitarian interest. Past initiatives have taken students to Europe to travel *In The Footsteps of Elie Wiesel*, to Rwanda to work in partnership with Partner In Health, and to Lexington, NC to further literacy in underserved schools.

Continued...

FIVE INITIATIVES

...continued from previous page.

IV. *Living Together in the 21st Century:* *Living Together in the 21st Century* is a curriculum-based, education outreach project for 2nd grade students originated by Nobel Peace Laureate, Elie Wiesel, with involvement by child activist, Jonathan Kozol, and created by Charlotte-Mecklenburg teachers. *Living Together* teaches problem solving strategies, conflict resolution and respect for others. The underlying mission of the project is to simultaneously begin to build compassion for people of all races, cultures and backgrounds, and to teach life skills in young children that will prepare them to live in our society harmoniously. *Living Together* has been mandated as an integral part of the Charlotte-Mecklenburg elementary school curriculum.

V. *Books Beyond Borders:* *Books Beyond Borders* encourages international understanding and action on behalf of others by helping Charlotte students furnish libraries for children around the world. To date, libraries have been created at Ningyuan Middle School in China, the Beit Tzipora Centers for Ethiopian Children in Israel, Lexington City Schools in North Carolina, and The Echo Children's Library at Nkondo #1 Primary School in Rwanda.

THE ECHO FOUNDATION

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